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Background:Social distancing and mass quarantines were implemented worldwide in response to the current COVID-19 pandemic. Prior research has shown that such measures bear negative consequences for population mental health and well-being. Conversely, a growing body of evidence suggests that feeling positively identified with a group is associated with physical and mental health benefits.Aims:This study tested whether national identification could promote wellbeing and physical health during the COVID-19 pandemic.Method:We used survey data conducted among 67 countries ( N = 46,450).Results:Mixed-model analyses revealed that national identity was associated with wellbeing – despite adjustment on social belonging, COVID-19 perceived risk, exposure and ideology. This effect did not extend to physical health.Conclusions:These results suggest that the mere feeling of belonging to a national group may have mental health benefits. We discuss the implications of our findings within the social cure framework and their relevance for population mental health under COVID-19.

Despite the scientific consensus about the anthropogenic nature of climate change, there are still obstacles hindering society from acknowledging the severity of the situation. Notably, previous research suggests that climate change threats can cause people to display ethnocentric reactions to preserve the ingroup's interests. In this research, we investigate the relation between collective narcissism and attitudes towards climate science. We argue that national collective narcissism is negatively associated with the acceptance of climate science. We further hypothesized that this relation might be mediated by conspiracy beliefs about climate change, because narcissistic identifiers are prone to hold conspiracy beliefs. In a pilot study (N = 409), we found that national collective narcissism was significantly associated with climate change conspiracy beliefs. In Study 1 (N = 295), climate change conspiracy beliefs mediated the negative relation between national collective narcissism and acceptance of climate science. In Study 2 (N = 375), this mediation was replicated when controlling for other forms of climate skepticism. Lastly, general conspiracy mentality did not mediate this relation, which emphasizes the importance of considering the specificity of climate change conspiracy theories (rather than generic propensity to believe in conspiracy theories) in understanding distrust of climate science. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Objective. The objective of this research was to describe and analyze the role of psychological and behavioral factors on perceptions of COVID-19 in France and Quebec at three different times during the pandemic. Design. We conducted three qualitative and quantitative studies (Study 1 N = 255, Study 2 N = 230, Study 3 N = 143). Participants were asked to evaluate psychological and behavioral measures: at the beginning of lockdown (Study 1), during lockdown (Study 2), and during lockdown exit (Study 3). Results. Results of Study 1 show that perceptions of COVID-19 are organized around fear and a sense of threat. During the lockdown, participants mentioned for the first time the health practices to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (Study 2). Psychological and social impacts constitute a central theme in participants' discourse (Study 2 and 3). Conclusions. The results show that perceptions of risk during a pandemic are socially constructed. Perceptions seem to be influenced by the political and health management of a territory and by the evolution of behavioral and psychological responses.

Research suggests that belief in conspiracy theories (CT) stems from basic psychological mechanisms and is linked to other belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs). While previous research has extensively examined individual and contextual variables associated with CT beliefs, it has not yet investigated the role of culture. In the current research, we tested, based on a situated cultural cognition perspective, the extent to which culture predicts CT beliefs. Using Hofstede's model of cultural values, three nation‐level analyses of data from 25, 19, and 18 countries using different measures of CT beliefs (Study 1, N = 5323; Study 2a, N = 12,255; Study 2b, N = 30,994) revealed positive associations between masculinity, collectivism, and CT beliefs. A cross‐sectional study among U.S. citizens (Study 3, N = 350), using individual‐level measures of Hofstede's values, replicated these findings. A meta‐analysis of correlations across studies corroborated the presence of positive links between CT beliefs, collectivism, r = .31, 95% CI = [.15; .47], and masculinity, r = .39, 95% CI = [.18; .59]. Our results suggest that in addition to individual differences and contextual variables, cultural factors also play an important role in shaping CT beliefs.

The present study examines current social representations associated with the origins of the Great War, a major event that has profoundly affected Europe. A survey conducted in 20 European countries (N = 1906 students in social sciences) shows a high consensus: The outbreak of the war is attributed to the warring nations leaders while the responsibility of the populations is minimized. Building on the concept of social representation of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005), we suggest that the social representations of the Great War fulfill social psychological functions in contemporary Europe. We suggest that WWI may function as a charter for European integration. Their content also suggests a desire to distinguish a positively valued ingroup ("the people") from powerful elites, construed as an outgroup. ; (VLID)3569181

The present study examines current social representations associated with the origins of the Great War, a major event that has profoundly affected Europe. A survey conducted in 20 European countries (N = 1906 students in social sciences) shows a high consensus: The outbreak of the war is attributed to the warring nations' leaders while the responsibility of the populations is minimized. Building on the concept of social representation of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005), we suggest that the social representations of the Great War fulfill social psychological functions in contemporary Europe. We suggest that WWI may function as a charter for European integration. Their content also suggests a desire to distinguish a positively valued ingroup ("the people") from powerful elites, construed as an outgroup. ; This research was conducted within the framework of COST Action IS1205 "Social psychological dynamics of historical representations in the enlarged European Union. ...

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (i.e., conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation), or among both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N=104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, even though small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (i.e., those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion