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AbstractMany countries experience massive aid surges when civil wars end. However, operational contexts tend to remain particularly sensitive due to a combination of persisting local-level cleavages and low-quality state institutions. Consequently, aid provision risks inciting distributional conflicts and violent unrest—most notably when resources are injected into areas of high social heterogeneity or particularly weak state administration. I investigate this argument in the case of postwar Nepal. I combine geo-coded aid data with village-level information on various forms of violent unrest, as well as on social demographics and institutional quality. The panel analyses indicate positive short-term effects of aid on social unrest. More fine-grained estimations reveal that this effect is driven by a short-term escalation of violence against nonstate actors—in particular in ethnically fractionalized villages under the administration of weakly performing local-level state institutions. Descriptive cross-country analyses indicate that aid may have similar violence-inducing effects in other postwar contexts.

Where and how have precolonial institutions of conflict resolution remained intact? Although it is often argued that "traditional" institutions can play a key role in managing communal conflicts, little is known about the conditions of their "survival." This article argues that historical, political, and cultural topographies are essential to understanding patterns of the persistence and demise of precolonial institutions. Traditional modes of conflict resolution remain strong where they have been internalized over centuries: in the cultural and political centers of precolonial states. I use original geocoded survey data and historical spatial information on precolonial Burundi to analyze this hypothesis. The estimations yield robust correlations between the geographic patterns of the precolonial kingdom and current modes of resource-related conflict resolution.

Does extraction increase the likelihood of antistate violence in the early phases of state-building processes? Although research has focused on the impacts of war on state building, the potential "war-making effects" of extraction have largely been neglected. The article provides the first quantitative analysis of these effects in the context of colonial state building. It focuses on the "Maji Maji" rebellion (1905-1907), the most substantial incidence of anticolonial violence in Eastern Africa. Analyses based on a new historical data set confirm the correlation between extraction and resistance. More importantly, they reveal that distinct strategies of extraction produced distinct outcomes. Although the intensification of extraction in state-held areas created grievances among the population, it did not drive the rebellion. Rather, the results indicate that the expansion of extractive authority threatened the interests of local elites and provoked effective resistance. This finding provides insights into the mechanisms driving the "extraction-coercion cycle" of state building.

Does extraction increase the likelihood of antistate violence in the early phases of state-building processes? Although research has focused on the impacts of war on state building, the potential "war-making effects" of extraction have largely been neglected. The article provides the first quantitative analysis of these effects in the context of colonial state building. It focuses on the "Maji Maji" rebellion (1905-1907), the most substantial incidence of anticolonial violence in Eastern Africa. Analyses based on a new historical data set confirm the correlation between extraction and resistance. More importantly, they reveal that distinct strategies of extraction produced distinct outcomes. Although the intensification of extraction in state-held areas created grievances among the population, it did not drive the rebellion. Rather, the results indicate that the expansion of extractive authority threatened the interests of local elites and provoked effective resistance. This finding provides insights into the mechanisms driving the "extraction–coercion cycle" of state building.

Does extraction increase the likelihood of antistate violence in the early phases of statebuilding processes? While much research has focused on the impacts of war on statebuilding, the potential "war-making effects" of extraction have largely been neglected. The paper provides the first quantitative analysis of these effects in the context of colonial state-building. It focuses on the Maji Maji rebellion against the German colonial state (1905 - 1907), the most substantial rebellion in colonial Eastern Africa. Analyses based on a newly collected historical data set confirm the correlation between extraction and resistance. More importantly, they reveal that distinct strategies of extraction produced distinct outcomes. While the intensification of extraction in state-held areas created substantial grievances among the population, it did not drive the rebellion. Rather, the empirical results indicate that the expansion of extractive authority threatened the political and economic interests of local elites and thus provoked effective resistance. This finding provides additional insights into the mechanisms driving the "extraction-coercion cycle" of statebuilding.

Institutions can contribute to regulating interethnic conflict; however, in many cases they fail to bring about lasting peace. The paper argues that their negligence of intraethnic factors accounts for some of this failure. Ethnic groups are often treated as unitary actors even though most consist of various linguistic, tribal or religious subgroups. This internal heterogeneity is often obscured by overarching collective ethnic identities that are fostered by interethnic conflict. However, when such interethnic conflict is settled, these subgroup differences may come back to the fore. This resurgence can lead to subgroup conflict about the political and economic resources provided through intergroup institutional settlements. Such conflict can in turn undermine the peace-making effect of intergroup arrangements. Different subgroup identity constellations make such destructive effects more or less likely. The paper focuses on self-government provisions in the aftermath of violent interethnic conflict and argues that lasting intergroup arrangements are especially challenging when they involve contested ethnic groups.

The rationale is straightforward and persuasive: intrastate conflicts are by definition subnational phenomena. If we want to understand them fully, it may be wise to refocus our attention from the country level to the subnational level. Where violence is located might inform us as to why it erupts and how it is linked to various political, economic or social factors. The number of statistical geospatial analyses undertaken at the subnational level has been increasing constantly in recent years. Even though such studies have contributed greatly to peace and conflict research, they have come with their own challenges. Most importantly, they often do not adequately consider the theoretical and conceptual implications of switching from conventional cross-country to subnational analysis; this has led to dubious theoretical arguments and conclusions. Moreover, operationalization and measurement issues often limit these analyses' explanatory power. The paper reviews several geospatial analyses of violent conflict, points out the limitations of the previous research and proposes some potential avenues for improvement.