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Schism: China, America and the Fracturing of the Global Trading System. Paul Blustein. Waterloo, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019, 360 pages
In: Politique étrangère: revue trimestrielle publiée par l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Band Hiver, Heft 4, S. VII-VII
ISSN: 1958-8992
L'impact géoéconomique de la COVID-19 sur l'économie généralisée
In: Outre-terre: revue française de géopolitique, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 23-46
ISSN: 1951-624X
La suprématie de l'Union européenne face à la Chine en Méditerranée
In: Monde chinois: nouvelle Asie ; revue trimestrielle, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 102-120
Cet article analyse la pénétration commerciale chinoise dans la Méditerranée non européenne et comment elle affecte la présence économique de l'Union Européenne. En procédant à une analyse historique économique et géopolitique des pays de la région, il met en évidence leur hétérogénéité. Il montre en quoi la présence économique chinoise pourrait notamment s'expliquer par le positionnement géopolitique des différents pays de la région et du degré d'ouverture commerciale auprès des firmes européennes occidentales qui en a résulté depuis leur indépendance. Il analyse ensuite les sources de tension entre la Chine et l'Union européenne liée à l'expansion économique chinoise dans cette région.
L'impact géoéconomique de la COVID-19 sur l'économie généralisée
In: Outre-terre: revue française de géopolitique, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 25
ISSN: 1951-624X
Le projet mercantiliste de Trump : une tentative pour les firmes américaines de garder le contrôle de la chaîne de valeur globale face à la montée des économies émergentes et à la Chine dans une période de crise mondiale
In: Outre-terre: revue française de géopolitique, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 31-48
ISSN: 1951-624X
Stratégie Singapour : la chimère des brexiters
In: Outre-terre: revue française de géopolitique, Band 49, Heft 4, S. 47-58
ISSN: 1951-624X
L'Union eurasienne : un projet d'intégration régionale contrepoids à la Chine et à l'UE Un dessein géopolitique sans dynamique économique
In: Outre-terre: revue française de géopolitique, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 217-235
ISSN: 1951-624X
La reconfiguration industrielle globale et la crise mondiale
In: Outre-terre: revue française de géopolitique, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 149-198
ISSN: 1951-624X
Quand les États pensaient (à des degrés divers) la mondialisation
In: Outre-terre: revue française de géopolitique, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 25-27
ISSN: 1951-624X
Is a strengthening south-south regional integration possible? The case of Mercosur and Latin America
This article will look at the structural difficulties that regional integration faces in Latin America and in particular will analyze the evolution and prospects of Mercosur. It will show that regional integration could only fully develop at the end of the Cold War but this period coincided with the adoption of the Washington Consensus and that meant that the largest Latin American economies renounced to a substantial part of their import substitution industrialization policies. The global economic context reinforced the specialization of Mercosur and the rest of South American economies on commodities and energy sectors. This has generated a higher macroeconomic instability and more tensions between the member States of the Mercosur. It has also weakened the lobby of industrialists in shaping economic policies. The relative weakness of the industry in this region explains why the enterprise-driven regionalization will be weaker than in other regional integration processes such as the EU, NAFTA or ASEAN where it played a decisive role in the deepening of the economic integration. Introduction
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Is a strengthening south-south regional integration possible? The case of Mercosur and Latin America
This article will look at the structural difficulties that regional integration faces in Latin America and in particular will analyze the evolution and prospects of Mercosur. It will show that regional integration could only fully develop at the end of the Cold War but this period coincided with the adoption of the Washington Consensus and that meant that the largest Latin American economies renounced to a substantial part of their import substitution industrialization policies. The global economic context reinforced the specialization of Mercosur and the rest of South American economies on commodities and energy sectors. This has generated a higher macroeconomic instability and more tensions between the member States of the Mercosur. It has also weakened the lobby of industrialists in shaping economic policies. The relative weakness of the industry in this region explains why the enterprise-driven regionalization will be weaker than in other regional integration processes such as the EU, NAFTA or ASEAN where it played a decisive role in the deepening of the economic integration. Introduction
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Is a strengthening south-south regional integration possible? The case of Mercosur and Latin America
This article will look at the structural difficulties that regional integration faces in Latin America and in particular will analyze the evolution and prospects of Mercosur. It will show that regional integration could only fully develop at the end of the Cold War but this period coincided with the adoption of the Washington Consensus and that meant that the largest Latin American economies renounced to a substantial part of their import substitution industrialization policies. The global economic context reinforced the specialization of Mercosur and the rest of South American economies on commodities and energy sectors. This has generated a higher macroeconomic instability and more tensions between the member States of the Mercosur. It has also weakened the lobby of industrialists in shaping economic policies. The relative weakness of the industry in this region explains why the enterprise-driven regionalization will be weaker than in other regional integration processes such as the EU, NAFTA or ASEAN where it played a decisive role in the deepening of the economic integration. Introduction
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China's Industrial Policy
China's current industrial policy has been pursuing long term objectives and can be traced back to the late 1970s. The new CCP leadership under General Secretary Xi Jinping has not altered in any fundamental way these objectives. These are part of a long-term policy defined in the framework of the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans and other long-term programmes for scientific and technological development. Foreign investors have recently expressed concern due to negative media campaigns and government crackdowns on foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in China: the prosecution for bribery of GSK executives, fines imposed on Danone and five other MNEs under China's anti-monopoly regulations1 and shaming campaigns against GSK, VW, Samsung or Apple. At the same time, blatant privileged access to key PRC public procurements is granted to Chinese national champions, notably in the development of hundreds of thousands of 4G base stations.2 Moreover, Xi Jinping is explicitly rehabilitating Mao's legacy and CCP propaganda is encouraging virtuous and altruist behaviour, putting forward ideological icons from the 1960s.3 There has been a lot of speculation over whether this represents a change in policy on the part of the Chinese leadership that will restrict the room for manoeuvre of foreign investors in order to give more space for the development of Chinese national champions (as countries like Japan or South Korea once did) or simply a temporary leftist turn to strengthen Xi Jinping's hold on the CCP before he can actually proceed with an agenda of further liberalisation of the economy, as previously forecast by some analysts.
BASE
China's Industrial Policy
China's current industrial policy has been pursuing long term objectives and can be traced back to the late 1970s. The new CCP leadership under General Secretary Xi Jinping has not altered in any fundamental way these objectives. These are part of a long-term policy defined in the framework of the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans and other long-term programmes for scientific and technological development. Foreign investors have recently expressed concern due to negative media campaigns and government crackdowns on foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in China: the prosecution for bribery of GSK executives, fines imposed on Danone and five other MNEs under China's anti-monopoly regulations1 and shaming campaigns against GSK, VW, Samsung or Apple. At the same time, blatant privileged access to key PRC public procurements is granted to Chinese national champions, notably in the development of hundreds of thousands of 4G base stations.2 Moreover, Xi Jinping is explicitly rehabilitating Mao's legacy and CCP propaganda is encouraging virtuous and altruist behaviour, putting forward ideological icons from the 1960s.3 There has been a lot of speculation over whether this represents a change in policy on the part of the Chinese leadership that will restrict the room for manoeuvre of foreign investors in order to give more space for the development of Chinese national champions (as countries like Japan or South Korea once did) or simply a temporary leftist turn to strengthen Xi Jinping's hold on the CCP before he can actually proceed with an agenda of further liberalisation of the economy, as previously forecast by some analysts.
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