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"A brilliant account of the politics behind modern pandemics by a leading expert on humanitarian crisis and infectious disease"--

"The world almost conquered famine. Until the 1980s, this scourge killed ten million people every decade, but by early 2000s mass starvation had all-but-disappeared. Today, famines are resurgent, driven by war, blockade, hostility to humanitarian principles, and a volatile global economy. In Mass Starvation, world-renowned expert on humanitarian crisis and response Alex de Waal, provides an authoritative history of modern famines: their causes, dimensions, and why they ended. He analyzes starvation as a crime, and breaks new ground in examining forced starvation as an instrument of genocide and war. Refuting the enduring but erroneous view that attributes famine to overpopulation and natural disaster, he shows how political decision or political failing is an essential element in every famine, while the spread of democracy and human rights, and the ending of wars, were major factors in the near-ending of this devastating phenomenon. Hard-hitting and deeply informed, Mass Starvation explains why man-made famine and the political decisions that could end it for good must once again become a top priority for the international community"--

Libya's relationship with sub-Saharan Africa has been complex, troubled and misunderstood, both during the rule of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the conflict that culminated in his overthrow and death. The Libyan conflict of 2011 divided Africa, but nonetheless the African Union (AU) was able to agree on a political strategy aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement and power transition. The AU's peace initiative was launched in March 2011 and, contrary to widespread perception that the AU sought to prop up Gaddafi, it offered a credible and balanced option of a negotiated solution. United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 expressed support for the initiative, but in the event France, Britain and the United States blocked its chances of success. This article draws on evidence and analysis provided by the AU officials involved. It details the process whereby the AU adopted and implemented its decisions, and describes the AU's diplomatic engagement with Gaddafi and the National Transitional Council. The article also draws on information provided by Sudanese military and intelligence officials, providing an account, hitherto untold, of how the Sudanese government supported the Libyan opposition with military supplies, training and intelligence, in tacit cooperation with NATO countries. The article concludes with reflections on how the Libyan conflict has had an impact on the doctrine of the 'responsibility to protect', on the AU, and on Libya's relations with Africa. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)