Suchergebnisse

The kind of evidences offered in this paper to support the argument is in the first place quantitative. Sections one and two provide simple quantitative overviews of Japan's foreign trade in 1928 and 1934. The other sections are more qualitative. A third section, for instance, explains the reality behind the 1934 foreign trade figures. It shows that, in 1934, Japan was a country under tremendous export pressure. A following section explains which strategies Japan adopted to deal with this export pressure. A final section explains how Brazil fitted into this strategic framework. It must be emphasized that this paper is on how trade with Brazil met Japanese foreign trade objectives. It is not about how trade with Japan met Brazilian foreign trade objectives. This paper also does not provide details on Brazil's growth as a producer of raw cotton. This is already a well documented historical reality.

The literature suggests that cotton textiles should be unattractive for foreign direct investment (FDI). The product is largely undifferentiated; sellers need an intimate knowledge of local markets; and textiles use process technology, which multinational firms cannot monopolize. Indeed, since the 1970s, cotton textiles has been one of the few industries in Brazil in which local capital dominates, joint ventures prevail, and American firms are almost completely absent. Yet, between 1955 and the mid-1970s, Brazil saw significant foreign direct investment in textiles from Japanese firms. There were two successive waves of Japanese investment in the Brazilian cotton textile industry. The first ran from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. The second took place from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. Four Japanese textile firms participated in the first wave—Kanebo, Toyobo, Tsuzuki, and Unitika. Four more—Daiwa, Kurabo, Nisshinbo, and Omi—participated in the second wave.

The 7th Framework Programme will be the most ambitious one to date and signals a stronger role for European research. But, it represents just a small part of total public spending on R&D in the EU, the bulk of which is carried out by the national and regional authorities. Clearly, on its own, it cannot solve all Europe's problems. What is needed, this book argues, is a New Deal for research in Europe. This New Deal would involve the mobilisation of policy actors across all levels--regional, national and European--and their commitment to develop a more effective research system based on actions