Suchergebnisse

U.S. Nationalism and Interests (with Michaela Zabel) -- Deepening U.S.-PRC Competitions -- Trump and One-China Adjustments -- Backing Taiwan in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific -- Biden's Multilateralism and Democratic Resilience -- Taiwan Strait in the Era of Fortress America.

"This book explores U.S.-Taiwan-China relations during both the Trump and Biden administrations, revealing how policy changes under both presidents have impacted Washington's decades-long strategic policy framework for Cross-Strait Relations. By tracing the continuities and changes of U.S. Strategic ambiguity and One-China Policy framework between the Trump and Biden administrations the book reveals how the foreign policy prism, through which U.S. leaders view China and Taiwan, has experienced a distinct alteration, and subsequently led to a policy adjustment. Utilising a wide range of documents and primary material, such as White House documents (ranging from the Clinton to and Biden administrations) in conjunction with interviews with Taiwan officials, this volume provides a detailed portrait of past, present, and potential future U.S.-Taiwan-China relations. Moreover, it provides a succinct examination of U.S. foreign policy traditions such as internationalism, nationalism, and multilateral nationalism (providing a study of US-China relations and policies from Nixon to Biden) and the resulting influence of such traditions on recent U.S Cross-Strait policy. Presenting a comprehensive study of both the Trump and Biden Administrations approach to Taiwan, this will be a valuable resource for any scholar or student of U.S. Foreign Policy, U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations and Cross-Strait Relations"--

Preface -- The Question -- The Theoretical Arguments -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: The Xi-Ma Summit Meeting and US Interests Across the Taiwan Strait -- 1 The KMT-CCP United Front: Committing to "One China" -- Consolidating the "1992 Consensus" and Warning Against Taiwan's Independence -- Stressing on Common Chinese Heritage -- 2 Cross-Strait Rapprochement and Heightened USA-PRC Competition -- US Interests Toward the Taiwan Strait: Democracy and Strategic Ambiguity -- Is the KMT Too Closely Tied with the PRC? -- 3 Main Argument -- The "Second-Image Reversed": External Powers and Domestic Politics -- Great Power Rivalry and Nation-Building Projects -- USA-PRC Relations and Nation Building in Taiwan -- The USA and Taiwan -- The PRC and Taiwan -- Domestic Politics Filters International Systemic Influence: Neoclassical Realism -- 4 Plan of the Book -- References -- Author's Interviews -- Chapter 2: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge: Neoclassical Realism -- 1 The Theoretical Foundations of Neoclassical Realism -- Neoclassical Realism from the Works of Christensen, Dueck, and Layne -- Neoclassical Realism and Taiwan-China Relations -- 2 Proposing a Neoclassical Realist Explanation of Ma Ying-jeou's China Policy -- A Neoclassical Realist Model of Under-balancing: Divided Polity and Fragmented Views on "One China" -- 3 Conclusion -- References -- Author's Interviews -- Chapter 3: Defining "One China" -- 1 Background -- 2 Neoclassical Realism and Social Constructivism -- 3 The Evolution of "One China" in Cross-Strait Interactions -- The Era of Rigidity, 1949-92 -- The Hong Kong Meeting in 1992 -- Equality: "Both Mainland and Taiwan Belong to One China" -- Tacitly Accepting the ROC? -- Love and Hate Relationship: Beijing Persists to Isolate the ROC Internationally -- 4 Conclusion -- References

As Washington, Taipei, and Beijing commence their new administrations, this monograph sets out to examine their current and former respective Taiwan Strait policies and the strategic implications for cross-strait relations. Notwithstanding their domestic political pressures at home and different normative and strategic orientations and objectives, all three actors share the common national security interest in continuing and deepening the current peaceful China-Taiwan trajectory that has existed since May 2008

AbstractThis article revisits Chiang Kai‐shek's Kuomintang (KMT) party‐state during the Nanjing Decade (1927–37) of the Republic of China (ROC) and assesses how the actions and ideological propensities of the Nationalist regime affected prewar China's external relations with the United States. While both the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were constituted as Leninist parties in the 1920s, due to the Soviet Union's military and economic aid for Sun Yat‐sen's republican revolution, they had very different political objectives and socioeconomic perspectives on China's state/nation‐building. Consequently, the KMT's and CCP's respective attitudes towards the United States also differed. Though Leninism is an antithesis to Western liberal democracy, it is not inevitable for a Leninist dictatorship to engage in confrontations with Washington, as the central leadership's inclinations and actions would determine how China approaches America. Chiang's Confucian Leninism opened up the friendly ties with the United States in 1928, which eventually consolidated into a strong U.S.‐ROC alliance during WWII and beyond, despite the KMT's autocracy. The essay will contrast briefly with the post‐1949 People's Republic of China (PRC), as the CCP experienced from Mao Zedong's radical Leninism, Deng Xiaoping/Jiang Zemin/Hu Jintao's consultative Leninism, to Xi Jinping's expansionist Leninism today. The evolving CCP positions have also affected the extent of cooperation and hostility between Beijing and Washington and illustrated how the changing attributes of the Chinese Leninist regime are crucial in determining U.S.‐PRC strategic trajectories.

Since 1979, while U.S. congressional members have consistently tried to stepup support for Taiwan, American presidents, irrespective of Republicans or Democrats, have acted circumspectly to follow the U.S. One‐China policy, lest more obtrusive backing of the island would heighten Chinese nationalism and damage Sino‐American relationship. The Donald Trump administration's greater tilt toward Taipei suggests a growing convergence between the executive and legislative branches in elevating U.S.‐Taiwan ties. Though Trump's fickle styles have generated unpredictability, his administration team has strived to keep a steady stance on Washington's relations with Beijing and Taipei. The U.S. One‐China policy is creative and elastic, which could be constricted or stretched, depending on the changing strategic circumstances and the needs of American national security. The United States has an interest to enlarge the scope and depth of cooperation with Taipei in the Indo‐Pacific region to cope with a more powerful and assertive PRC.

This article examines how Wilsonian foreign policy tradition has shaped the postwar US One China policy, and how Jacksonianism, championed by the Donald Trump administration, challenges that vision. Embracing militant nationalism, commercial mercantilism, and unilateralist diplomacy, Trump's commitment to "One China" will more likely be conditional on Sino–American transactional interchanges.

The PRC's increasingly assertive foreign policy behaviors have triggered heightened anxiety among its regional neighbors. Washington has abided by a long-standing strategic ambiguity policy to manage the Taiwan Strait impasse. However, as the KMT's "1992 consensus" policy places Taiwan in close union with Beijing, Taipei's security positions sometimes go against the interests of the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific. Pulling Taiwan away from China's orbit is congruent with US interest in continuing that enduring policy framework and ensuring a healthy balance across the Strait.