Suchergebnisse

Papers presented at the National Seminar on Drinking Water and Food Security through Optimal Utilization of Groundwater, Rainwater Harvesting and Crop Water Planning with special reference to Gadag District, Karnataka, held at Hulkoti, during 29-30 April 2008

PurposeAlthough accountability has been one of the founding pillars of public services, many countries face situations of lack of accountability of service providers. The purpose of this paper is to propose a framework for accountability in public services by strengthening traditional accountability relationships among citizens, political authority and service provider, with the use of information and communication technology (ICT).Design/methodology/approachThe research analyses a case of public grievance redressal system in India that is entirely facilitated by ICT. It documents the key processes followed by the system and also examines the performance of the system using quantitative data.FindingsThe research identifies key technical and business characteristics of ICT applications that are intended to improve accountability. The traditional accountability relationship is then placed within an ICT framework to suggest how accountability can be reinforced in public services.Research limitations/implicationsThe framework is based on analysis of single case and therefore cannot be claimed to be comprehensive.Practical implicationsThe framework provides an analytical tool for e‐Government practitioners to design ICT interventions for accountability.Originality/valueMany mechanisms of enforcing accountability have been tried out by developing countries in the past but with little sustainable success. This paper proposes a different method of addressing the problem of poor accountability in public services by highlighting the role of ICT.

ABSTRACTNet neutrality (NN) is a widely debated policy issue that has the potential to alter the dynamics of accessing online content. The focal point of the debate lies in whether broadband service providers (BSPs) should be allowed to charge content providers for the preferential delivery of their digital content. This decision will affect broadband market coverage for end consumers as well as the issues of long‐term competition and innovation in the market of digital content. Our research aims to analyze and address these issues. We propose a game theoretical model with three players—the BSP, the content providers, and the consumers—where the BSP, in its capacity as a gatekeeper between the content providers and the consumers, is modeled as a two‐sided market platform. We find that while abandoning the principle of NN might sometimes result in increased consumer surplus and broadband market coverage, it can also hinder the ability of startups to compete against established rivals and thus reduce innovation at the edge. The results should be of great interest to policymakers as they debate on this very crucial issue.

ABSTRACTReverse auctions in business‐to‐business (B2B) exchanges provide numerous benefits to participants. Arguably the most notable benefit is that of lowered prices driven by increased competition in such auctions. The competition between sellers in reverse auctions has been analyzed using a game‐theoretic framework and equilibria have been established for several scenarios. One finding of note is that, in a setting in which sellers can meet total demand with the highest‐bidding seller being able to sell only a fraction of the total capacity, the sellers resort to a mixed‐strategy equilibrium. Although price randomization in industrial bidding is an accepted norm, one might argue that in reality managers do not utilize advanced game theory calculations in placing bids. More likely, managers adopt simple learning strategies. In this situation, it remains an open question as to whether the bid prices converge to the theoretical equilibrium over time. To address this question, we model reverse‐auction bidding behavior by artificial agents as both two‐player and n‐player games in a simulation environment. The agents begin the game with a minimal understanding of the environment but over time analyze wins and losses for use in determining future bids. To test for convergence, the agents explore the price space and exploit prices where profits are higher, given varying cost and capacity scenarios. In the two‐player case, the agents do indeed converge toward the theoretical equilibrium. The n‐player case provides results that reinforce our understanding of the theoretical equilibria. These results are promising enough to further consider the use of artificial learning mechanisms in reverse auctions and other electronic market transactions, especially as more sophisticated mechanisms are developed to tackle real‐life complexities. We also develop the analytical results when one agent does not behave strategically while the other agent does and show that our simulations for this environment also result in convergence toward the theoretical equilibrium. Because the nature of the best response in the new setting is very different (pure strategy as opposed to mixed), it indicates the robustness of the devised algorithm. The use of artificial agents can also overcome the limitations in rationality demonstrated by human managers. The results thus have interesting implications for designing artificial agents in automating bid responses for large numbers of bids where human intervention might not always be possible.

BACKGROUND: A third of the 2·5 billion people worldwide without access to improved sanitation live in India, as do two-thirds of the 1·1 billion practising open defecation and a quarter of the 1·5 million who die annually from diarrhoeal diseases. We aimed to assess the effectiveness of a rural sanitation intervention, within the context of the Government of India's Total Sanitation Campaign, to prevent diarrhoea, soil-transmitted helminth infection, and child malnutrition. METHODS: We did a cluster-randomised controlled trial between May 20, 2010, and Dec 22, 2013, in 100 rural villages in Odisha, India. Households within villages were eligible if they had a child younger than 4 years or a pregnant woman. Villages were randomly assigned (1:1), with a computer-generated sequence, to undergo latrine promotion and construction or to receive no intervention (control). Randomisation was stratified by administrative block to ensure an equal number of intervention and control villages in each block. Masking of participants was not possible because of the nature of the intervention. However, households were not told explicitly that the purpose of enrolment was to study the effect of a trial intervention, and the surveillance team was different from the intervention team. The primary endpoint was 7-day prevalence of reported diarrhoea in children younger than 5 years. We did intention-to-treat and per-protocol analyses. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, number NCT01214785. FINDINGS: We randomly assigned 50 villages to the intervention group and 50 villages to the control group. There were 4586 households (24,969 individuals) in intervention villages and 4894 households (25,982 individuals) in control villages. The intervention increased mean village-level latrine coverage from 9% of households to 63%, compared with an increase from 8% to 12% in control villages. Health surveillance data were obtained from 1437 households with children younger than 5 years in the intervention group (1919 children younger than 5 years), and from 1465 households (1916 children younger than 5 years) in the control group. 7-day prevalence of reported diarrhoea in children younger than 5 years was 8·8% in the intervention group and 9·1% in the control group (period prevalence ratio 0·97, 95% CI 0·83-1·12). 162 participants died in the intervention group (11 children younger than 5 years) and 151 died in the control group (13 children younger than 5 years). INTERPRETATION: Increased latrine coverage is generally believed to be effective for reducing exposure to faecal pathogens and preventing disease; however, our results show that this outcome cannot be assumed. As efforts to improve sanitation are being undertaken worldwide, approaches should not only meet international coverage targets, but should also be implemented in a way that achieves uptake, reduces exposure, and delivers genuine health gains. FUNDING: Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), and Department for International Development-backed SHARE Research Consortium at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine.