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This experiment examined the effects of negotiators' and opponents' coercive capability on level of demand and on communication of threats and promises. Applying conflict spiral and deterrence perspectives inspired contrasting predictions. Subjects were given high, moderate, or low coercive power and learned that their opponents had low, moderate, or high coercive power. Subsequently, subjects negotiated through computers with opponents (in reality, simulated by a computer), who sent compellent threats or promises designed to induce some desired behavior. Higher levels of the focal negotiator's coercive power increased communication of threats but did not influence level of demand. Higher levels of the opponent's coercive power produced greater decline in level of demand but only when the opponent sent threats instead of promises. Power balance produced less communication of threats and greater decline of demand than power preponderance. The conclusion discusses limitations and contributions, as well as the applied value for mediation and dispute resolution.

Examines the effects of negotiators' & opponents' coercive capability on level of demand & on communication of threats & promises. Applying conflict spiral & deterrence perspectives inspired contrasting predictions. In an experiment, 170 undergraduates were given high, moderate, or low coercive power & learned that their opponents had low, moderate, or high coercive power. Subsequently, Ss negotiated through computers with opponents (in reality, simulated by a computer), who sent compellent threats or promises designed to induce some desired behavior. Higher levels of the focal negotiator's coercive power increased communication of threats but did not influence level of demand. Higher levels of the opponent's coercive power produced greater decline in level of demand but only when the opponent sent threats instead of promises. Power balance produced less communication of threats & greater decline of demand than power preponderance. The conclusion discusses limitations & contributions, as well as the applied value for mediation & dispute resolution. 5 Tables, 2 Figures, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

Intergroup conflicts are often regulated by negotiating group representatives, who are influenced by constituent pressures. We examined how within-constituent disagreement influences representative negotiations. In a 2 × 2 experiment, the majority of constituents was either hawkish or dovish vis-à-vis the out-group, and the minority had either low or high status. After being exposed to constituent voice, representatives negotiated in a multi-issue task with integrative potential. Results showed that representatives reached more integrative agreements when the constituent majority was dovish rather than hawkish, but only when the hawkish minority had low rather than high status; when the hawkish minority had high status, representatives reached suboptimal agreements equal to those reached when the constituent majority was hawkish. Additional results showed that under these circumstances, representatives perceived the cooperativeness of their constituency as highest and also had the most trust that the constituency would approve of the agreement. Implications are discussed for theory on intergroup relations, (representative) negotiation, and conflict resolution.

In the current research, we investigate the effects of breaks—temporary recesses in which participants stop interacting and withdraw from the situation—on negotiation processes and outcomes. We conducted two laboratory experiments in which participants engaged in buyer-seller negotiations. Experiment 1 (N = 140) showed that dyads reached higher-quality agreements after a break in which they were cognitively busy with a distraction task than after a break in which they could reflect upon the negotiation. Experiment 2 (N = 76) showed that competitive thinking during a break lead to lower-quality agreements than cooperative thinking during the break. It seems that the negative effects of competitive thoughts during a break can be compensated by turning one's mind to other issues than the negotiation, or by actively engaging in cooperative thinking.

This article describes how laboratory experiments are used by social psychologists & those in related fields to study conflict, negotiation, & mediation. In a laboratory experiment, the researcher experimentally controls one or more variables in controlled, artificial settings that induce processes likely to occur naturally. Laboratory experiments are the primary method used to establish cause-&-effect relationships among variables & to reduce alternative explanations; thus they are primarily concerned with validity of explanation. In this article, we describe several basic design features including conceptual replication, precise manipulation, & the use of a moderator variable, which all help assess the processes underlying a research finding. These design features foster conceptual internal validity, which describes the impact of one variable on another & the quality of such an explanation. Conceptual internal validity provides a basis for generalization of findings & thus new research. It also fosters strong inference, which helps build cumulative knowledge. Laboratory experiments are not well suited to answer all questions & problems -- for example, they may not produce deep understanding of a particular historical event & must be supplemented by other methods, such as surveys & case studies. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

Performance ranking is common across a range of professional and recreational domains. Even when it has no economic consequences but does order people in terms of their social standing, anticipating such performance ranking may affect how people feel and perform. We examined this possibility by asking human subjects to execute a simple cognitive task while anticipating their performance being ranked by an outside evaluator. We measured baseline and postperformance levels of testosterone and cortisol. We find that (1) anticipating performance ranking reduces testosterone and increases cortisol, (2) both these hormonal responses benefit cognitive performance, which explains why (3) anticipation of being ranked by a peer increases cognitive performance.

It is generally acknowledged that principal or third-party stimulation of social conflict can enhance the quality of group decision making, promote affective acceptance of decisions by all participants, or increase joint outcomes. Here, it is argued that when conflict focuses on identity issues, tension level is high, & disputants' goals are negatively interdependent, conflict stimulation generally decreases joint performance, but when conflict focuses on task issues, tension level is low, & disputants' goals are positively interdependent, stimulation enhances performance. It is argued that conflict may be stimulated either by creating or extending conflict issues, or by promoting contentious conflict behaviors. 1 Figure, 44 References. Adapted from the source document.

This experiment examines how members' individualistic or cooperative motivational orientations affect the processes and outcomes of negotiating groups. A total of 228 students participated in a three-person negotiation simulation where motivational orientations were induced through written instructions and members were aware of each other's orientations. Results showed that groups with only cooperative members were more satisfied with their negotiations than were groups with other member compositions. Conversely, groups with only individualistic members achieved higher joint gains than did groups with other member compositions. Process analyses indicated that individualistic groups increased their integrative activities and decreased their distributive activities toward the end of their negotiations. Our results challenge the dominant view that individualistic orientations are detrimental for group processes and outcomes.

Although conflict and negotiation studies have examined symmetrical structures in which both parties want change, or asymmetrical structures in which one party wants change and the other to maintain the status quo, no research provided a direct comparison of both structures. Two experiments were conducted to fill this void. Results show that in asymmetrical structures challengers engage in more problem solving and more contending, have less of a loss frame and perceive less control than defendants, and are perceived be less successful. In symmetrical structures, behavior and attitudes of parties are more alike and there is more reciprocation of problem solving and yielding. Furthermore, findings reveal that challengers see their defendant as less friendly and more dominant than defendants see their challengers. Finally, no evidence was obtained that social value orientation moderates these effects. Implications for conflict theory and research, and for third party interventions in symmetrical versus asymmetrical conflicts, are discussed.

Although conflict and negotiation studies have examined symmetrical structures in which both parties want change, or asymmetrical structures in which one party wants change and the other to maintain the status quo, no research provided a direct comparison of both structures. Two experiments were conducted to fill this void. Results show that in asymmetrical structures challengers engage in more problem solving and more contending, have less of a loss frame and perceive less control than defendants, and are perceived be less successful. In symmetrical structures, behavior and attitudes of parties are more alike and there is more reciprocation of problem solving and yielding. Furthermore, findings reveal that challengers see their defendant as less friendly and more dominant than defendants see their challengers. Finally, no evidence was obtained that social value orientation moderates these effects. Implications for conflict theory and research, and for third party interventions in symmetrical versus asymmetrical conflicts, are discussed.

This experiment examines how members' individualistic or cooperative motivational orientations affect the processes and outcomes of negotiating groups. A total of 228 students participated in a three-person negotiation simulation where motivational orientations were induced through written instructions and members were aware of each other's orientations. Results showed that groups with only cooperative members were more satisfied with their negotiations than were groups with other member compositions. Conversely, groups with only individualistic members achieved higher joint gains than did groups with other member compositions. Process analyses indicated that individualistic groups increased their integrative activities and decreased their distributive activities toward the end of their negotiations. Our results challenge the dominant view that individualistic orientations are detrimental for group processes and outcomes.