Concentration in Seed and Biotech Markets: Extent, Causes, and Impacts
In: Annual Review of Resource Economics, Volume 12, Issue 1, p. 129-147
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In: Annual Review of Resource Economics, Volume 12, Issue 1, p. 129-147
SSRN
Despite the growing importance of geographical indications (GI), relatively little attention has been devoted to studying the optimal size of a GI region, as well as how lobbying by interest groups may affect the actual size. We develop a political economy model of the size of geographical indications, taking into account possible effects on perceived quality as well as on cost sharing among producers. We show that the political process may result in a GI area that is smaller or larger than the social optimum, not just depending on the relative political influence of existing and potential producers, but also on how changes in quality affect consumer welfare.
BASE
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 96, Issue 1, p. 154-171
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Almost half of the world's vineyards are in the EU and the EU produces around 60% of the world's wine. The EU is also the world's most regulated wine market. In 2007, the European Union decided on a major refirm of its wine policy, the so-called Common Market Organization (CMO) for wine. A crucial element was the abolishment of a system of planting rights to regulate planting of vineyards in the EU. However, before its implementation opponents of the liberalization of planting rights are lobbying EU governments to reverse the decision. Our paper provides the first theoretical analysis of the economic effects and the welfare implications of planting rights. Our model integrates the markets for land, planting rights and wine to analyze the efficiency and distributional effects. We analyze the impact of enforcement problems, trade restrictions, and the use of government reserves in the planting rights system.
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Retailers' private standards are increasingly important in addressing consumer concerns about safety, quality and social and environmental issues. Empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts. This article develops a political economy model that may contribute to explaining this stylized fact. We show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard, retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one, depending on several factors.
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Working paper
In: Economic Development and Cultural Change, Volume 67, Issue 3, p. 493-535
ISSN: 1539-2988
In: Business history, Volume 58, Issue 5, p. 694-724
ISSN: 1743-7938
In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant's optimum and the government's optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers.
BASE
In: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/370736
In this article we study the political process that governs the creation and size of new Geographical Indications (GIs). Producers can choose to apply for a GI and subsequently go through a bargaining process with the government. We derive the optimal GI area from the point of view of consumers, producers, social welfare, and the government; and we show how bargaining leads to a GI size in between the applicant's optimum and the government's optimum. Under the assumption that the non-GI good is a commodity, any GI implemented through the political process is welfare-enhancing, but not all welfare-enhancing GIs will be proposed by producers.
BASE
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Working paper
In: LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance Discussion Paper No.325/2013
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Working paper
In: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Discussion Paper 308/2012
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Working paper
Over the past decades, the world has witnessed an unprecedented growth in global value chains, propelled by increasingly demanding quality standards. These trends lead to concerns about the impact of value chains on development and poverty and about the possible protectionist nature of quality standards in rich countries. This book offers the first integrated theoretical analysis of the economic and political factors which determine the level of quality standards, as well as their economic effects along the value chain. Using realistic assumptions motivated by empirical research, the theoretical framework in this book makes it possible to study the efficiency effects as well as the distributional consequences of one of the most striking evolutions affecting global trade and development today
In: Applied economic perspectives and policy, Volume 41, Issue 4, p. 620-649
ISSN: 2040-5804
AbstractThis paper provides an overview and analysis of wine regulations in an international and historical comparative perspective. Wine is an excellent sector to study government interventions because for centuries wine markets have been subject to many government regulations that differ greatly within and between countries. Wine consumption taxes, for example, range from zero in some countries to more than 100% in others. The European Union has extensive quantity and quality regulations for wine, while other major producers such as Australia and the United States are much less regulated. After a general overview of current regulations and historical evolutions, we analyze three key wine regulations in more detail: consumption taxes, planting rights, and geographical indications. Most wine regulations reveal a tension between the public interest and vested private interests.