Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Membership and International Cooperation -- 1.1 Defining IGO Membership -- 1.2 Membership in International Relations Theory -- 1.3 Geopolitical Alignment as Basis for IGO Cooperation -- 1.4 Chapter Overview -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2. Flexibility by Design: Rules for Accession -- 2.1 IGO Accession as Club Membership -- 2.2 International Society and Ending IGO Membership -- 2.3 Data on IGO Accession Rules -- 2.3.1 Founding Charter Documents -- 2.3.2 Participation Mandate -- 2.3.3 Conditionality Terms -- 2.4 Toward a Broader Understanding of Accession -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 3. Membership Patterns in Economic Institutions -- 3.1 Geopolitics and Economic Cooperation -- 3.1.1 Testable Implications for Membership Patterns -- 3.2 Empirical Analysis of IGO Membership Patterns -- 3.2.1 Data on Membership in Multilateral Economic Organizations -- 3.2.2 Logistic Regression Analysis of Membership -- 3.2.3 Finite Mixture Model of Weighted Decision-Making -- 3.3 Conclusion -- 4. Accession to the GATT/WTO -- 4.1 Supply and Demand of Membership -- 4.1.1 Discretionary Rules for GATT/WTO Accession -- 4.1.2 The Geopolitical Basis of the Multilateral Trade Regime -- 4.1.3 Examples of Accession Negotiations -- 4.2 Empirical Analysis of Entry into GATT/WTO -- 4.2.1 Data on GATT/WTO Application and Accession -- 4.2.2 Geopolitical Alignment and Trade Regime Membership -- 4.3 Conclusion -- 5. The OECD: More Than a Rich Country Club -- 5.1 Vague Rules and Selective Enlargement -- 5.2 Selecting for Similar Type in the OECD -- 5.2.1 The OECD Accession Process -- 5.2.2 The Price of Admission -- 5.2.3 Why Bother? Understanding Demand for Membership -- 5.2.4 Seeking Status through Association -- 5.3 Common Features of the Like-Minded Club -- 5.4 Statistical Analysis of OECD Accession.

The discriminatory logic at the heart of multilateralismMember selection is one of the defining elements of social organization, imposing categories on who we are and what we do. Discriminatory Clubs shows how international organizations are like social clubs, ones in which institutional rules and informal practices enable states to favor friends while excluding rivals.Where race or socioeconomic status may be a basis for discrimination by social clubs, geopolitical alignment determines who gets into the room to make the rules of global governance. Christina Davis brings together a wealth of data on membership provisions for more than three hundred organizations to reveal the prevalence of club-style selection on the world stage. States join organizations to deepen their association with a particular group of states—most often their allies—and for the gains from policy coordination. Even organizations that claim to be universal, to target narrow issues, or to cover geographic regions use club-style admission criteria. Davis demonstrates that when it comes to the most important decision of cooperation—who belongs to the club and who doesn't—geopolitical alignment can matter more than the merits or policies of potential members.With illuminating case studies ranging from nineteenth-century Japan to contemporary Palestine and Taiwan, Discriminatory Clubs sheds light on how, for global and regional organizations such as the WTO and the EU, alliance ties and shared foreign-policy positions form the basis of cooperation

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO.

This detailed account of the politics of opening agricultural markets explains how the institutional context of international negotiations alters the balance of interests at the domestic level to favor trade liberalization despite opposition from powerful farm groups. Historically, agriculture stands out as a sector in which countries stubbornly defend domestic programs, and agricultural issues have been the most frequent source of trade disputes in the postwar trading system. While much protection remains, agricultural trade negotiations have resulted in substantial concessions as well as ne

This detailed account of the politics of opening agricultural markets explains how the institutional context of international negotiations alters the balance of interests at the domestic level to favor trade liberalization despite opposition from powerful farm groups. Historically, agriculture stands out as a sector in which countries stubbornly defend domestic programs, and agricultural issues have been the most frequent source of trade disputes in the postwar trading system. While much protection remains, agricultural trade negotiations have resulted in substantial concessions as well as.

The rules-based trade order confronts a crisis as both rule-making and enforcement have stalled in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Locked in great power rivalry, the United States and China are undermining the rules, making it necessary for middle powers like Canada and Japan to lead a coalition to reform the WTO. Working together they should advocate for greater transparency over subsidy policies and guidelines for how to balance security goals with economic cooperation.

The social context of relations between states provides the foundation for cooperation within international institutions. In a departure from theories that focus on rational design of contracts and functional demand for institutions, increasingly scholars emphasize geopolitics. Both as a component of power and social context, geopolitics shapes multilateral cooperation. This article examines theories that bring new perspectives on cooperation as a process embedded within international society. It highlights innovative developments to include relational variables in empirical analysis to measure how geopolitical alignment between states impacts the design and effectiveness of international institutions. The relational politics that undergird multilateral cooperation also contribute to the proliferation of institutions as states build new clubs for cooperation

After decades of focusing largely on multilateral trade rules, the past fifteen years witnessed a surge of free trade agreements by East Asian governments. Regional production networks benefit from harmonization of rules and lowering trade barriers. Yet several features stand out in these agreements—they focus on goods trade and are not embedded in strong regional institutions for shared decision making. This reflects both the divergent preferences among widely different countries and the reluctance of Japan or China to advocate any policies beyond liberalization of trade and investment. The TPP broke the mold of East Asian PTAs largely due to the leadership of the United States, which pushed others to adopt new rules on labor, environment, digital trade, state-owned enterprises, and competition policy. Yet, surprisingly, these features may persist in trade law despite the exit of the United States from the agreement. A key reason is the transformation of Japan, which began as a bystander to the agreement and now stands as one of its strongest advocates. A second reason is the use of templates in trade agreements, which can transfer the negotiated terms from one deal into subsequent agreements.

An examination of the relationship between democracy & trade policy argue that international organizations, eg, the World Trade Organization, & international rules allow democratic leaders to grapple with the challenges of free trade & domestic protectionist pressures. D. Edelman