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INTRODUCTION: The global health field has witnessed the rise, short-term persistence and fall of several movements. One Health, which addresses links between human, animal and environmental health, is currently experiencing a surge in political and financial attention, but there are well-documented barriers to collaboration between stakeholders from different sectors. We examined how stakeholder dynamics and approaches to operationalising One Health have evolved further to recent political and financial support for One Health. METHODS: We conducted a mixed methods study, first by qualitatively investigating views of 25 major policymakers and funders of One Health programmes about factors supporting or impeding systemic changes to strengthen the One Health movement. We then triangulated these findings with a quantitative analysis of the current operations of 100 global One Health Networks. RESULTS: We found that recent attention to One Health at high-level political fora has increased power struggles between dominant human and animal health stakeholders, in a context where investment in collaboration building skills is lacking. The injection of funding to support One Health initiatives has been accompanied by a rise in organisations conducting diverse activities under the One Health umbrella, with stakeholders shifting operationalisation in directions most aligned with their own interests, thereby splintering and weakening the movement. While international attention to antimicrobial resistance was identified as a unique opportunity to strengthen the One Health movement, there is a risk that this will further drive a siloed, disease-specific approach and that structural changes required for wider collaboration will be neglected. CONCLUSION: Our analysis indicated several opportunities to capitalise on the current growth in One Health initiatives and funding. In particular, evidence from better monitoring and evaluation of ongoing activities could support the case for future funding and allow development of more ...

Introduction: The global health field has witnessed the rise, short-term persistence and fall of several movements. One Health, which addresses links between human, animal and environmental health, is currently experiencing a surge in political and financial attention, but there are well-documented barriers to collaboration between stakeholders from different sectors. We examined how stakeholder dynamics and approaches to operationalising One Health have evolved further to recent political and financial support for One Health. Methods: We conducted a mixed methods study, first by qualitatively investigating views of 25 major policymakers and funders of One Health programmes about factors supporting or impeding systemic changes to strengthen the One Health movement. We then triangulated these findings with a quantitative analysis of the current operations of 100 global One Health Networks. Results: We found that recent attention to One Health at high-level political fora has increased power struggles between dominant human and animal health stakeholders, in a context where investment in collaboration building skills is lacking. The injection of funding to support One Health initiatives has been accompanied by a rise in organisations conducting diverse activities under the One Health umbrella, with stakeholders shifting operationalisation in directions most aligned with their own interests, thereby splintering and weakening the movement. While international attention to antimicrobial resistance was identified as a unique opportunity to strengthen the One Health movement, there is a risk that this will further drive a siloed, disease-specific approach and that structural changes required for wider collaboration will be neglected. Conclusion: Our analysis indicated several opportunities to capitalise on the current growth in One Health initiatives and funding. In particular, evidence from better monitoring and evaluation of ongoing activities could support the case for future funding and allow development of more precise guidelines on best practices.

Involuntary migration is a crucially important global challenge from an economic, social, and public health perspective. The number of displaced people reached an unprecedented level in 2015, at a total of 60 million worldwide, with more than 1 million crossing into Europe in the past year alone. Migrants and refugees are often perceived to carry a higher load of infectious diseases, despite no systematic association. We propose three important contributions that the global health community can make to help address infectious disease risks and global health inequalities worldwide, with a particular focus on the refugee crisis in Europe. First, policy decisions should be based on a sound evidence base regarding health risks and burdens to health systems, rather than prejudice or unfounded fears. Second, for incoming refugees, we must focus on building inclusive, cost-effective health services to promote collective health security. Finally, alongside protracted conflicts, widening of health and socioeconomic inequalities between high-income and lower-income countries should be acknowledged as major drivers for the global refugee crisis, and fully considered in planning long-term solutions.

BACKGROUND: The recent increase in attention to linkages between human health, animal health, and the state of the environment has resulted in the rapid growth of networks that facilitate collaboration between these sectors. This study ascertained whether duplication of efforts is occurring across networks, which stakeholders are being engaged, and how frequently monitoring and evaluation of investments is being reported. METHODS: This study is a systematic analysis of One Health networks (OHNs) in Africa, Asia, and Europe. We defined an OHN as an engagement between two or more discrete organisations with at least two of the following sectors represented: animal health, human health, and the environment or ecosystem. Between June 5 and Sept 29, 2017, we systematically searched for OHNs in PubMed, Google, Google Scholar, and relevant conference websites. No language restrictions were applied, but we were only able to translate from English and French. Data about OHNs, including their year of initiation, sectors of engagement, regions of operation, activities conducted, and stakeholders involved, were extracted with a standardised template and analysed descriptively. FINDINGS: After screening 2430 search results, we identified and analysed 100 unique OHNs, of which 86 were formed after 2005. 32 OHNs covered only human and animal health, without engaging with the role of the environment on health. 78 OHNs involved academic bodies and 78 involved government bodies, with for-profit organisations involved in only 23 and community groups involved in only ten. There were few collaborations exclusively between networks in the developing world (four OHNs) and only 15 OHNs reported monitoring and evaluation information. The majority of OHNs worked on supporting communication, collaboration, information sharing, and capacity building. INTERPRETATION: Amid concerns about there being insufficient strategic direction and coordination in the growth of OHNs, our study provides empirical evidence about limitations in stakeholder representation, apparently absent or ambiguous monitoring and evaluation structures, and potential areas of duplication. The collective strategic functioning of OHNs might be improved by more transparent reporting of goals and outcomes of OHN activities, as well as more collaborations led by networks within the developing world and increased attention to environmental health. FUNDING: None.

OBJECTIVES: To describe trends in major communicable diseases in Syria during the ongoing conflict, and the challenges to communicable disease surveillance and control in the context of dynamic, large-scale population displacement, unplanned mass gatherings, and disruption to critical infrastructure. METHODS: A rapid review of the peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed literature from 2005 to 2015 was performed, augmented by secondary analysis of monitoring data from two disease early warning systems currently operational in Syria, focusing mainly on three diseases: tuberculosis (TB), measles, and polio. RESULTS: Trend data show discrepancies in case report numbers between government and non-government controlled areas, especially for TB, but interpretation is hampered by uncertainties over sentinel surveillance coverage and base population numbers. Communicable disease control has been undermined by a combination of governance fragmentation, direct and indirect damage to facilities and systems, and health worker flight. CONCLUSIONS: Five years into the crisis, some progress has been made in disease surveillance, but governance and coordination problems, variable immunization coverage, and the dynamic and indiscriminate nature of the conflict continue to pose a serious threat to population health in Syria and surrounding countries. The risk of major cross-border communicable disease outbreaks is high, and challenges for health in a post-conflict Syria are formidable.

Objectives: To describe trends in major communicable diseases in Syria during the ongoing conflict, and the challenges to communicable disease surveillance and control in the context of dynamic, large-scale population displacement, unplanned mass gatherings, and disruption to critical infrastructure. Methods: A rapid review of the peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed literature from 2005 to 2015 was performed, augmented by secondary analysis of monitoring data from two disease early warning systems currently operational in Syria, focusing mainly on three diseases: tuberculosis (TB), measles, and polio. Results: Trend data show discrepancies in case report numbers between government and nongovernment controlled areas, especially for TB, but interpretation is hampered by uncertainties over sentinel surveillance coverage and base population numbers. Communicable disease control has been undermined by a combination of governance fragmentation, direct and indirect damage to facilities and systems, and health worker flight. Conclusions: Five years into the crisis, some progress has been made in disease surveillance, but governance and coordination problems, variable immunization coverage, and the dynamic and indiscriminate nature of the conflict continue to pose a serious threat to population health in Syria and surrounding countries. The risk of major cross-border communicable disease outbreaks is high, and challenges for health in a post-conflict Syria are formidable.

Objectives To describe trends in major communicable diseases in Syria during the ongoing conflict, and the challenges to communicable disease surveillance and control in the context of dynamic, large-scale population displacement, unplanned mass gatherings, and disruption to critical infrastructure. Methods A rapid review of the peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed literature from 2005 to 2015 was performed, augmented by secondary analysis of monitoring data from two disease early warning systems currently operational in Syria, focusing mainly on three diseases: tuberculosis (TB), measles, and polio. Results Trend data show discrepancies in case report numbers between government and non-government controlled areas, especially for TB, but interpretation is hampered by uncertainties over sentinel surveillance coverage and base population numbers. Communicable disease control has been undermined by a combination of governance fragmentation, direct and indirect damage to facilities and systems, and health worker flight. Conclusions Five years into the crisis, some progress has been made in disease surveillance, but governance and coordination problems, variable immunization coverage, and the dynamic and indiscriminate nature of the conflict continue to pose a serious threat to population health in Syria and surrounding countries. The risk of major cross-border communicable disease outbreaks is high, and challenges for health in a post-conflict Syria are formidable.

Current evidence describing antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in the context of the Syrian conflict is of poor quality and sparse in nature. This paper explores and reports the major drivers of AMR that were present in Syria pre-conflict and those that have emerged since its onset in March 2011. Drivers that existed before the conflict included a lack of enforcement of existing legislation to regulate over-the-counter antibiotics and notification of communicable diseases. This contributed to a number of drivers of AMR after the onset of conflict, and these were also compounded by the exodus of trained staff, the increase in overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, the increase in injuries, and economic sanctions limiting the availability of required laboratory medical materials and equipment. Addressing AMR in this context requires pragmatic, multifaceted action at the local, regional, and international levels to detect and manage potentially high rates of multidrug-resistant infections. Priorities are (1) the development of a competent surveillance system for hospital-acquired infections, (2) antimicrobial stewardship, and (3) the creation of cost-effective and implementable infection control policies. However, it is only by addressing the conflict and immediate cessation of the targeting of health facilities that the rehabilitation of the health system, which is key to addressing AMR in this context, can progress.

Current evidence describing antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in the context of the Syrian conflict is of poor quality and sparse in nature. This paper explores and reports the major drivers of AMR that were present in Syria pre-conflict and those that have emerged since its onset in March 2011. Drivers that existed before the conflict included a lack of enforcement of existing legislation to regulate over-the-counter antibiotics and notification of communicable diseases. This contributed to a number of drivers of AMR after the onset of conflict, and these were also compounded by the exodus of trained staff, the increase in overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, the increase in injuries, and economic sanctions limiting the availability of required laboratory medical materials and equipment. Addressing AMR in this context requires pragmatic, multifaceted action at the local, regional, and international levels to detect and manage potentially high rates of multidrug-resistant infections. Priorities are (1) the development of a competent surveillance system for hospital-acquired infections, (2) antimicrobial stewardship, and (3) the creation of cost-effective and implementable infection control policies. However, it is only by addressing the conflict and immediate cessation of the targeting of health facilities that the rehabilitation of the health system, which is key to addressing AMR in this context, can progress.

The identification of monkeypox in 3 separate patients in the United Kingdom in September raised media and political attention on an emerging public health threat. Nigeria, whose last confirmed case of monkeypox was in 1978, is currently experiencing an unusually large and outbreak of human monkeypox cases, a 'One Human-Environmental-Animal Health' approach is being effectively used to define and tackle the outbreak. As of 13th October 2018, there have been one hundred and sixteen confirmed cases the majority of whom are under 40 years. Over the past 20 years ten Central and West African countries have reported monkeypox cases which have risen exponentially. We review the history and evolution of monkeypox outbreaks in Africa and USA, the changing clinical presentations, and discuss possible factors underlying the increasing numbers being detected including the cessation of smallpox vaccination programs. Major knowledge gaps remain on the epidemiology, host reservoir, and emergence, transmission, pathogenesis and prevention of monkeypoz.

World TB Day, March 24th commemorates the day in March 1882 when Professor Robert Koch made the groundbreaking announcement in Berlin of his discovery of Mycobacterium tuberculosis as the cause of Tuberculosis (TB) (Koch, 1882). At the time of his announcement, there was a deadly TB epidemic, rampaging throughout Europe and the Americas, causing the death of one out of every seven people. Since Koch's announcement, Mycobacterium tuberculosis has defied worldwide efforts by public health systems, researchers, governments and the World Health Organization (WHO) to eradicate it. The data presented in the WHO Global TB Report 2017 (World Health Organization, 2017a) makes very gruesome reading. In 2016 there were an estimated 10.4 million people who developed TB disease worldwide, of which 90% were adults, 35% female and 10% were HIV-co-infected people. An estimated 40% of active TB cases go undiagnosed each year. One hundred and thirty-six years since Koch's announcement, TB remains a major global public health issue and TB has surpassed HIV/AIDS and malaria as the world's top cause of death from an infectious disease! On World TB Day, March 24th, 2018, we need to reflect on the current status quo of the continuing devastating global TB epidemic.

The identification of monkeypox in 3 separate patients in the United Kingdom in September raised media and political attention on an emerging public health threat. Nigeria, whose last confirmed case of monkeypox was in 1978, is currently experiencing an unusually large and outbreak of human monkeypox cases, a 'One Human-Environmental-Animal Health' approach is being effectively used to define and tackle the outbreak. As of 13th October 2018, there have been one hundred and sixteen confirmed cases the majority of whom are under 40 years. Over the past 20 years ten Central and West African countries have reported monkeypox cases which have risen exponentially. We review the history and evolution of monkeypox outbreaks in Africa and USA, the changing clinical presentations, and discuss possible factors underlying the increasing numbers being detected including the cessation of smallpox vaccination programs. Major knowledge gaps remain on the epidemiology, host reservoir, and emergence, transmission, pathogenesis and prevention of monkeypoz.