Suchergebnisse

This essay explores several moral issues raised by global warming through the lens of Claudia Card's theory of evil. I focus on Alaskan villages in the sub-Arctic whose residents must relocate owing to extreme erosion, melting sea ice, and rising water levels. I use Card's discussion of genocide as social death to argue that failure to help these groups maintain their unique cultural identities can be thought of as genocidal.

AbstractThis essay explores the Earth Charter through an ecological feminist lens. In a previous essay on the Charter (Davion 2002), I argued that although basically consistent with ecological feminist approaches, the charter fails adequately to consider issues of ethical responsibility, social location, and power. I shall now argue that while my original observations remain troubling, the Charter does have profound implications for the morality of war. In what follows I first introduce ecological feminism. I then review my earlier conclusions concerning the charter, explaining why I believe they remain crucial. I conclude with a discussion of why, despite some important flaws, the Charter has important moral implications concerning themorality of war.

In this paper I link the very interesting analysis of responsibility provided by Larry May and Robert Strikwerda in "Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape (May and Strikwerda 1994) to some strategies for helping women avoid rape. In addition, I call for some clarification on May and Strikwerda's claim that rapists are fully responsible for their actions and that it is largely a matter of luck which men actually turn out to be rapists.

I reply to Laura Duhan Kaplan that I do not suggest women's political choices concerning pacifism are determined by biology. Although I contend the practice of mothering does not imply a pacifist commitment, this does not imply that the practice of mothering is inconsistent with such a commitment. Further, because the practice of mothering is not limited to women, even if it is inconsistent with pacifist commitment, this does not limit choices based on biology.

I argue there is no pacifist commitment implied by the practice of mothering, contrary to what Ruddick suggests. Using violence in certain situations is consistent with the goals of this practice. Furthermore, I use Ruddick's valuable analysis of the care for particular individuals involved in this practice to show why pacifism may be incompatible with caring passionately for individuals. If giving up passionate attach-ments to individuals is necessary for pacifist commitment as Ghandi claims, then the price is too hith.

Here I support my position in "Do Good Feminists Compete?" against the suggestion that competing with others weakens rather than strengthens one's sense of self.

In this paper I argue against the view widely held among feminists that nurturing and competition are incompatible. I also explore the following two more specific objections against competition: (1) competitions are "mini-wars" which encourage hatred; (2) while not "miniwars," competitions foster a war-like mentality. Underlying these objections is the fear that too strong a sense of self makes war likely by severing connection with others. I argue that because patriarchy encourages women to have too little sense of self, some competition may be useful.