Suchergebnisse

The ongoing decline of local news not only deprives communities of important information, but also provides an opening for misinformation through so-called pink slime journalism: local media that poses as a news outlet and exploits the low cost of automating content to deceive readers. Is there an advantage to posing as a newspaper online? In this study, I use a survey experiment to assess how readers respond to the same headline delivered to them as a fake newspaper, a fake website, or a real television station. Respondents rated the fake local newspaper as less credible than a real television station or a fake local website, but they rated fake local websites as credibly as real local television. Readers' preference for following local or national news and the timing of assessment moderate these effects.

I examine the organizational and voter contact strategies of the presidential campaigns in the 2016 election, finding that Hillary Clinton opened many more field offices than Donald Trump. Both Clinton and Trump invested less aggressively in field operations than their predecessors while avoiding areas of opponent strength and "swing" areas. Neither Clinton nor Trump held a clear advantage in voter contact, and estimates of the effects of field offices were smaller than in previous cycles. Clinton's defeat should not be interpreted as evidence that field organizing is a poor investment in 2020.

ObjectivesCan presidential candidates influence their coverage in Iowa's smaller local newspapers? I extend the approach of previous research by examining the impact of campaign press releases on newspaper stories before the 2016 Iowa caucuses.MethodsI coded the topic and tone of candidate press releases, and located "hits" in Iowa newspapers between September 2015 and January 2016 for the top two Democratic and Republican candidates.ResultsPress releases were used primarily for information dissemination in Iowa, while competitive messages decreased as a share of campaign communications. Small, weekly community newspapers hardly covered the campaign.ConclusionsNewspapers in cities outside the state capital are ripe for campaign influence through the Associated Press and deserve more scrutiny, since their combined circulation rivals the largest state newspaper. Media–candidate relations are changing, but press releases remain a critical tool for campaigns to earn local coverage.

Presidential campaigns that understand the behaviors and interests of media organizations are rewarded with increased exposure in the news. Campaigns attract attention from local media by appealing to the news values of proximity and conflict. I compare campaign coverage in areas with and without a local campaign presence using an original, nationwide data set from three recent U.S. presidential elections and find that candidates receive more stories in the local press in areas where they establish a presence. By subsidizing locally framed content, campaigns can increase their local earned media, with larger effects in competitive states and areas without investments in previous elections.

Elite polarization is at an all-time high. Has this division filtered down into the public, and is this trend being exacerbated by expanded media choice in the postbroadcast era? Using National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) data from recent election cycles, we analyze the influence of news choice on individual-level perceptions of the ideologies of parties and partisan elites. We examine whether cable news choice shapes respondents' ability to correctly identify Democrats as the more liberal party, and Republicans as more conservative. Using cross-sectional and panel data, we find that partisan news consumers—particularly those watching Fox News—are better able to identify the positions and ideologies of partisan elites. Partisan news may help citizens participate more effectively by helping them identify the ideological orientation of the major parties and candidates.

Though elite-based campaign mobilization was thought to be dead just a few election cycles ago, it has come roaring back in recent years. The vast majority of this direct voter outreach is coordinated through campaign field offices. Despite the increasing importance of such activities, little is known about where campaigns choose to locate these field offices and what effect campaign offices have on election outcomes. We develop a theoretical argument about where candidates will locate these offices, and test our argument using data from recent elections. We also show that these field offices increase county-level vote share by approximately 1%, netting Obama approximately 275,000 additional votes in the 2008 election. We conclude by discussing the normative implications of increased campaign investment in field operations. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Though elite-based campaign mobilization was thought to be dead just a few election cycles ago, it has come roaring back in recent years. The vast majority of this direct voter outreach is coordinated through campaign field offices. Despite the increasing importance of such activities, little is known about where campaigns choose to locate these field offices and what effect campaign offices have on election outcomes. We develop a theoretical argument about where candidates will locate these offices, and test our argument using data from recent elections. We also show that these field offices increase county-level vote share by approximately 1%, netting Obama approximately 275,000 additional votes in the 2008 election. We conclude by discussing the normative implications of increased campaign investment in field operations.

How do partisans react when their candidate wins or loses a gubernatorial election? Previous work shows that when parties win presidential elections, demand for their affiliated local newspapers decreases relative to the losing party's newspapers. However, it is unclear if this negative link extends beyond presidential races into state-level elections. To test this relationship, we analyze demand for partisan and non-partisan newspapers in Virginia and New Jersey—two states that hold off-cycle gubernatorial elections with no competition from federal elections—from 1933 to 2005. We find demand for local newspapers associated with the winning party declines after gubernatorial elections compared to demand for other newspapers. The results also shed light on whether (and which) winning partisans are disengaging completely or shifting their consumption to independent newspapers. Taken together, our study suggests that state-level elections significantly influence local newspaper consumption and adds valuable local context to our understanding of the political dynamics of news demand.

ObjectivesWe examine how prior experience with government agencies shapes citizens' assessments of government performance. In Louisiana, two extreme weather events, 11 years apart, required intervention from the state and federal government: Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2016 floods. Were Louisianans' attitudes toward government response shaped by their prior experiences during a natural disaster?MethodsWe use an original survey of Louisianans to assess the role of Katrina experience in performance assessments of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Louisiana state government in 2016.ResultsWe find a significant negative relationship: flood aid applicants in 2016 rated state government much lower, but only if they also applied for Katrina aid.ConclusionsThose with personal experience with FEMA hold lower expectations of state government performance, which deteriorated under the Jindal Administration, and look to the federal government for support. Prior experience with government agencies establishes expectations of responsibility that endure years later.