Suchergebnisse

In the battle for influence, public affairs professionals make crucial strategic decisions every single day. "Should we go public with this case?" "Who are we going to lobby, and how?" "Should we form a coalition with other organisations?" Public affairs professionals often make these decisions based on their experience or their gut feeling. In practice, lobbying is often more of an art than a science. It is an intuitive and creative process, rarely involving any insights rooted in science. And yet many public affairs professionals are faced with uncertainty about the added value of their activities. "Does what we do really matter?" "What kind of impact do we have?" "Are we making the right strategic decisions?" Some colleagues seek to compensate for these doubts with an overwhelming dose of self‐confidence. An experienced lobbyist recently said during a lecture: "The day I can measure my influence is the day I can double my rates." Other public affairs professionals are a little more modest and try to assess their impact with key performance indicators. They systematically review the lobbying tactics used. This systematic approach has gained a lot of traction in recent years. The smoky back rooms, the cigars, and whisky of the past are now giving way to evidence‐based lobbying, based on facts, building a bridge between art and science of lobbying.

This research agenda contribution starts from the observation that an increasing number of interest group studies have been addressing questions about framing. Although this emerging literature has made great progress towards being able to study interest group framing in large-n designs owing to advances in data-gathering techniques, many analytical and conceptual challenges still lie ahead. One important question that remains is how framing can serve as a political strategy and, more precisely, which frames are most effective. This article gives an overview of the recent work on interest group framing. It highlights some key issues that interest group scholars face when they undertake research on framing. Various studies on interest group framing are contrasted in terms of the types of frames studied, the level of analysis employed and how influence is determined. I conclude by developing an agenda with some concrete recommendations for interest group scholars that deal with questions about framing.

Due to the politicization of much policymaking in the European Union (EU) and the growing competences of the European Parliament (EP), party groups in the EP have become key targets for organized interests. This article investigates which party groups in the EP are prioritized by EU lobbyists and why. The focus is on two presumed key components of this prioritization process, namely power and position. It is expected that lobbyists take into account both the extent to which parties align with their views and their legislative power. The empirical analysis draws on interviews with 143 interest group officials and their lobbying expenditures on 78 legislative proposals initiated by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. The analysis suggests that the media prominence of party groups in relation to specific issues as well as the extent to which interest organizations and party groups adopt opposing policy positions considerably shape how party groups in the EP are targeted by lobbyists.

AbstractEU politics has long been portrayed as an elite affair in which technocratic deliberation prevails. As a consequence, information supply by interest groups has typically been viewed as part of an expertise‐based exchange with policy‐makers. Less attention has been devoted to whether the supply of information is also used to exert political pressure. In addition to expertise‐based exchanges between interest groups and policy‐makers, can we identify the prevalence of information supply that aims to put pressure on EU policy‐makers? And under what conditions are different modes of information supply likely to occur? My analysis relies on interviews with 143 lobbyists who were active on a set of 78 legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010. The results demonstrate that expertise‐based exchanges are dominant in interactions with civil servants, while political information is predominantly communicated to political officials and often the key substance in outside lobbying tactics.