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Objective. The extent to which candidates for elected office keep their campaign promises holds great interest for citizens and has important consequences for the quality of democracy. However, we know very little about whether candidates actually keep these promises. This article examines the relationship between campaign promises and the subsequent legislative behavior of members of Congress in the area of environmental protection.Methods. Responses to the 1996 National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) are matched with roll‐call data on environmental issues from the 105th Congress. A series of bivariate probit models with selection are then used to assess the extent to which roll‐call votes are consistent with candidate policy statements in the NPAT.Results. We find that members of Congress vote consistent with their campaign promises 73 percent of the time, and that NPAT responses help to predict roll‐call votes even when controlling for party, race, gender, campaign contributions, and previous environmental voting record. We also find that the propensity to keep campaign promises varies systematically across types of legislators.Conclusions. Contrary to public perceptions, candidates for Congress routinely act to keep their campaign promises once elected, at least in the area of environmental protection policy.

Objective. The extent to which candidates for elected office keep their campaign promises holds great interest for citizens and has important consequences for the quality of democracy. However, we know very little about whether candidates actually keep these promises. This article examines the relationship between campaign promises and the subsequent legislative behavior of members of Congress in the area of environmental protection. Methods. Responses to the 1996 National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) are matched with roll-call data on environmental issues from the 105th Congress. A series of bivariate probit models with selection are then used to assess the extent to which roll-call votes are consistent with candidate policy statements in the NPAT. Results. We find that members of Congress vote consistent with their campaign promises 73 percent of the time, and that NPAT responses help to predict roll-call votes even when controlling for party, race, gender, campaign contributions, and previous environmental voting record. We also find that the propensity to keep campaign promises varies systematically across types of legislators. Conclusions. Contrary to public perceptions, candidates for Congress routinely act to keep their campaign promises once elected, at least in the area of environmental protection policy. (Original abstract)

Objective. The extent to which candidates for elected office keep their campaign promises holds great interest for citizens & has important consequences for the quality of democracy. However, we know very little about whether candidates actually keep these promises. This article examines the relationship between campaign promises & the subsequent legislative behavior of members of Congress in the area of environmental protection. Methods. Responses to the 1996 National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) are matched with roll-call data on environmental issues from the 105th Congress. A series of bivariate probit models with selection are then used to assess the extent to which roll-call votes are consistent with candidate policy statements in the NPAT. Results. We find that members of Congress vote consistently with their campaign promises 73% of the time, & that NPAT responses help to predict roll-call votes even when controlling for party, race, gender, campaign contributions, & previous environmental voting record. We also find that the propensity to keep campaign promises varies systematically across types of legislators. Conclusions. Contrary to public perceptions, candidates for Congress routinely act to keep their campaign promises once elected, at least in the area of environmental protection policy. 3 Tables, 48 References. Adapted from the source document.

Whether organizations should contract out for goods and services or produce them internally continues to be a subject of debate. Service contracting patterns in cities may be explained by the characteristics of goods and services and the extent of political and administrative uncertainty in city leadership. Turnover in executive leadership can affect the ability of local governments to negotiate contracts, make credible commitments to suppliers, and faithfully uphold and enforce contracts. When transaction costs resulting from turnover are high, contracting out becomes less likely. The results of this study show that both city manager turnover and certain service types significantly reduce the likelihood of service contracting, particularly with private, for-profit providers. Adapted from the source document.