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This article bridges the divide between comparative politics and international relations by examining the interaction between domestic instability and policy choices made at the domestic and international level. It is theorized that leaders select from a basket of options that include diversion, repression, and political concessions. It is argued that governmental institutions affect political leaders choices, with more domestically constrained democratic governments eschewing the use of repression, instead opting for diversion and concessions. Whereas autocratic governments will use repression as it is the most effective and least costly option. Using a panel vector autoregression model, the study tests whether political leaders use one or a mixture of responses when confronted with widespread dissatisfaction. The analysis models feedback loops enabling it to simultaneously evaluate the effectiveness of those strategies at reducing instability within the different institutional contexts. The study found little evidence of diversion, but it did find that the international environment affects both policy choices and affected the level of instability in the state. The use of concessions for all states is generally counterproductive when that state is involved in a strategic rivalry whereas they tend to reduce instability when both democracies and autocracies are in a more peaceful international environment.

This paper applies theories of strategic conflict avoidance and diversionary war to help explain US-Iranian interactions. The article argues that US attempts at coercive diplomacy have tended to strengthen hardliners in Iran by allowing them to frame opposition to government policies as support for the United States. In particular, US public uncertainty about the advisability of using force against Iran provided both the Supreme Leader and the Iranian President with an opportunity to increase tensions with the United States with little concern about provoking a military strike. The aggressive stance of the Iranian regime is about developing a threat which diverts attention from domestic problems and places it firmly in the arena of the international. Adapted from the source document.

The study, using an autoregressive model and a time series of events data, tests whether Iran, Syria and North Korea have altered their behaviour towards the USA in response to the US occupation of Iraq. In particular, the study posits a modified theory of `strategic conflict avoidance', suggesting that perceived failings in US policy towards Iraq that manifest in low popularity ratings have, in fact, constrained the US president from initiating future aggressive actions. Potential targets of US aggression, rather than becoming more cooperative towards an unpopular US president, as suggested by strategic conflict avoidance theory, now become more hostile as they take advantage of public unease with an adventurous foreign policy. The analysis provides mixed support for the hypothesis, finding that North Korea has altered its strategic conflict avoidance behaviour in response to the Iraq occupation. Syria has become more hostile towards the USA, whereas, surprisingly, Iran is relatively uninfluenced by US domestic politics. The article suggests that coercive strategies might provide an opening in current US negotiations with North Korea, but also worryingly concludes, on the basis of the evidence, that the chances of a negotiated settlement with Iran are small.

The Korean peninsula is one of the most dangerous places on the planet. Decisions relating to the peninsula are for high stakes, and one small error can potentially result in an enormously destructive war. This article seeks to assess whether strategies of engagement or coercion can improve the chances of North Korea co-operating with either the US or South Korea. Using Vector Autoregression (VAR) techniques I assess the behavioural patterns of the North Korean regime in response to the actions of the states involved in the six-party talks between 1990 and 2000. The article finds that there were dramatic differences between the negotiating strategies employed by both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in their dealings with both the US and South Korea. The results suggest that, in being able to manipulate US foreign policy, the North Koreans are punching well above their weight and that the chances of a meaningful settlement with the regime of Kim Jong Il are very small.

The effects of domestic strife on the likelihood of an international conflict are tested empirically. A rare-events logit model with corrections for temporal dependence to assess whether domestic strife is related to the initiation of international conflicts is used to test the validity of the diversionary conflict thesis. Results suggest that decision makers do initiate international conflicts when the state is undergoing domestic strife, although not in a predicted manner. The results indicate that violent domestic strife increases the likelihood of a diversionary conflict, whereas nonviolent strife increases the likelihood of repression. The research also presents evidence that calls into question some of the claims made in previous studies and demonstrates that domestic strife in a target state increases the likelihood of being attacked.