Suchergebnisse

This paper considers unilateral border measures, as contemplated by a number of developed states in conjunction with domestic emissions reduction schemes, as they relate to international trade and international environmental law. Specifically, I argue that to the extent that WTO-compliance requires strict adherence to the principle of nondiscrimination, as embodied in the national treatment and most-favored nation provisions in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, there is the potential for conflict with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), both as a free-standing principle of customary international law and as set out in various multilateral environmental agreements and, in particular in the climate change context, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. This is insofar as the unilateral imposition of BCAs by developed countries shifts costs of compliance with environmental legislation in developed economies onto the developing world. Such allocation may conflict with the principle of CBDR, which recognizes the unequal contribution to environmental degradation of developed countries as well as their enhanced ability to address the challenges presented by such degradation and, as a consequence, requires that they undertake more onerous obligations with respect to climate change mitigation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the extent to which this conflict is illustrative of a deeper tension between efficiency and equity considerations inherent in the intersection of international economic law and international environmental law. Adapted from the source document.