Tariff jumping foreign investment and capital taxation
In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 260
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In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 260
In: Economics & politics, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 33-59
ISSN: 1468-0343
When shock therapy is politically infeasible, will gradualism work? This paper takes up this question by: (i) building a political economy model in which it makes sense; (ii) stating the relevant political economy constraint rigorously; and (iii) analyzing the question in the context of a neoclassical model of adjustment, based on Mussa (1978). The paper answers the question in the affirmative, thus contributing to the scientific and policy literature on the economic analysis of policy reform.
In: Economics & politics, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 33-60
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 25, Heft 12, S. 1989-2006
ISSN: 0165-1889
SSRN
Working paper
In: The International trade journal, Band 25, Heft 5, S. 581-618
ISSN: 1521-0545
In: Emerging markets, finance and trade: EMFT, Band 42, Heft 6, S. 46-58
ISSN: 1558-0938
This study is motivated by frequent calls to harmonize labor standards across countries, which result from the fear that economic integration (and the accompanying liberalization of trade flows) will lead to an erosion of working conditions, as countries deliberately try to reduce labor standards in order to maintain competitiveness. We examine the linkages between labor standards and economic integration in the European Union (EU) and, in particular, investigate the following questions. First, whether the conventional wisdom that labor standards are important determinants of trade performance holds, and second whether there has been a race to the bottom" of standards across countries with deeper integration. We follow a neoclassical factor-proportions framework to conduct our empirical investigation, and unlike previous studies, which rely mostly on cross-sectional data, we use a fully-fledged panel data set to explore the relationship between labor standards and export performance. Our estimates based on data for the period 1980-2001 for EU-15 countries provides mixed evidence regarding the conventional wisdom, and we find that trade performance is largely based on factor endowments. We also find mixed evidence for ó-convergence" in labor standards.
BASE
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1746
SSRN
In: Journal of international trade & economic development: an international and comparative review, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 179-198
ISSN: 1469-9559
In: Politics & society, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 403-430
ISSN: 1552-7514
In: Politics & society, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 403-430
ISSN: 0032-3292
Tax competition poses two problems for international cooperation: defection and distributive conflict. Multilateral cooperation to stop tax competition may fail because states face incentives to renege on their promises or because they face adverse distributional consequences, either of which makes cooperation an unattractive option for them. Conventional wisdom in international relations concentrates on the first problem, highlighting that the problem of tax competition resembles a Prisoner's dilemma. We argue instead that it is the peculiar distributional consequences of tax competition which explain why all attempts to regulate it cooperatively have failed. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical research on the European Union's unsuccessful record of tax cooperation, we show how distributive, within-group conflict amongst potential cooperators interacts with the constraints imposed by a non-cooperating outside world to make multilateral tax cooperation an especially elusive goal for international collaboration. ; Der Steuerwettbewerb stellt die internationale Kooperation vor ein Defektionsund ein Verteilungsproblem. Die Kooperation kann scheitern, weil Kooperationszusagen opportunistisch ausgebeutet werden oder weil Verteilungskonflikte verhindern, daß es überhaupt zu solchen Zusagen kommt. Die bisherige Literatur hat sich fast ausschließlich auf das erste Problem konzentriert. Sie zeigt, daß der Steuerwettbewerb die Struktur eines Gefangenendilemmas hat und erklärt dadurch das regelmäßige Scheitern von Kooperationsversuchen. Wir argumentieren dagegen, daß dieses Scheitern in erster Linie auf Verteilungsprobleme zurückzuführen ist. Modelltheoretische Überlegungen und empirische Befunde aus dem europäischen Binnenmarkt zeigen, wie Verteilungskonflikte sowohl zwischen den potentiellen Kooperationspartnern als auch zwischen diesen und dritten Staaten den Steuerwettbewerb zu einem schwer lösbaren Kooperationsproblem werden lassen.
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In: Journal of globalization and development, Band 3, Heft 1
ISSN: 1948-1837
In: The journal of policy reform, Band 7, Heft 2, S. 069-081
ISSN: 1477-2736