Suchergebnisse

This essay makes some points about Hungary and Poland as illiberal democracies. In so doing, it addresses the meaning of this notion and how it applies to these Central European states. A number of relevant factors deserve careful consideration in order to understand the recent constitutional developments in both countries: transition fatigue, long-term institutional patterns, and the implications of European Union membership.

El equilibrio interno de poder de las órdenes federales es un tema importante en el pensamiento constitucional de Kelsen. Su teoría de los conflictos federales está en deuda tanto con los logros de sus investigaciones sobre la teoría del derecho como con su participación directa en los debates de política constitucional en los años veinte y treinta. Al hacerlo, adoptó una postura firme en el momento del golpe prusiano, una importante crisis constitucional en cuya gestión Carl Schmitt también desempeñó un papel importante. En mi ensayo, me basaré en el análisis de Paolo Carrozza sobre la contribución de Kelsen a la teoría constitucional de las federaciones. Se trata de resaltar su relevancia para una comprensión adecuada de los desarrollos más recientes en los sistemas federales, incluidas las consecuencias de las crisis secesionistas en Europa.Recibido: 11 mayo 2019Aceptado: 21 junio 2019Publicación en línea: 31 julio 2019

This essay focuses on electoral laws as a peculiar area of tension between parliaments, in their capacity as law-making bodies, and constitutional courts. In so doing, attention will be paid to the implications of legislative discretion, a notion that is often mentioned in the relevant case law of constitutional courts. Meanwhile, the analysis will turn to the limits that the courts place on legislative action in this domain. This essay considers European constitutional orders as well as Japan.

Abstract
The aim of this contribution is to make some points on the distinction between 'perfect' (or equal) and 'imperfect' (or unequal) bicameralism and its relevance to contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. The analysis starts with an assumption that this distinction is somehow under-theorised. The distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism, finally resulting in a clear prevalence of the latter, mainly focuses on two aspects: the exercise of legislative function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote. In spite of the unquestionable relevance of these two components to the activity of parliaments, these analyses are incomplete. The functions and competences of a given second chamber depend on the way it represents pluralism: the weight that each legal system attaches to the representative role of its own second chamber decisively shapes the perimeter of their functions. Important evidence for validating this claim comes from the procedures for passing constitutional amendments, in which second chambers, even in a number of 'unequal' bicameral systems, are put on equal footing with first chambers.

Abstract
The aim of this essay is to compare the two House of Cards TV series – the British one and the American one – from a constitutional viewpoint. In so doing, the contribution tries to answer some research questions: how are the constitutional systems of the UK and the US respectively portrayed in the two TV series? More generally, how can contemporary political dramas approach constitutional issues?

Abstract The aim of this contribution is to make some points on the distinction between 'perfect' (or equal) and 'imperfect' (or unequal) bicameralism and its relevance to contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. The analysis starts with an assumption that this distinction is somehow under-theorised. The distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism, finally resulting in a clear prevalence of the latter, mainly focuses on two aspects: the exercise of legislative function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote. In spite of the unquestionable relevance of these two components to the activity of parliaments, these analyses are incomplete. The functions and competences of a given second chamber depend on the way it represents pluralism: the weight that each legal system attaches to the representative role of its own second chamber decisively shapes the perimeter of their functions. Important evidence for validating this claim comes from the procedures for passing constitutional amendments, in which second chambers, even in a number of 'unequal' bicameral systems, are put on equal footing with first chambers.

The aim of this contribution is to make some points on the distinction between 'perfect' (or equal) and 'imperfect' (or unequal) bicameralism and its relevance to contemporary discussions about second chambers and their constitutional position. The analysis starts with an assumption that this distinction is somehow under-theorised. The distinction between perfect and imperfect bicameralism, finally resulting in a clear prevalence of the latter, mainly focuses on two aspects: the exercise of legislative function and, in parliamentary regimes, the confidence vote. In spite of the unquestionable relevance of these two components to the activity of parliaments, these analyses are incomplete. The functions and competences of a given second chamber depend on the way it represents pluralism: the weight that each legal system attaches to the representative role of its own second chamber decisively shapes the perimeter of their functions. Important evidence for validating this claim comes from the procedures for passing constitutional amendments, in which second chambers, even in a number of 'unequal' bicameral systems, are put on equal footing with first chambers.

This case note analyses Judgment no. 183/2018 of the Italian Constitutional Court. In this decision the Constitutional Court has struck down the provisions of a regional law of Veneto which introduced an obligation to hoist the regional flag – based on the historic Lion of Saint Mark – on all public buildings located in the Venetian territory, including state buildings. The impugned provisions have been declared unconstitutional for two reasons. First, they illegitimately impinged upon the exclusive state competence to legislate in the field of the legal and administrative organisation of national public agencies and the state itself. Second, they violated fundamental constitutional principles regarding the unity and indivisibility of the Italian Republic and the role of the tricolour flag as a symbol of national unity. This judgment of the Constitutional Court is particularly topical at a time when the state and the Venetian government are negotiating the terms of enhanced autonomy for the region.