Suchergebnisse

This article examines environmental security in Haiti and specifically the connection between human security and fertility. Rather than viewing population growth as a causal factor leading to the breakdown in Haiti's social order, this article examines the ways in which the lack of social order in Haiti has created a context in which fertility rates have remained high. It attempts to move beyond simplified views of population-environment-security links to a fuller appreciation of the institutional factors that have contributed to the country's socioeconomic decline and the breakdown of public order. The principal conclusion is that the tremendous human insecurity in Haiti—which is due to failures in governance, widespread poverty, and environmental degradation—has contributed to large desired family size. To succeed, future efforts to reduce fertility rates will need first to address the economic and environmental security of poor Haitians and particularly women.

As a result of global increases in both temperature and specific humidity, heat stress is projected to intensify throughout the 21st century. Some of the regions most susceptible to dangerous heat and humidity combinations are also among the most densely populated. Consequently, there is the potential for widespread exposure to wet bulb temperatures that approach and in some cases exceed postulated theoretical limits of human tolerance by mid- to late-century. We project that by 2080 the relative frequency of present-day extreme wet bulb temperature events could rise by a factor of 100–250 (approximately double the frequency change projected for temperature alone) in the tropics and parts of the mid-latitudes, areas which are projected to contain approximately half the world's population. In addition, population exposure to wet bulb temperatures that exceed recent deadly heat waves may increase by a factor of five to ten, with 150–750 million person-days of exposure to wet bulb temperatures above those seen in today's most severe heat waves by 2070–2080. Under RCP 8.5, exposure to wet bulb temperatures above 35 °C—the theoretical limit for human tolerance—could exceed a million person-days per year by 2080. Limiting emissions to follow RCP 4.5 entirely eliminates exposure to that extreme threshold. Some of the most affected regions, especially Northeast India and coastal West Africa, currently have scarce cooling infrastructure, relatively low adaptive capacity, and rapidly growing populations. In the coming decades heat stress may prove to be one of the most widely experienced and directly dangerous aspects of climate change, posing a severe threat to human health, energy infrastructure, and outdoor activities ranging from agricultural production to military training.

AbstractDevelopment cooperation actors have been addressing climate change as a cross-cutting issue and investing in climate adaptation projects since the early 2000s. More recently, as concern has risen about the potential impacts of climate variability and change on human mobility, development cooperation actors have begun to design projects that intentionally address the drivers of migration, including climate impacts on livelihoods. However, to date, we know little about the development cooperation's role and function in responding to climate related mobility and migration. As such, the main aim of this paper is to outline the policy frameworks and approaches shaping development cooperation actors' engagement and to identify areas for further exploration and investment. First, we frame the concept of climate mobility and migration and discuss some applicable policy frameworks that govern the issue from various perspectives; secondly, we review the toolbox of approaches that development cooperation actors bring to climate mobility; and third, we discuss the implications of the current Covid-19 pandemic and identify avenues for the way forward. We conclude that ensuring safe and orderly mobility and the decent reception and long-term inclusion of migrants and displaced persons under conditions of more severe climate hazards, and in the context of rising nationalism and xenophobia, poses significant challenges. Integrated approaches across multiple policy sectors and levels of governance are needed. In addition to resources, development cooperation actors can bring data to help empower the most affected communities and regions and leverage their convening power to foster more coordinated approaches within and across countries.

As a result of global increases in both temperature and specific humidity, heat stress is projected to intensify throughout the 21(st) century. Some of the regions most susceptible to dangerous heat and humidity combinations are also among the most densely populated. Consequently, there is the potential for widespread exposure to wet bulb temperatures that approach and in some cases exceed postulated theoretical limits of human tolerance by mid- to late-century. We project that by 2080 the relative frequency of present-day extreme wet bulb temperature events could rise by a factor of 100 – 250 (approximately double the frequency change projected for temperature alone) in the tropics and parts of the mid-latitudes, areas which are projected to contain approximately half the world's population. In addition, population exposure to wet bulb temperatures that exceed recent deadly heat waves may increase by a factor of five to ten, with 150 – 750 million person-days of exposure to wet bulb temperatures above those seen in today's most severe heat waves by 2070 – 2080. Under RCP 8.5, exposure to wet bulb temperatures above 35°C – the theoretical limit for human tolerance – could exceed a million person-days per year by 2080. Limiting emissions to follow RCP 4.5 entirely eliminates exposure to that extreme threshold. Some of the most affected regions, especially Northeast India and coastal West Africa, currently have scarce cooling infrastructure, relatively low adaptive capacity, and rapidly growing populations. In the coming decades heat stress may prove to be one of the most widely experienced and directly dangerous aspects of climate change, posing a severe threat to human health, energy infrastructure, and outdoor activities ranging from agricultural production to military training.

Abstract
A spatial analysis is presented that aims to synthesize the evidence for climate and social dimensions of the "regreening" of the Sahel. Using an independently constructed archival database of donor-funded interventions in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Senegal in response to the persistence of drought in the 1970s and 1980s, the spatial distribution of these interventions is examined in relation to population density and to trends in precipitation and in greenness. Three categories of environmental change are classified: 1) regions at the northern grassland/shrubland edge of the Sahel where NDVI varies interannually with precipitation, 2) densely populated cropland regions of the Sahel where significant trends in precipitation and NDVI decouple at interannual time scales, and 3) regions at the southern savanna edge of the Sahel where NDVI variation is independent of precipitation. Examination of the spatial distribution of environmental change, number of development projects, and population density brings to the fore the second category, covering the cropland areas where population density and regreening are higher than average. While few, regions in this category coincide with emerging hotspots of regreening in northern Burkina Faso and southern central Niger known from case study literature. In examining the impact of efforts to rejuvenate the Sahelian environment and livelihoods in the aftermath of the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s against the backdrop of a varying and uncertain climate, the transition from desertification to regreening discourses is framed in the context of adaptation to climate change.

Abstract
There is lack of studies of global variation in religious affiliation alongside environmental change worldwide. The aim of the current study is to help fill this gap by exploring variation in religious affiliation alongside environmental change worldwide. We study this relationship by analysing religious affiliation, a variety of environmental stressors and environmental outcomes.