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This paper investigates the relationship between subjective financial literacy, i.e. self-reported by investors, and trading behavior. In particular, we use the level of financial knowledge and experience reported in the MiFID tests by retail investors. Such tests are implemented in the EU from the so-called MiFID directive since November 2007. We show that subjective financial literacy helps explain cross-sectional variations in retail investors' behavior. Investors who report higher levels of financial literacy seem to invest smarter, even after controlling for gender, age, portfolio value, trading experience and education. They trade more and are less prone to the disposition effect. They tend to concentrate their portfolios on a small set of stocks and achieve diversification through investment funds holding. Their trading behaviors allow them to display higher gross and net returns as well as higher excess Sharpe ratios. Our findings are relevant for both policy making and understanding retail investors' behavior.

This paper investigates the relationship between subjective financial literacy, i.e. self-reported by investors, and trading behavior. In particular, we use the level of financial knowledge and experience reported in the MiFID tests by retail investors. Such tests are implemented in the EU from the so-called MiFID directive since November 2007. We show that subjective financial literacy helps explain cross-sectional variations in retail investors' behavior. Investors who report higher levels of financial literacy seem to invest smarter, even after controlling for gender, age, portfolio value, trading experience and education. They trade more and are less prone to the disposition effect. They tend to concentrate their portfolios on a small set of stocks and achieve diversification through investment funds holding. Their trading behaviors allow them to display higher gross and net returns as well as higher excess Sharpe ratios. Our findings are relevant for both policy making and understanding retail investors' behavior.

We measure the extent to which consolidated liquidity in modern fragmented equity markets overstates true liquidity due to a phenomenon that we call Ghost Liquidity (GL). GL exists when traders place duplicate limit orders on competing venues, intending for only one of the orders to execute, and when one does execute, duplicates are cancelled. Employing data from 2013 for 91 stocks trading on their primary exchanges and three alternative platforms where order submitters are identified consistently across venues, we find that simply measured consolidated liquidity exceeds true consolidated liquidity due to the existence of GL. On average, for every 100 shares passively traded by a multi-market liquidity supplier on a given venue, around 19 shares are immediately cancelled by the same liquidity supplier on a different venue. Yet the average weight of GL in total consolidated depth, at around 4%, does not outweigh the liquidity benefits of fragmentation. GL is most pronounced for traders with a speed advantage such as high-frequency traders, in stocks exhibiting greater market fragmentation, in stocks where the tick is more likely to be binding, and on non-primary exchanges. Furthermore, GL decreases when the fraction of traders using smart order routing is large. Finally, we show that an increase in GL leads to the execution costs of slow and algo traders increasing, while those of HFTs are unaffected.

We measure the extent to which consolidated liquidity in modern fragmented equity markets overstates true liquidity due to a phenomenon that we call Ghost Liquidity (GL). GL exists when traders place duplicate limit orders on competing venues, intending for only one of the orders to execute, and when one does execute, duplicates are cancelled. Employing data from 2013 for 91 stocks trading on their primary exchanges and three alternative platforms where order submitters are identified consistently across venues, we find that simply measured consolidated liquidity exceeds true consolidated liquidity due to the existence of GL. On average, for every 100 shares passively traded by a multi-market liquidity supplier on a given venue, around 19 shares are immediately cancelled by the same liquidity supplier on a different venue. Yet the average weight of GL in total consolidated depth, at around 4%, does not outweigh the liquidity benefits of fragmentation. GL is most pronounced for traders with a speed advantage such as high-frequency traders, in stocks exhibiting greater market fragmentation, in stocks where the tick is more likely to be binding, and on non-primary exchanges. Furthermore, GL decreases when the fraction of traders using smart order routing is large. Finally, we show that an increase in GL leads to the execution costs of slow and algo traders increasing, while those of HFTs are unaffected.

International audience ; We measure the extent to which consolidated liquidity in modern fragmented equity markets overstates true liquidity due to a phenomenon that we call Ghost Liquidity (GL). GL exists when traders place duplicate limit orders on competing venues, intending for only one of the orders to execute, and when one does execute, duplicates are cancelled. We employ data from 2013, covering 91 stocks trading on their primary exchanges and three alternative platforms and where order submitters are identified consistently across venues, to measure the incidence of GL and to investigate its determinants. On average, for every 100 shares pending on an order book, slightlymore than 8 shares are immediately cancelled by the same liquidity supplier on a different venue.This percentage is significantly greater for HFTs than for non-HFTs and for those trading as principal. Overall, GL represents a significant fraction of total liquidity, implying that simply measured consolidated liquidity greatly exceeds true consolidated liquidity.

International audience ; We measure the extent to which consolidated liquidity in modern fragmented equity markets overstates true liquidity due to a phenomenon that we call Ghost Liquidity (GL). GL exists when traders place duplicate limit orders on competing venues, intending for only one of the orders to execute, and when one does execute, duplicates are cancelled. We employ data from 2013, covering 91 stocks trading on their primary exchanges and three alternative platforms and where order submitters are identified consistently across venues, to measure the incidence of GL and to investigate its determinants. On average, for every 100 shares pending on an order book, slightlymore than 8 shares are immediately cancelled by the same liquidity supplier on a different venue.This percentage is significantly greater for HFTs than for non-HFTs and for those trading as principal. Overall, GL represents a significant fraction of total liquidity, implying that simply measured consolidated liquidity greatly exceeds true consolidated liquidity.