Suchergebnisse

In 1989, Soviet control over Eastern Europe ended when the communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact collapsed. These momentous and largely bloodless events set the stage for the end of the Cold War and ushered in a new era in international politics. Why did communism collapse relatively peacefully in Eastern Europe? Why did these changes occur in 1989, after more than four decades of communist rule? Why did this upheaval happen almost simultaneously in most of the Warsaw Pact? In Comrades No More, Renee de Nevers examines how internal and external factors interacted in the collapse of East European communism. She argues that Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union were necessary to start the process of political change in Eastern Europe, but domestic factors in each communist state determined when and how each country abandoned communism. A "demonstration effect" emerged as Hungary and Poland introduced reforms and showed that Moscow would not intervene to prevent political and economic changes.De Nevers analyzes the process of change in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. She traces the pattern of reform in each country and shows how these patterns influenced their postcommunist political evolution.

AbstractSecurity is generally considered a core public good provided by the state. Since outsourcing military and security tasks erodes the state's monopoly of force, we would expect regulation in this area to be stronger than in areas that do not have potentially lethal consequences. But neither caution nor careful regulation is evident in state responses to the emergence of private military and security companies; instead, the industry's rapid growth has outpaced government efforts to control their activities. This article assesses whether two industry associations, the US-based International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), have adopted mechanisms necessary for effective self-regulation, and it evaluates different national approaches to self-regulation. Neither the IPOA nor the BAPSC has established self-regulatory mechanisms able to monitor or sanction member companies' behavior. The IPOA's activities correspond to American patterns of self-regulation, while the BAPSC's efforts suggest weaker linkages with the British government than seen in other self-regulatory mechanisms.

The use of contractors employed by private security companies (PSCs) has exploded in recent years, outpacing efforts to assess the consequences of increased reliance on PSCs for international humanitarian law (IHL). This matters both for the states that hire these companies and for the employees of PSCs on or near battlefields. This article examines the legal status of PSCs under the existing IHL framework, focusing on activities where PSC employees carry weapons and how the presence of PSCs in asymmetric conflicts increases the challenge of determining what actions are appropriate within the laws of war. In most cases, PSC employees cannot be accorded combatant status under IHL. However, the actions of private contractors may put their protection as civilians under IHL at risk, and this is particularly true in asymmetric conflicts. I argue that changing the status of PSCs on the battlefield under IHL to take into account the tasks they are performing is not the answer. Rather, bearing IHL in mind, states need to rethink the tasks that PSCs conduct on their behalf, even if this means reducing reliance on PSCs or limiting state military activities. Notably, the USA should re-evaluate its reliance on PSCs to conduct tasks in situations where PSC employees are likely to be pulled into hostilities.