Suchergebnisse

This article shows how asymmetric information shaped slavery by determining the likelihood of manumission. A theoretical model explains the need to offer positive incentives to slaves working in occupations characterized by a high degree of asymmetric information. As a result, masters freed (and, more generally, rewarded) slaves who performed well. The model's implications are then tested against the available evidence: both in Rome and in the Atlantic world, slaves with high asymmetric information tasks had greater chances of manumission. The analysis also sheds light on the master's choices of carrots versus sticks and of labor versus slavery."Whatever work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own maintenance can be squeezed out of him by violence only."Adam Smith,The Wealth of Nations1"[N]or because they are slaves do they less than free men need the lure of hope and happy expectation."Xenophon,The Economist2

Résumé Le caractère incomplet des contrats et des règles de droit conduit souvent à des contentieux. Avant qu'un conflit ne survienne, les parties peuvent décider de recourir à l'arbitrage. Si elles choisissent de procéder de la sorte, les conflits futurs seront résolus devant un arbitre. Dans le cas contraire, les parties choisiront entre la négociation et le procès. Cet article analyse les variables qui sont susceptibles d'influencer les choix des parties : l'incertitude du cas, les coûts de la procédure judiciaire, la probabilité d'un conflit, et les montants en jeu. Les résultats contrastent avec la littérature existante, qui ne distingue pas les contrats, dans lesquels des clauses d'arbitrage peuvent être incluses, des délits civils, pour lesquels elles ne peuvent exister. À titre d'exemple, l'article montre que les mesures qui permettent de réduire les contentieux en responsabilité délictuelle, comme des mesures de taxation, peuvent soit réduire, soit augmenter les litiges an matière contractuelle. Enfin, le modèle montre que les clauses d'arbitrage sont à même de rendre le contrat plus complet ex ante, alors que l'arrangement entre les parties équivaut à une renégociation ex post du contrat. À partir de ce cadre d'analyse, des implications théoriques sur la résolution des conflits et les contrats incomplets peuvent être déduites. JEL Codes: K12, K41.

The law and the economy are deeply influenced by horizontal property rights, which are the rules regulating legal direct and indirect takings between private parties. To foster research on the determinants and impact of these institutions, we illustrate here a novel data set partially employed in (Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Carmine Guerriero, 2015; Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Carmine Guerriero, Zhenxing Huang, 2016) [3], [4], and (Guerriero Carmine, 2016) [6] and describing the acquisition of ownership through adverse possession of personal and real property and the use of government takings to transfer real property from a private party to another private party in 126 jurisdictions. These data are based on the laws and judicial decisions prevailing in each jurisdiction between 1981 and 2011.

In the traditional formulation of rent-seeking games, increasing returns to effort are characterized by an exponent r>1. However, when the value of the rent is normalized to 1, the players' effort levels A and B will typically be less than 1. Thus, when A<1 and r>1, the value of A r decreases as r increases, contradicting the interpretation of r>1 as representing increasing returns to effort. This apparent defect in the mathematization of the problem seems to suggest that a different interpretation of r is required whenever A<1, upsetting the uniformity and elegance of the model. In this short note, we demonstrate that the perceived problem is illusory, and that the usual interpretation of r is satisfactory for all values of A. Adapted from the source document.