Suchergebnisse

Ranking methods are fundamental tools in many areas. Popular methods aggregate the statements of 'experts' in different ways. As such, there are various reasonable ranking methods, each one of them more or less adapted to the environment under consideration. This paper introduces a new method, called the handicap-based method, and characterizes it through appealing properties. This method assigns not only scores to the items but also weights to the experts. Scores and weights form an equilibrium for a relationship based on the notion of handicaps. The method is, in a sense made precise in the paper, the counterpart to the counting method in environments that require intensity-invariance. Intensity-invariance is a desirable property when the intensity of the experts' statements has to be controlled. Otherwise, both the counting and handicap-based methods satisfy a property called homogeneity, which is a desirable property when cardinal statements matter, as is the case in many applications. The method is illustrated for ranking economic journals.

Dans de nombreuses situations politiques et économiques, deux forces dominent la formation de groupes : d'une part les rendements attendus d'une coordination à l'intérieur d'un groupe croissent avec sa taille, d'autre part la diversité des préférences et des goûts freinent la coordination, défavorisant les groupes larges et hétérogènes. Lorsque ces deux forces, de direction opposée, sont à l'œuvre, on peut s'attendre à la formation de plusieurs groupes disjoints, chacun exploitant les rendements croissants tout en répondant aux préférences de ces membres. Sous quelles conditions peut-on espérer une organisation efficace et stable de la société ? La libre mobilité des individus et la libre formation de coalitions suffisent-elles ? Cet article présente les approches théoriques à ces questions ainsi que quelques études empiriques récentes.

In a large range of political and economic situations, the formation of coordinated groups is driven by two opposite forces: increasing returns to size on the one hand, the heterogeneity of preferences, which hampers coordination , on the other. An important question is whether competitive pressures, such as described by free mobility and free entry, lead to an efficient and stable organization of the society into possibly several self-sufficient groups. This paper discusses theoretical approaches to this question as well as recent empirical studies.

In a large range of political and economic situations, the formation of coordinated groups is driven by two opposite forces: increasing returns to size on the one hand, the heterogeneity of preferences, which hampers coordination , on the other. An important question is whether competitive pressures, such as described by free mobility and free entry, lead to an efficient and stable organization of the society into possibly several self-sufficient groups. This paper discusses theoretical approaches to this question as well as recent empirical studies.

In a large range of political and economic situations, the formation of coordinated groups is driven by two opposite forces: increasing returns to size on the one hand, the heterogeneity of preferences, which hampers coordination , on the other. An important question is whether competitive pressures, such as described by free mobility and free entry, lead to an efficient and stable organization of the society into possibly several self-sufficient groups. This paper discusses theoretical approaches to this question as well as recent empirical studies.

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries

This paper proposes to measure the spill-over effects that cross-liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion -the aggregate debt repayments- the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures -one for each institutionsummarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources and they can be useful to determine optimal intervention policies. The approach is illustrated to evaluate the consolidated foreign claims of 10 EU countries