Suchergebnisse

Does climate change cause conflict? Did it cause the Syrian uprising? Some policymakers and academics have made this claim, but is it true? This study presents a new conceptual framework to evaluate this claim. Contributing to scholarship in the fields of critical security, environmental security, human security, and Arab politics, Marwa Daoudy prioritizes non-Western and marginalized perspectives to make sense of Syria's place in this international debate. Designing an innovative multidisciplinary framework and applying it to the Syrian case, Daoudy uses extensive field research and her own personal background as a Syrian scholar to present primary interviews with Syrian government officials and citizens, as well as the research of domestic Syrian experts, to provide a unique insight into Syria's environmental, economic and social vulnerabilities leading up to the 2011 uprising.

Scholars of environmental politics and policy experts have long debated whether climate change can be linked to violent conflict. I present a new framework called human–environmental–climate security (HECS), which integrates critiques of traditional security frameworks while offering a systematized method of process tracing. Using existing concepts of vulnerability and resilience, I illustrate the empirical utility of centering the human subject and local conceptions of security when analyzing the role of climate in armed conflict. I develop this framework using the cases of Syria, Sudan, and Morocco. I argue that the ecological drivers of conflicts in Sudan and Syria are best understood as a result of policy decisions that reflected the ideology and preferences of ruling elites rather than direct functions of climate change. Conversely, I present the case of Morocco as a counterfactual in which sound government policy attenuated environmental drivers of conflict. In doing so, this approach considers the impacts of international and domestic structures of inequality on people's climate vulnerability and resilience.

How do actors weaponize water in intrastate conflicts? Existing typologies of water weaponization make deterministic differentiations between state and non-state actors and invoke opaque labels like 'terrorism'. Furthermore, these typologies ignore how various actors engaged in violent conflict also cooperate over water, and whether water weaponization occurs beyond war. I propose a new typology for water weaponization in an analysis of the case of Syria, drawing on the leaked 'ISIS papers' as well as primary sources and interviews. The study begins by charting how the Ba'athist regime used water as a weapon of domination and legitimacy against its Kurdish population with infrastructure that would later facilitate the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) ability to take hold of northeast Syria. I then turn to how non-state armed groups like ISIS and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) have adopted strategies of water weaponization similar to the Syrian government by targeting and channelling water systems with major tactical implications. Finally, I show how enemy parties such as ISIS and the al-Assad regime weaponized cooperative water agreements to advance their mutual interests with violent implications for civilians. As such, I sort strategies of water weaponization into four categories: domination and legitimacy, military tools, military targets, and cooperation. In doing so, this new typology makes three main contributions, by: 1) accounting for how water is weaponized in state-society relations outside conflict; 2) refining existing definitions of water as a military tool and target; and 3) appraising the weapon-like effects of water cooperation.

AbstractThis article addresses the conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris waters from the perspective of negotiation theories, by examining the role of power in upstream/downstream negotiations. Conceptual and empirical links are established between water, negotiation (structure, process), power (asymmetries, coalition dynamics, strategies, development of alternatives) and security (direct/indirect interests such as national security, border security, territorial claims, economic development and environmental concerns). The study concludes that asymmetries in power have favored upstream/downstream interactions towards bilateral if not basin-wide arrangements. The framework shows that traditional elements of power, such as upstream positions, military and economic resources, do not constitute the only sources of power. Bargaining power can also determine the dynamics between respective riparians. Time constitutes an important source of power, and interests vary over time when political settings and security concerns shift. Downstream or more vulnerable riparians can invert situations of power asymmetry by acting on the basin-dominant riparian's interests and thus reduce its alternatives. Syria's use of 'issue-linkage' in its interactions with Turkey over water and wider security issues serves as the primary example.

The concept of benefit-sharing, as employed in the Inter-SEDE model, analyzes potential security, economic development, and environmental-related benefits to sharing the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris river basins. The article finds that Iraq scores fairly high on security and economics-related indicators, revealing the country's vulnerable downstream position. Syria's security score highlights this actor's vulnerable position as the mid-stream riparian. Turkey is favorably differentiated on some of the economic indicators. To enhance the potential for spill-over between watercooperation and conflict prevention, durable and peaceful relations among riparian states require that water-related benefits be shared.

Examining the international dimensions of the Syrian conflict, this book studies external factors relating to the uprising. It explores the involvement of outside powers and the events' impact both on regional and international level. Syria was widely perceived to be essential to the regional power balance, hence it was a valued prize to be fought over. The book examines the impact of global and regional powers in propelling the conflict in Syria; looks at the motives and strategies of the key regional and international actors (Hizbollah, Palestinians; Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, US, Russia, EU) and analyses the impact of the Syrian conflict on key relations between regional states (Turkey-Syria, Turkey-Iran, Iraq-Syria). Finally, several chapters treat the impact on Syria of international sanctions and the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine (R2P). This book is a follow on to volume one, The Syrian Uprising: domestic origins and early trajectory, eds, Raymond Hinnebusch and Omar Imady (2018). Subsequent volumes will examine the later evolution of the conflict.