Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis paper adds to the discussion on the value of online surveys for political science research. Mainly because of the lower costs, collecting survey data over the web has become increasingly popular in recent years, despite the higher sampling and coverage error in web-only surveys, especially online access polls. Recruiting respondents for the actual panel surveys based on a representative sample using a different mode is regarded as a solution to the sampling problem. Two approaches have been used to tackle the problem of coverage error: Providing respondents with computers (e.g. LISS, ELIPPS, GIP) and offering a different mode than online to respondents, thereby adopting a mixed mode design (e.g. paper as in GALLUP, GESIS Panel). The literature suggests that offering participation in the respondent's preferred mode affects response rates positively but not much is known about respondents' reasoning to choose a specific mode. We argue that it is important to understand this decision to evaluate the selection into online surveys and the consequences this has for data quality. We investigate this question by drawing on data from the GESIS Panel face-to-face recruitment interview for building a mixed mode access panel (paper and web) in Germany that gave a mode choice to internet users. Our results suggest that web literacy, age and education alone do not explain the mode choice but that affinity towards the technology related to the online mode has an independent effect. In a second step, we analyse the effect of this selection mechanism on answers to questions on typical variables used in political participation research such as media competence, political interest and civic duty in the subsequent mixed mode survey. We assess the added value of adopting a mixed-mode strategy. The results inform the evaluation of biases in unimode online surveys.

AbstractSomeEuropean law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinisesEuropean Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and theEuropean Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non‐transparent fast‐track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issue's salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.

European compliance research has benefited greatly from both quantitative and qualitative studies. Scholars have raised our awareness of potential country, policy sector and Directive-specific compliance patterns, while drawing on very different samples of transposition and infringement data as well as institutional and preference-driven explanations for the observed trends. In our nested analysis of transposition timeliness across nine member states and 1192 directives, we critically assess the fit of our event history model as well as explicit patterns among countryvs. sector-specific trends. We then discuss the relative position of existing case studies within the larger sample based on their deviance and consider the extent to which member state transposition patterns can be generalized or remain individual, Directive-specific phenomena.

Research on European legislative decision-making has entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allowing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multiple policy domains and over time. At the same time, the quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive source for legislative information, and case-level data are not directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to identify the most crucial pitfalls and provide a reliable data source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly available EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particular advantages, and we discuss which of the two might be better suited for the analysis of specific research questions.

International audience ; Research on European legislative decision-making has entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allowing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multiple policy domains and over time. At the same time, the quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive source for legislative information, and case-level data are not directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to identify the most crucial pitfalls and provide a reliable data source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly available EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particular advantages, and we discuss which of the two might be better suited for the analysis of specific research questions.

Research on European legislative decision-making has entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allowing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multiple policy domains & over time. At the same time, the quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive source for legislative information, & case-level data are not directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to identify the most crucial pitfalls & provide a reliable data source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly available EU legislative database, CELEX, & compare it with a less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particular advantages, & we discuss which of the two might be better suited for the analysis of specific research questions. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

Research on European legislative decision-making has entered a stage of quantitative analysis. The quantitative approach promises to advance the current dialogue by allowing for the evaluation of competing approaches across multiple policy domains and over time. At the same time, the quantitative study of EU decision-making introduces a number of drawbacks: it is difficult to identify one definitive source for legislative information, and case-level data are not directly accessible in a machine-readable format. In order to identify the most crucial pitfalls and provide a reliable data source, we evaluate the most frequently cited, publicly available EU legislative database, CELEX, and compare it with a less publicized legislative database referred to as PreLex. We find that CELEX documents legislative events, whereas PreLex records inter-institutional activities in the legislative process. Unsurprisingly, each of these databases has particular advantages, and we discuss which of the two might be better suited for the analysis of specific research questions.