Suchergebnisse

This article – written originally as a blog post for the think tank Bruegel – reviews the decisions made in June 2022 to allow Croatia into the euro zone but, in contrast, to make no change in the status of Bulgaria which, nominally, thus remains an EU Member State with a derogation from introducing the euro but one subject to complying with the requirements to allow it to do so. The author notes that, while the Bulgarian legislation on central bank independence remains an outstanding issue, there are other aspects of the decision to allow Croatia in but to refuse Bulgaria which cause disquiet. In reviewing price stability statistics on the basis of different measures, the author concludes that these indicate a level of decision-making discretion, creating a grey area in the criterion, as well as uncertainty over how comparative inflation performance is judged and a level of dubiety. He concludes that a rethink is necessary on how to interpret 'best performers' and that the time is right to fix the flaws in the existing criterion by switching to comparators which are closest to the average for the euro area as a whole.

AbstractBoth the level and composition of public expenditures and revenues have implications for economic development, as argued by the 'fiscal multiplier' and the 'quality of public finance' literature. Public finance decisions also influence the distribution of income. By reviewing the literature, I argue for a fair distribution of income as reflected in low income inequality, not particularly because of the impact of income inequality on long-term growth (which is a controversial issue), but primarily because income inequality typically implies inequality of opportunity. European Union countries have very diverse public finance structures and different levels of effectiveness, and there is room for improvement in growth and equality impacts in all countries. A general guideline would be that the most effective approach comprises progressive taxes and inheritance taxes, spending on education, health and public infrastructure, and better government effectiveness. At the height of the 2008 global and the subsequent European financial and economic crises, the fiscal consolidation strategies of EU countries largely relied on cutting public investment and social spending (except pensions), which is the opposite of what is suggested in the literature. Better fiscal rules and good fiscal institutions are needed to safeguard growth- and distribution friendly expenditures in a crisis.

Two questions should be answered in relation to the international role of the euro: is a more important international role for the euro worth pursuing, and what measures would achieve this result, if it is worth pursuing? The most significant benefit for the euro area if the euro played an increased international role would be less dependence on the dollar and a reduced ability of the United States to pursue its political objectives, which are possibly inconsistent with European Union objectives. Historically, international functions have been shared between currencies and the international weights of currencies have evolved according to a limited number of variables. The most important of these are the economic size of the issuing country, the level of development and stability of the underlying financial market, openness to capital movements, a policy stance that encourages currency internationalisation, and political and military power. With the exception of financial stability, these factors do not vary substantially in the short run and give rise to persistent, long-term trends. Thus, in the first twenty years of its existence, the euro has consistently been the second most used international currency, while the dollar has maintained the first position it has held since the second world war. The gap between the dollar and the euro is greatest in the invoicing of commodity trade and as vehicle for foreign exchange transactions, and smallest in cross-border payments. While the ranking of the dollar and the euro has not changed, the euro's share has fluctuated, particularly in its use in international finance, in correlation with the stability of the euro financial market. This has confirmed that a necessary condition for the euro to play a greater international role is the stability of the euro-area financial system. In addition, the completion of banking union, progress on capital markets union, the issuance of a common bond, and more generally the completion of the institutional architecture of the euro area and progress on a common foreign and defence policy, would promote a wider role for the euro. The European Central Bank should also move beyond its neutral attitude towards the international use of the euro. Most of these policies would have effects well beyond the international use of the euro and, while in principle desirable, are not easy to achieve. Proposals on the international role of the euro published in December 2018 by the European Commission were the start of a journey rather than a decisive step towards a greater international role for the euro.

The Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth set a target of lifting more than 20 million people out of poverty, but European Union countries have struggled to make progress towards the target. Zsolt Darvas demonstrates both theoretically and empirically that the 'poverty' indicator in the Europe 2020 strategy essentially measures income inequality, not poverty. His illustrative calculations show that even after taking into account the positive impact expected economic growth should have on material deprivation and low work intensity, the Gini coefficient of income inequality would have to fall by four points in each EU country if the Europe 2020 'poverty' target is to be reached. This would be a huge decline. Enormous differences between 'poverty' thresholds adopted by different EU countries make the EU-wide 'poverty' aggregate pointless. Even though 24 percent of EU citizens are deemed to be poor or socially excluded, we find that social issues receive little attention in the European Semester, which is supposed to support the achievement of Europe 2020 targets. The few relevant recommendations that have been made targeted poverty, employability and social exclusion, which are important goals. There have been no specific measures to reduce income inequality. The political agreement between EU member states clearly expressed the goal of reducing poverty, not inequality. It was a grave mistake to base the Europe 2020 poverty target on an indicator of income inequality and to speak about 'poverty reduction' in relation to that indicator. The European Council should meet again to discuss what social goals to pursue, and to adopt corresponding indicators and strategy. There are good reasons to aim for lower income inequality, which would require further measures such as more progressive income, wealth and inheritance taxes, better opportunities for disadvantaged and poorer families, with implications for education systems and labour market institutions, and the curtailing of unjustified rents enjoyed by certain segments of society. The author suggests that the misleading label of the Europe 2020 target indicator 'at risk of poverty or social exclusion' be replaced with 'relative income poverty or income inequality or potentially social excluded', which may sound convoluted, but would be better than the current short but misleading name. New poverty indicators should be developed, such as considering the cost of a specific basket of goods and services as the threshold. Beyond headcount, the calculation of poverty gaps and other indicators that show the depth and severity of poverty would be important. EU-wide poverty and income distribution indicators should consider the distribution of income within the EU as a whole.

This paper compares financial assistance programmes of four euro-area countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus) and three non-euro-area countries (Hungary, Latvia, and Romania) of the European Union in the aftermath of the 2007/08 global financial and economic crisis—which were supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and various European financing facilities. These programmes have distinct features compared with assistance programmes in other parts of the world, such as the size of imbalances, financing, unique cooperation of the IMF and various European facilities, and membership of a currency union in the case of euro-area countries. We evaluate the programmes by assessing their success in creating conditions to regain market access, the degree of compliance with loan conditionality, and actual economic performance relative to programme assumptions. We conclude that the rate of compliance with loan conditionality was not a good predictor of programme success and that deviations from gross domestic product programme assumption correlate strongly with fiscal performance and unemployment, highlighting the key role of macroeconomic projections in programme design. While the Troika institutions succeeded in cooperating, there were major disputes among them in some cases, especially related to the assessment of fiscal sustainability and cross-country spillovers. Asian countries can draw several lessons from European experiences, including the coexistence of the IMF and regional safety nets, cooperation issues, systemic spillovers, and social implications of programme design.

The European Union's Lisbon strategy goal of tackling poverty was a notable failure, while the Europe 2020 strategy's poverty target is out of reach. Both strategies were based on variants of the 'at risk of poverty' indicator, which has an inappropriate and misleading name. We demonstrate theoretically and empirically by cross-section, time series and panel cointegration evidence, that the 'at risk of poverty' indicator essentially measures income inequality, not poverty. Our calculations show that even after taking into account the positive impact that expected economic growth should have on material deprivation and low work intensity, the Gini coefficient of income inequality would have to fall by 3.5 points in each EU country if the Europe 2020 poverty target is to be reached, which is implausible. Huge differences between national poverty thresholds make the EU-wide poverty aggregate pointless. We approximate the EU-wide distribution of income and use it calculate EU-wide poverty indicators. The political agreement between EU member states expressed the goal of reducing poverty, not inequality. There are good reasons to aim for lower income inequality, but a political agreement would be needed to set an inequality goal and corresponding policies.

Highlights * Global current account imbalances widened before the 2007/2008 crisis and have narrowed since then. While the post-crisis adjustment of European current account deficits was in line with global developments (though more forceful), European current account surpluses defied global trends and increased. * We use panel econometric models to analyse the determinants of medium-term current account balances. Our results confirm that higher fiscal balances, higher GDP per capita, more rapidly aging populations, larger net foreign assets, larger oil rents and better legal systems increase the medium-term current account balance, while a larger growth differential and a higher old-age dependency ratio reduce it. * European current account surpluses became excessive during the past twelve years according to our estimates, while they were in line with model predictions in the preceding three decades. * Generally, the gap between the actual current account and its fitted value by the model has a strong predictive power for future current account changes. Excess deficits adjust more forcefully than excess surpluses. However, in the 2004-07 period, excess imbalances were amplified, which was followed by a forceful correction in 2008-15, with the exception of European surpluses.

Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggest that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons. First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored. Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery and there has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

The SME access-to-finance problem is not universal in the European Union and there are reasons for the fall in credit aggregates and higher SME lending rates in southern Europe. Possible market failures, high unemployment and externalities justify making greater and easier access to finance for SMEs a top priority. Previous European initiatives were able to support only a tiny fraction of Europe's SMEs; merely stepping-up these programmes is unlikely to result in a break-through. Without repairing bank balance sheets and resuming economic growth, initiatives to help SMEs get access to finance will have limited success. The European Central Bank can foster bank recapitalisation by performing in the toughest possible way the asset quality review before it takes over the single supervisory role. Of the possible initiatives for fostering SME access to finance, a properly designed scheme for targeted central bank lending seems to be the best complement to the banking clean-up, but other options, such as increased European Investment Bank lending and the promotion of securitisation of SME loans, should also be explored.

We study the transmission of monetary policy to macroeconomic variables with structural time-varying coefficient vector autoregressions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in comparison with that in the euro area. These three countries have experienced changes in monetary policy regimes and went through substantial structural changes, which call for the use of a time-varying parameter analysis. Our results indicate that the impact on output of a monetary shock changed over time. At the point of the last observation of our sample, the fourth quarter of 2011,among the three countries, monetary policy was most powerful in Poland and not much less strong than the transmission in the euro area. We discuss various factors that can contribute to differences in monetary transmission, such as financial structure, labour market rigidities, industry composition, exchange rate regime, credibility of monetary policy and trade openness.

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.

As a background document for Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/11 'Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustment', this working paper presents detailed results for 24 EU countries on: The sectoral changes in the economy; The unit labour costs (ULC) based real effective exchange (REER) rate and its main components; Export performance. The ULC-REERs are calculated: For the total economy, the business sector (excluding agriculture, construction and real estate activities), and some main sectors; Using both actual aggregates and fixed-weight aggregates, as the latter is free from the impacts of compositional changes; Against 30 trading partners and against three subsets of trading partners: euro-area, non-euro area EU, non-EU.