Suchergebnisse

Over the second half of the twentieth century rapid population growth in the less developed countries has redrawn the global demographic map. Many once‐poor countries have also experienced strong economic growth, which in combination with the demographic change has yielded marked shifts in the world's economic balance, with far‐reaching geopolitical implications. At the same time, low fertility in much of the developed world presages a future of population shrinkage, accompanied by pronounced population aging. In per capita terms, the economic advantages of the developed countries will likely persist for many years, but their actual and potential falls in population may accentuate their loss of relative economic power and eventually lead to marginalization of their international standing and influence. Preventing population shrinkage will be an urgent task for them, requiring either large‐scale immigration (likely to be ruled out) or raising the birth rate. Existing pro‐family policies have had at best modest effects on fertility levels. Two novel approaches are described that would plausibly have greater impact. One would counteract the disproportionate influence of older voters in the electorate by granting voting rights to all citizens, allowing custodial parents to vote on behalf of their children. The second would reform the public pension system to reestablish the link between the financial security of retired persons and the number of children they have raised to productive adulthood.

The long‐range population projections of the United Nations issued in 2003 span three centuries and are elaborated for all countries of the world according to the present‐day political map. This note discusses the merits and limitations of this ambitious enterprise. The numerical implications of various contrasting assumptions concerning fertility, in combination with single hypothetical future schedules of mortality and international migration, provide a valuable frame of reference for contemplating possible long‐range demographic trajectories. The dominant suggestion of these projections of a surprise‐free convergence to a stationary or slowly declining population is, however, questionable: with respect to global numbers, relative magnitudes of the constituting units of the global total, and the time pattern of change the demographic future is likely to be far less orderly.

The article discusses issues raised by persistent below‐replacement fertility in Europe. The continent's demographic predicament is highlighted by comparing age structures and relative population sizes between populations in and outside Europe—such as those of Russia and Yemen and those of an enlarged 25‐country European Union and a 25‐country hinterland to the EU in North Africa and West Asia—during the past 50 years and prospectively up to 2050, based on United Nations estimates and projections. Potential geopolitical aspects of the population shifts are considered. European policy responses to them are found largely wanting. With respect to the key demographic variable, fertility, explicit pronatalism is rejected by most European governments. A set of policy measures that commands wide support, with the hoped‐for side effect of raising birth rates, seeks to make women's participation in the formal labor force compatible with childrearing. The effectiveness of such measures, however, is likely to be limited. Continued below‐replacement fertility, higher immigration from outside Europe, negative population growth, and loss of demographic weight within the global population are safe predictions for the Europe of the twenty‐first century.

Population policies are deliberately constructed or modified institutional arrangements and/or specific programs through which governments influence, directly or indirectly, demographic change. For any given country, the aim of population policy may be narrowly construed as bringing about quantitative changes in the membership of the territorially circumscribed population under the government's jurisdiction. Governments' concern with population matters can also extend beyond the borders of their own jurisdictions. Thus, international aspects of population policy have become increasingly salient in the contemporary world. Additions to the population are primarily the result of individual decisions concerning childbearing. Within the constraints of their social milieu, these decisions reflect an implicit calculus by parents about the private costs and benefits of children. But neither costs nor benefits of fertility are likely to be fully internal to the family: they can also impose burdens and advantages on others in the society. Such externalities, negative and positive, represent a legitimate concern for all those affected. The paper briefly discusses how individual and collective interests were reconciled in traditional societies, summarizes the population policy approaches adopted by the classic liberal state, and sketches government responses to the low-fertility demographic regime that emerged in the West between the two World Wars. In greater detail it considers international population policies after World War II and contemporary population policy responses to below-replacement fertility.

Der Beitrag diskutiert die Frage, ob es auch in demographischer Hinsicht einen zur "unsichtbaren Hand" von A. Smith analogen Wirkungsmechanismus gibt, der die generativen Entscheidungen der einzelnen auf der Makroebene zu einem kollektiv optimalen Zustand auf der Makroebene transformiert. Der Autor kommt zu dem Schluß, daß es einen solchen Mechanismus nicht gibt und daß daher bevölkerungspolitische Aktivitäten des Staates (zur Herstellung eines optimalen Zustands) prinzipiell gerechtfertigt sind. Er verweist darauf, daß Prozesse der "unsichtbaren Hand" nicht immer zu besseren kollektiven Zuständen führen (z. B. Umweltverschmutzung). Der Autor diskutiert anschließend verschiedene Äußerungen von Malthus zur Bevölkerungsentwicklung und hebt die Notwendigkeit hervor, den durch den Geburtenrückgang in vielen westlichen Gesellschaften drohenden negativen externen Effekten (Zusammenbruch der Alterssicherung) durch politische Maßnahmen gegenzusteuern. Abschließend weist der Autor auf den unzureichenden Wissenstand der Demographie hin, der noch nicht ausreicht, "um die Kluft zwischen privatem Interesse und öffentlichem Nutzen in Gesellschaften mit niedrigem Geburtenniveau auszuloten und mögliche Lösungen für eine strukturelle, institutionelle Reform zu erkunden". (PF)