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Machine generated contents note: -- Part 1: The Historical and Political Background of the Crisis * The Roots of Crisis: Post-Kargil Conflict in Kashmir and the 2001-2002 Near War--Praveen Swami * The Political-Military Background of the 2001-2002 Military Standoff: A Pakistani Perspective--Zafar Jaspal * Part 2: The Conventional Military Environment * The Military Dimension of the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan Standoff: Planning and Preparation for Land Operations--Gurmeet Kanwal * Part 3: Managing the Nuclear Environment * What Was Done to Achieve Strategic Stability During the Cold War? Implications for South Asian Crises--Michael Wheeler * Pakistans Nuclear Force Posture and the 2001-2002 Crisis--Feroz Khan * Part 4: Outside Actors and Crisis Resolution:_ The United States Role * Crisis Management in South Asias Twin Peaks Crisis--Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon * The 2002 Crisis: A Real-Time View From Islamabad--David Smith * Part 5: Avoiding Future Crises * Arms Control, Confidence Building and Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective--Naeem Salik * Conclusion: Lessons Learned and Unlearned

17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under review. ; The article of record may be found at https://cgsr.llnl.gov ; This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ISBN-978-1-952565-07-6 LCCN-2021901137 LLNL-BOOK-818513 TID-59693 ; This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ISBN-978-1-952565-07-6 LCCN-2021901137 LLNL-BOOK-818513 TID-59693

17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under review. ; The article of record may be found at https://cgsr.llnl.gov ; This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ISBN-978-1-952565-07-6 LCCN-2021901137 LLNL-BOOK-818513 TID-59693 ; This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ISBN-978-1-952565-07-6 LCCN-2021901137 LLNL-BOOK-818513 TID-59693

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.006 ; This article examines "strategic latency", a condition in which technologies that could provide military (or economic) advantage remain untapped. As difficult as it is to explain why certain ideas and technologies flourish and find rapid acceptance, it is equally hard to understand why some good ideas languish, only to be rediscovered and exploited under other circumstances. Why is latent capacity so often dormant? What are the indicators that latent capacity is on the verge of being weaponized.

Highlights decision by Great Britain, France, and the US to ratify the protocols of the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga; US support for existing and proposed regional zones in the South Pacific.