Suchergebnisse

Die Spieltheorie ist eines der interessantesten und fruchtbarsten geistigen Produkte unserer Zeit. Sie eröffnet uns einen völlig neuen, faszinierenden Zugang zu einer Vielzahl von Fragestellungen in den Bereichen der Wirtschaft und Politik, Ökologie und Biologie und anderen mehr, indem sie Modelle zur Verfügung stellt, die es uns erlauben, scheinbar ganz unterschiedliche Sachverhalte auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner zu bringen und ihre Struktur klar und präzise zu analysieren. Morton D. Davis gelingt es, auch mathematisch weniger versierten Lesern und Leserinnen die Grundlagen der Spieltheorie und die Vielfalt ihrer Anwendungsmöglichkeiten in einfacher und nichttechnischer Sprache nahezubringen.

"In this introduction to the mathematics of money, Morton D. Davis invites us to take a fresh look at the numbers that underpin our financial decisions. He talks about strategies to use when we are required to bet against the odds (purchasing auto insurance) or choose to bet against the odds (wagering in a casino or at the track). He considers the ways in which we can streamline and simplify the choices available to us in mortgages and other loans. And he helps us understand the real probabilities when we accept a tip on that "one in a thousand" stock, even when the tip comes from a brilliantly successful day trader."--BOOK JACKET

The purpose of this article is to assess the effect of the winner-take-all feature of the Electoral College on the allocation of resources by candidates to the states in a presidential campaign. Conceptualizing the campaign as a two-person zero-sum infinite game, it is found that the main effect of this feature is to induce candidates to allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2's power of the electoral votes of each state, which creates a peculiar bias that makes voters living in the largest states as much as three times as attractive campaign targets as voters living in the smallest states. Empirically, it is shown that the 3/2's rule explains quite well the time allocations of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 campaigns; for presidential campaigns in 1976 and 1980, optimal allocations are indicated for all fifty states and the District of Columbia. A comparison with optimal allocations under a system of direct popular-vote election of the president reveals that such a system would be less susceptible to manipulative strategies than the Electoral College as well as being compatible with the egalitarian principle of "one man, one vote."