EMU and the external value of the EURO
In: Discussion paper series 2058
In: International macroeconomics
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In: Discussion paper series 2058
In: International macroeconomics
In: Discussion paper series 1842
In: International macroeconomics
In: Advances in Computational Economics; Quantitative Economic Policy, S. 157-184
In: Intereconomics: review of European economic policy, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 173-177
ISSN: 1613-964X
In: Intereconomics: review of European economic policy, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 195-200
ISSN: 1613-964X
In both Europe and the United States, interest rates have been declining for more than fifteen years. For much of this period, real interest rates have been negative and they are expected to remain negative for at least another decade. The literature associates this decline in interest rates with a similarly protracted decline in productivity. But the decline in productivity appears paradoxical given major technological advances. The decline in the price of capital is underpinned by the factors that have caused a decline in demand for capital, as well as a relative increase in its supply. On the supply side, aging and an increase in overall macroeconomic risk since the financial crisis have both led to increased savings. On the demand side, the increase in the importance of intangible capital in production has reduced the demand for physical capital. Nevertheless, for the US, the literature has identified the increase in market concentration as the biggest factor responsible for the reduction in the overall demand for capital. Digital innovation has led to the creation of champion firms that have captured big market shares and have been able to prevent others from entering not only the US market, but markets globally. This has dampened investment. Europe is affected by US digital dominance, but other factors, including aging and increased risk, are more prominent in sustaining the downward pressure on interest rates. In particular, the lack of risk capital, in the context of capital markets, contributes to this downward pressure in the EU. As the knowledge economy relies increasingly on intangible capital, a bank-based system that requires collateral is not well suited to finance investments. A lack of suitable finance will remain an important factor in the downward pressure on interest rates. The structural factors behind the downward pressure on interest rates imply that macroeconomic policy will have a reduced role in managing aggregate demand. Monetary policy in the euro area will be more about preventing financial fragmentation and less about stimulating demand. Equally, fiscal policy will have more of a supporting rather than stimulating role. Tackling the structural decline in market dynamism and therefore in real rates will require structural policies to reduce market power globally and ensure the creation of capital markets in the EU.
BASE
Productivity growth in Europe has been on a downward trend for several decades. Given that productivity growth is a crucial source of output growth, particularly in an aging society like the European Union, it is crucial to understand what is driving this slowdown and what the potential consequences are for our economic model and for citizens' welfare.Some explanations for this trend are global in nature, but there are also significant dif-ferences in country structures in Europe that have led to different outcomes and that need to be accounted for before policy prescriptions can be made.The objective of MICROPROD, an EU-wide research project that runs until the end of 2021, is to contribute to this research strand by using data from various European countries to study the microeconomic mechanisms behind this macroeconomic phenomenon. In particular, the aim is to understand the challenges posed to Europe by the fourth industrial revolution and its impact on productivity in the context of globalisation and digitalisation, and to recommend policies to address these challenges.MICROPROD researchers have so far delivered 20 papers on four broad issues relevant for today's policy debates: the measurement and effects of intangible capital on productivity; the impact of globalisation, international trade and the integration of global value chains (GVCs) on productivity; factor allocation and allocative efficiency; and finally the social consequences of the two structural shocks Europe has faced in the last two decades: globalisation and technological progress. This Policy Contribution reviews the main conclusions of these 20 MICROPROD papers and how they inform policy debates. However, the mid-point of the three-year MICROPROD project also coincided with the start of the COVID-19 crisis, which might have accelerated some trends or possibly reversed others. We therefore discuss how some of the messages of MICROPROD research may contribute to our understanding of the current crisis and its aftermath.
BASE
Four major developments have challenged the status quo and reopened the debate on the forms that money will take in the future: 1) use of cash as a medium of exchange has declined; 2) distributed ledger technology (DLT) has led to the emergence of thousands of digital cryptocurrencies; 3) some global tech giants are planning to provide private digital currencies to their billions of users in the form of stablecoins; and 4) in turn, public authorities are thinking about providing their own digital currencies to the general public. These developments raise questions about the implications for financial stability, the transmission of monetary policy and financial intermediation. This Policy Contribution focuses on the consequences stablecoins and central bank digital currencies could have. Stablecoins, such as Facebook's Libra, differ from earlier generations of cryptocurrencies in three fundamental ways. First, they would start with large networks of users and global accessibility, two pivotal features for the critical uptake of a new currency. Second, given the current limitations of DLT, including in terms of energy efficiency, new stablecoins would rely on (more) centralised systems to validate transactions. Third, stablecoins would focus particularly on reducing the volatility in the value of the new currency. These new features of stablecoins attempt to correct some of the critical deficiencies identified in first-generation cryptocurrencies, which meant they did not acquire the main functions of money. However, new stablecoins raise other questions and potentially create new problems. One issue could arise from the more centralised (permissioned) validation system, which could lead to collusion problems. Another issue could arise from the reserve system that is supposed to ensure the stability of stablecoins, such as Libra, which could be incompatible with the profit maximisation behaviour of a private issuer. Facebook's Libra plan has been a wake-up call to central banks and governments which, afraid of losing their monetary sovereignty, have renewed their interest in central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) as a potential solution. CBDCs could make private digital currencies less attractive and slow down their adoption. But there are other reasons to give the general public access to central bank liabilities. One important reason to provide CBDCs to citizens is that if cash disappears, citizens will lose direct access to sovereign money. Another benefit of the introduction of CBDCs is that monetary policy could be strengthened by transmitting it directly to the general public. However, the introduction of CBDCs could also be disruptive and create risks. In particular, CBDCs could have major consequences for financial intermediation. These risks would have to be evaluated by policymakers before any decisions are taken. If CBDCs are introduced, central banks would have to carefully calibrate their properties to minimise these risks. But, eventually, if these risks - and in particular the risk of structural financial disintermediation - do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to counter them.
BASE
The greatest challenge for the EU in trying to identify an optimal response is understanding the motives behind the US strategy. The rhetoric, and more recently also actions, of the current US administration on trade and the global multilateral system are a real threat to the process of globalisation. While the costs are not immediate, they will materialise and they will be hard to revert.
BASE
Growing financialization and complexity demands financial literacy to be an integral part of the research agenda and policy design globally. It applies particularly to developed countries, since research findings suggest that financial literacy becomes more important with higher levels of economic development. Financial literacy is financial education, such as basic economics, statistics and numeracy skills combined with the ability to employ these skills in making financial decisions. Research has shown that as people become more financially literate, they make better saving and borrowing decisions, are more likely to plan for retirement and hold more diverse assets in their balance sheet. As more and more households are asked to make their own decisions about such issues, financial illiteracy can become a serious threat to their life-time welfare. European Union contains in itself world's best performers (Sweden, Denmark) as well as those that score below global average (Romania, Portugal) in financial literacy rankings. The findings for the EU echo those that are also applicable to other developed economies, namely that low-income individuals, women, young people and less educated people tend to consistently underperform in literacy tests. Financial literacy matters for the EU for three reasons: 1) in the face of rapidly ageing population, the pressure on the pension system could be mitigated through shifting towards more occupational and personal insurance systems. This shifts more and more responsibilities to the individual who can greatly enhance their decision-making with higher levels of financial literacy. 2) mortgage-debt makes up an overwhelming share of total debt of euro-area households. Understanding the implications of indebtedness and how financial literacy can help is especially important for young households, first-time homeowners and those at the lower end of the income distribution. 3) financial literacy is negatively associated with the main elements of inclusive growth in the EU, namely poverty, inequality, social exclusion and social immobility. Financial literacy can therefore help access the benefits of economic growth and contribute to the inclusive growth agenda in the EU. In light of these findings, the policy recommendations entail starting financial literacy programs from the young age; promoting programs that are tailored to the specific needs of communities, especially young people, women and low-income groups; providing targeted financial education for people on the verge of major financial decisions, such as the first mortgage, student loan, retirement investment. However, at the same time it is important to resist information overload, support more research into financial literacy, especially behavioural aspects of financial decision-making and increase private sector involvement since they are at the forefront of financial education and service provision.
BASE
In: Journal of Financial Regulation, 5(1):64-90, 2019, Oxford University Press,
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Working paper
In: IMF Working Paper No. 15/283
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In: IMF Working Paper No. 13/86
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1457
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In: Journal of economic policy reform, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 342-358
ISSN: 1748-7889