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In this article, two contrasting theories on the attitudes of unskilled blue collar workers are confronted: the 'embourgeoisement' thesis and the hypothesis of the 'authoritarianism of the working class'. The 'embourgeoisement' thesis states that blue collar workersadopted the attitudes (and life style) of white collar workers, from whom they can no longer be distinguished. Lipset's hypothesis of the 'authoritarianism of the working class', on the other hand, states that blue collar workers more strongly endorse a conservative attitude on socio-cultural matters and a progressive stand concerning socio-economic issues. Both hypotheses are tested using data from a small scale survey (N = 135) among unskilled blue collar workers and lower- and mid-level white collar workers from different large companies in the region of Leuven, Belgium. The results indicate that the interviewed unskilled blue collar workers still hold a set of attitudes that distinguishes them from the interviewed white collar workers. So, the 'embourgeoisement' thesis was refuted. Instead, the unskilled blue collar workers were more conservative on a socio-cultural level, and more progressive concerning socio-economic issues. These results are in line with Lipset's 'authoritarianism of the working class' hypothesis.

This study reports the results of qualitative interviews with 28 extreme right wing activists in Flanders (Belgium). We focus on the (ideological) motives for activism (why did they become active?) & the trajectory followed in becoming active (how did they become active?). The results show that these activists are primarily motivated by ethnic nationalism. All other ideological stands (e.g., rejection of foreigners, authoritarian attitudes & rejection of actual politics in Belgium) seem to be derived from this core of ethnic nationalism. The trajectory followed is primarily one that relates to socialization & continuity: most interviewees grew up in a family in which nationalism was of primordial importance. A minority of respondents, however, followed trajectories that refer to compliance or to conversion (deprivation). Adapted from the source document.

In this article, the existence of a working class culture is analysed on the basis of a representative sample of workers in Flanders. In the firsl part, theories such as the inclividualization theory and the postmodern criticism of social classes are reviewed, leading to the hypothesis that a working class culture no longer exists. Next, three hypotheses are analysed; (1) blue collar workers still hold a set of typical attitudes which distinguish them from white collar workers, (2) the social class of the respondents can be predicted on the basis of their attitudes and subjective identification with a social class, (3) the social class of the respondents has an autonomous effect on their attitudes. These three hypotheses are all corroborated, suggesting that the disappearance of a working class culture needs a more carefully balanced appraisal than the one offered by the reviewed theories on its disappearance.

Analyzes ideological differences between extreme right-wing parties & their voters in the Flemish & Walloon part of Belgium, referring to ongoing research (N = 30 interviews to date). Extreme right-wing ideology consists of five core elements -- (biological) racism, extreme ethnonationalism, the leadership principle, antiparliamentarianism, & an antileftist attitude -- that refer to the basic value of right-wing extremism: inequality of individuals & (ethnic) groups. This bears out in an analysis of the ideology of the Vlaams Blok in Flanders. However, the attitudes & motives of the voters of this party lie in opposition to those of right-wing extremists. The ideological gap between the Vlaams Blok & its electorate is attributed to the strategy of this party, because it cultivates two faces: populist/moderate to attract votes & radical extreme right-wing to recruit & motivate militants. In Wallonia, less is known about the ideology of right-wing parties & their voters, but it is suggested that Flemish research may well be generalized. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

Zowel op sociaal-economisch als op sociaal-cultureel vlak deden er zich de laatste decennia in onze samenleving belangrijke evoluties voor, zoals de stijging van het welvaarts- en het opleidingsniveau. Deze evoluties hebben tot de "verburgerlijkingshypothese" geleid, waarbij verondersteld wordt dat arbeiders het leefpatroon en de opvattingen van bedienden hebben overgenomen, en daardoor nog nauwelijks te onderscheiden zijn van de middenklasse. In dit artikel wordt een deel van deze hypothese getoetst : in hoeverre houden arbeiders er met betrekking tot sociaal-culturele en sociaal-economische onderwerpen (nog) andere opvattingen op na dan bedienden ? Daartoe werden in 1988 135 werknemers uit de Leuvense regio aan huis geïnterviewd. De steekproef bestand uit ongeschoolde arbeiders, lagere bedienden en bedienden uit het midden-niveau. Uit de resultaten blijkt dat de (ongeschoolde) arbeiders nog altijd een eigen geheel aan opvattingen en waarden vertonen (een eigen 'arbeiderscultuur'), en dus niet als verburgerlijkt kunnen worden beschouwd. Globaal genomen zijn ze conservatiever op sociaal-cultureel vlak, doch progressiever op sociaal-economisch gebied. Deze vaststellingen liggen tevens in de lijn van de veronderstellingen die Lipset uit zijn hypothese over het "autoritarisme van de arbeidersklasse" afleidt.

In deze bijdrage worden enkele basistrends geschetst over de tewerkstellings- en werkloosheidssituatie van jongeren in Vlaanderen. Drie topics komen daarbij aan bod. Eerst wordt de evolutie van de jeugdwerkloosheid en haar oorzaken in kaart gebracht. Vervolgens wordt een overzicht geboden van de kwaliteit en de stabiliteit van de tewerkstelling van jongeren. Tot slot wordt ingegaan op de individuele en maatschappelijke gevolgen van jeugdwerkloosheid. Het optimisme over de verbetering van de jeugdwerkloosheid wordt hierdoor in aanzienlijke mate genuanceerd. De daling van de werkloosheid onder jongeren sinds 1983 werd immers veroorzaakt door een afname van het aanbod aan jongeren op de arbeidsmarkt en niet door een toename van het aantal arbeidsplaatsen. Daarnaast werd de kwaliteit en de stabiliteit van hun tewerkstelling aangetast. Werkloosheid bemoeilijkt tot slot de psychische ontwikkeling van jongeren en vergroot hun bereidheid tot toegevingen om toch maar werk te vinden. Daardoor vergroten jongeren hun weerloosheid, terwijl de solidariteit onder werknemers erdoor kan worden ondergraven.

Our review of the literature shows that only a minority of youngsters shifts to a more extreme (leftist or rightist) political position because of their experience with unemployment. Unemployment deepens the political apathy of the majority of the youngsters. Unemployment isolates youngsters, so they cannot develop any involvement in polities. The"learned-helplessness" experience of unemployment also contributes to their political apathy.In 1985, 536 employed and 220 unemployed were surveyed on their political, socio-economical and religious attitudes, and their voting behaviour. Because the majority of the respondents were militants of the Christian Labour Movement, we expected the unemployed to shift to the left, rather than to become politically apathetic. The results confirm this hypothesis : the unemployed described themselves as "center left", were more radical on socio-economical issues and favored a more leftist vote that the employed. Surprisingly, the unemployed were also more sceptical about religion and more permissive in sexual ethics.

A review of the literature indicates that only a minority of youth shift to a more extreme (leftist or rightist) political position because of their experience with unemployment. Rather, unemployment deepens the political apathy of youth because it serves to isolate youth. The learned-helplessness experience of unemployment also contributes to their political apathy. Analysis of 1985 survey data from 536 employed & 220 unemployed youth regarding their political, socioeconomic, & religious attitudes, & their voting behavior, reveals that the unemployed described themselves as "center left," & were more radical on socioeconomic issues & favored a more leftist vote than the employed. The unemployed were also more skeptical about religion & more permissive in sexual ethics. 3 Tables. Modified HA