Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1. Advocacy group effects in global governance: populations, strategies, and political opportunity structures Lisa M. Dellmuth and Elizabeth A. Bloodgood -- Chapter 2. No borders, no bias? Comparing advocacy group populations at the national and transnational levels Joost Berkhout and Marcel Hanegraaf -- Chapter 3. NGO participation in global governance institutions: international and domestic drivers of engagement Laura A. Henry -- Chapter 4. When do refugees matter? The importance of issue salience for digital advocacy organizations Nina Hall -- Chapter 5. Taking control of regulations: how international advocacy NGOs shape the regulatory environments of their target countries Andrew Heiss -- Chapter 6. Competition and strategic differentiation among transnational advocacy groups Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni -- Chapter 7. Correction to: Lobbying the lobbyists: when and why do policymakers seek to influence advocacy groups in global governance? Kirsten Lucas, Marcel Hanegraaff and Iskander De Bruycker -- Chapter 8. The stakes of global venue shopping: examining bank lobbying in the Basel Committee and the European Union Adam William Chalmers and Adela Alexandra Iacobov -- Chapter 9. Transnational partnerships' strategies in global fisheries governance Matilda Tove Petersson -- Chapter 10. Close cousins or false friends? Studying interest groups and INGOs Darren R. Halpin -- Chapter11. Civil society and global governance: Exploring transscalar connections Jan Aart Scholte.

AbstractThis article offers the first systematic and comparative analysis of the effects of elite communication on citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs). Departing from cueing theory, it develops novel hypotheses about the effects of elite communication under the specific conditions of global governance. It tests these hypotheses by conducting a population-based survey experiment among almost 10,000 residents of three countries in relation to five IOs. The evidence suggests four principal findings. First, communication by national governments and civil society organizations has stronger effects on legitimacy perceptions than communication by IOs themselves. Secondly, elite communication affects legitimacy perceptions irrespective of whether it invokes IOs' procedures or performance as grounds for criticism or endorsement. Thirdly, negative messages are more effective than positive messages in shaping citizens' legitimacy perceptions. Fourthly, comparing across IOs indicates that elite communication is more often effective in relation to the IMF, NAFTA and WTO, than the EU and UN.

Abstract
Global governance is no longer a matter of state cooperation or bureaucratic politics. Since the end of the cold war, advocacy groups have proliferated and enjoyed increasing access to global governance institutions such as the European Union, World Trade Organization, and the United Nations climate conferences. This special issue seeks to push theories of interest groups and international non-governmental organizations forward. We argue that the advocacy group effects on global governance institutions are best understood by examining how groups use and shape domestic and global political opportunity structures. The individual articles examine how, when, and why domestic and global political opportunity structures shape advocacy group effects in global governance, across global institutions, levels of government, advocacy organizations, issue areas, and over time. As special interests are becoming increasingly involved in global governance, we need to better understand how advocacy organizations may impact global public goods provision.

Global governance is no longer a matter of state cooperation or bureaucratic politics. Since the end of the cold war, advocacy groups have proliferated and enjoyed increasing access to global governance institutions such as the European Union, World Trade Organization, and the United Nations climate conferences. This special issue seeks to push theories of interest groups and international non-governmental organizations forward. We argue that the advocacy group effects on global governance institutions are best understood by examining how groups use and shape domestic and global political opportunity structures. The individual articles examine how, when, and why domestic and global political opportunity structures shape advocacy group effects in global governance, across global institutions, levels of government, advocacy organizations, issue areas, and over time. As special interests are becoming increasingly involved in global governance, we need to better understand how advocacy organizations may impact global public goods provision.

While public support is central to the problem-solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens' support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals' immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.

While public support is central to the problem-solving capacity of the European Union (EU), we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens' support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. We argue, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, we argue that support for the EU is a function of the fit between EU spending and regional need targeted by spending. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy, and environmental protection in 126 EU regions over the period 2001- 2011 corroborate our argument. As the EU and other international organizations become increasingly publicly contested, the organizations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions. ; Elite communication and the social legitimacy of international organizations

While public support is central to the problem-solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens' support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals' immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.

AbstractWhile public support is central to the problem‐solving capacity of the European Union, we know little about when and why the EU can increase its citizens' support through spending. Extensive research finds that citizens living in countries that are net beneficiaries of the EU budget are more supportive of the EU, assuming that citizens care equally about all forms of spending. It is argued in this article, however, that the amount of spending is only part of the story. Understanding the effects of spending on support requires a consideration of how transfers are spent. Drawing on policy feedback theories in comparative politics, it is shown that support for the EU is a function of the fit between the spending area and economic need in individuals' immediate living context. Results from a statistical analysis of EU spending on human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental protection in 127 EU regions over the period 2001–2011 corroborate this argument. As the EU and other international organisations become increasingly publicly contested, the organisations themselves may increasingly try to shore up public support through spending, but they will only be successful under specific conditions.

While there is broad consensus that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sometimes succeed in influencing policy making within international organizations (IOs), there is much less agreement on the factors that make NGO lobbying effective. This article makes two contributions to this debate. First, the determinants of influence among NGOs active in different IOs, issue areas and policy phases are examined. The analysis builds on original survey data of more than 400 NGOs involved in five different IOs, complemented by elite interviews with IO and state officials. Secondly, the article advances a specific argument about how the strategic exchange of information and access between NGOs and IOs increases NGO influence in IOs. This argument, derived from theories of lobbying in American and European politics, is contrasted with three alternative explanations of NGO influence, privileging material resources, transnational networks and public opinion mobilization, and the broader implications of these results for research on NGOs in global governance are explored.

Climate-related security challenges are transnational in character, leading states to increasingly rely on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – such as the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization – for policy solutions. While climate security issues do typically not fit comfortably within the mandates of existing IGOs, recent decades have seen increasing efforts by IGOs to link climate change and security. This article reviews existing studies on IGOs' responses to climate security challenges. It draws together research from several bodies of literature spanning political science, international relations, and environmental social science, identifying an emerging field of research revolving around IGOs and climate security. We observe significant advancement in this young field, with scholars extending and enriching our understanding of how and why IGOs address climate security challenges. Yet we still know little about the conditions under which IGOs respond to climate security challenges and when they do so effectively. This article discusses the main gaps in current work and makes some suggestions about how these gaps may be usefully addressed in future research. A better understanding of the conditions under which IGOs respond (effectively) to climate security challenges would contribute to broader debates on climate security, institutional change, and effectiveness in international relations and environmental social science, and may facilitate crafting effective global solutions to society's most intractable climate security challenges.

This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states' power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are three-fold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success—particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity.

This article provides a systematic assessment of bargaining success in the reform of the Eurozone 2010 to 2015. Theoretically, we develop an argument about preferences and institutions as determinants of bargaining success and contrast this argument with an alternative account privileging states' power resources. Empirically, we conduct a statistical analysis of new data covering all key reform proposals. Our findings are three-fold. First, contrary to a conventional narrative of German dominance, the negotiations produced no clear winners and losers. Second, while power resources were of limited importance, holding preferences that were centrist or close to the European Commission favored bargaining success—particularly when adoption only required the support of a qualified majority. Third, these descriptive and explanatory results reflect dynamics of compromise and reciprocity.

This article examines the extent to which economic or political factors shaped government preferences in the reform of the Economic Monetary Union. A multilevel analysis of European Union member governments' preferences on 40 EMU reform issues negotiated between 2010 and 2015 suggests that countries' financial sector exposure has significant explanatory power. Seeking to minimize the risk of costly bailouts, countries with highly exposed financial sectors were more likely to support solutions involving high degrees of European integration. In contrast, political factors had no systematic impact. These findings help to enhance our understanding of preference formation in the European Union and the viability of future EMU reform.