Suchergebnisse

There are many arguments for shifting at least part of the higher educational cost burden from governments (or taxpayers) to individuals, particularly in Europe. But this case largely rests onthe capability to offer deferred and incomecontingent payments. The two first features are critical to efficiency – students and lenders should not be deterred by excessive risk – and justice – contributions should be tailored to ex post ability to pay. Examples of instruments satisfying these criteria are income-contingent loans and human capital contracts. The central aim of this paper is to produce realistic estimates of how graduates' and nongraduates' lifetime income is likely to be affected by the generalisation of these instruments. Using data on Belgian income, we evaluate their effect on the distribution of lifetime net income, using higher income tax as a benchmark. The paper then considers the different ways of financing the cost ofincome-contingency, with a particular focus on the risk of adverse selection inherent to pooling the cost among graduates. But it shows that investing less on students opting for less profitable programs is asimple way to mitigate its severity.

"The arguments for refinancing the European Union's (EU) higher education via higher tuition fees largely rest on preserving the profitability of the educational investment and offering deferred and income-contingent payments. Using income survey datasets on Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) we first estimate how graduates' private return on educational investment is likely to be affected by higher private contributions. We then evaluate the effect of income-contingent and deferred payment mechanisms on lifetime net income and its capacity to account for graduates' ability to pay, considering numerous ways of financing the cost of introducing income-contingency. Our analysis reveals that increasing individuals' contributions to higher education costs, through income-contingent and deferred instruments, does not significantly affect the private rate of return of heterogeneous graduates, allows for payments to be indexed to ability to pay, and can be implemented in ways that minimize the risk of adverse selection. These findings prove robust to significant variations between countries' unharmonised higher education institutional structures." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

There are many economic and philosophical arguments supporting the introduction of student loans as a way to complement public financing and secure adequate resources for higher education, particularly in Europe. These arguments are briefly reviewed in this paper. But the case in favour of student loans largely rests on the capability to provide loans that are income-contingent. Indeed, income-contingent repayments are critical to both efficiency (students and lenders should not be deterred due to excessive risk) and equity (contributions should be tailored to ex post ability to pay). But income-contingency comes at a cost that can be expressed as a risk premium that should be supported and shared between graduates and/or taxpayers. The central aim of this paper is to produce realistic estimates of such a risk, identifying the conditions for the implementation of an income-contingent loan scheme in order to channel additional private funding to higher education systems. How does low lifetime income and/or unemployment spells among higher education graduates translates into risk premia? Results, derived from the analysis of Belgian earnings data, suggest that the risk premium ranges from 13% for university (ISCED 6-7) graduates to 26% for non-university (ISCED 5) ones. The paper further investigates the various ways of pooling and shifting this risk, while addressing the danger of public debt classification (ie, student loans classified as public) and adverse selection (ie, unsustainable pooling of high and low risk loans). JEL classification: I28 (Education: Government Policy). H520 (National Government Expenditures and Education).

There are many economic and philosophical arguments supporting the introduction of student loans as a way to complement public financing and secure adequate resources for higher education, particularly in Europe. These arguments are briefly reviewed in this paper. But the case in favour of student loans largely rests on the capability to provide loans that are income-contingent. Indeed, income-contingent repayments are critical to both efficiency (students and lenders should not be deterred due to excessive risk) and equity (contributions should be tailored to ex post ability to pay). But income-contingency comes at a cost that can be expressed as a risk premium that should be supported and shared between graduates and/or taxpayers. The central aim of this paper is to produce realistic estimates of such a risk, identifying the conditions for the implementation of an income-contingent loan scheme in order to channel additional private funding to higher education systems. How does low lifetime income and/or unemployment spells among higher education graduates translates into risk premia? Results, derived from the analysis of Belgian earnings data, suggest that the risk premium ranges from 13% for university (ISCED 6-7) graduates to 26% for non-university (ISCED 5) ones. The paper further investigates the various ways of pooling and shifting this risk, while addressing the danger of public debt classification (ie, student loans classified as public) and adverse selection (ie, unsustainable pooling of high and low risk loans). JEL classification: I28 (Education: Government Policy). H520 (National Government Expenditures and Education).