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The fall of the New Order government in 1998 and the political reform that followed posed substantial challenges for Indonesia's bureaucracy to continue fulfilling its mandate. This book analyses the process of bureaucratic reform in the irrigation sector. Using Irrigation Management Transfer policy as the entry point for analysis, it documents and analyses the irrigation bureaucracy‰Ûªs ability to sustain its power and prominence in the sector‰Ûªs development, amidst and against national and int

Singapore had been one of the nations severely affected by the 2008-09 global financial and economic crisis. The city state came under pressure through the financial, trade, and confidence channels. To counter these shocks, Singapore policymakers undertook unprecedented monetary and fiscal policy measures. They subsequently charted a revival strategy that would help the country emerge stronger after the crisis. These all-encompassing policies together with the global economic recovery in 2009

Why do ASEAN and India have such a muted economic relationship? This Perspective looks into the matter and discusses the political-economy challenges that is restraining the relationship to advance further. It concludes that although the absolute levels of trade and investment are low due to India's approach to trade policy and to the mismatch in sectoral interest in trade negotiations, there are economic upsides, given the Indian diaspora in ASEAN countries, improved air connectivity, services trade complementarities and India's quest with domestic reform.

This Perspective analyses the trade and investment relations that Southeast Asian economies have with China and compares these to those they have with the US, Japan, the EU and South Korea.4 The paper concludes that although China has leverage in terms of trade, its investments are yet to catch up with those from other developed countries. China can therefore not really as yet be called a dominant economic power in Southeast Asia. However, as China increases its outbound investments and completes more infrastructure projects, its geopolitical influence in the region will definitely increase.

This Perspective looks at the ASEAN Single Window (ASW) via the establishment of National Single Windows (NSW) in 10 member economies. The betterment of customs processes is regularly requested by importers/exporters in the region. Despite challenges in terms of coordination across government bodies, man-power and financial resources to implement single window in national economies, ASEAN countries are working earnestly to launch ASW in 2018 (at least on a limited scale). The urgency of the issue is reflected in the AEC 2025 action plan, which states 2016-2018 as an indicative timeline for operationalising the initiative.

As we begin 2015, attention turns to the ten Southeast Asian nations and their concrete 'deliverable' of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) on 31 December. Understandably, questions have been raised as to whether the AEC can be successfully achieved. This paper tries to provide an answer to this by arguing that one should not judge the AEC solely by its economic outcomes and the issue of whether the AEC can be attained in its entirety by the deadline. Rather, one should also evaluate the AEC against its ability to serve the region's strategic goals of economic coherence in dealing with the international community as well as maintaining ASEAN centrality.

This paper argues that the AIIB may not provide a complete solution for the MPAC. This is because the AIIB is first and foremost an Asian bank, rather than one focused on Southeast Asia and its membership ranges from countries in Asia to Europe and Latin America. It is highly likely that this regional development bank will have a pan-Asian coverage.

As the ASEAN Economic Community's (AEC) 2015 deadline approaches, the project suffers more detractors than supporters. A majority seems convinced that the initiative's deliverables, namely an integrated production space with free movement of goods, services, and skilled labour will not be achieved by December 2015. This 'bald' statement has some merit. But we must ask ourselves what the definition of economic community was when ASEAN decided to form an AEC. Even if we go with the notion that 'ASEAN cannot deliver on AEC', how far can we blame the organisation? And can AEC, as the only regional initiative, be blamed for policy changes in each member country's domestic economy, and hence for the possible negative fallouts? To answer these questions, this article will attempt to explain five crucial facts about ASEAN economic cooperation. This is important, as irrespective of any criticism, ASEAN will announce the attainment of the AEC on 31 December 2015.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), now being negotiated between ASEAN and its six existing trade agreement partners 2 , is an opportunity of underappreciated global significance. If the negotiations are successfully concluded and the agreement is ratified and implemented, it will be the largest trade deal in GDP and population terms since the GATT Uruguay Round agreement in 1994 which established the World Trade Organization.

ASEAN has been active in the formation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) since the early 1990s. Besides its own integration initiatives like the ASEAN Free Trade Area and the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN has also enacted five plus 1 FTAs with China, South Korea, Japan, India and Australia-New Zealand, making ASEAN an FTA hub for broader Asian region. Realizing the challenges of multiple FTAs, a decision was reached in November 2011 to establish a comprehensive RTA, covering the five ASEAN+1 FTAs under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework. Another RTA that has attracted lot of attention lately is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), led by the United States. Despite the similar objective of increasing economic cooperation, the two RTAs differ from each other. RCEP is expected to accommodate the development differences of the member countries, while TPP is said to have a more demanding set of commitments. Both RCEP and TPP are perceived to have strategic roles in the Asia-Pacific region. TPP is a component of the U.S.'s Asian 'pivot' strategy, in reaction to Asia's economic rise and integration efforts. TPP also can be viewed as a consequence of the limited integration progress under APEC. In addition many have argued that TPP is a containment strategy aimed at China. RCEP is expected to reinforce ASEAN 'centrality' in the wider Asia-Pacific regional architecture. The ongoing negotiations for both RCEP and TPP face complex challenges, and are expected to encounter difficulties to conclude