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Corrigendum: Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution
In: American economic review, Band 99, Heft 5, S. 2277-2277
ISSN: 1944-7981
Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 4, S. 1292-1311
ISSN: 1944-7981
Language is a powerful coordination device. We generalize the cheap-talk approach to pre-play communication by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages. Players have a lexicographic preference, second to material payoffs, against deviating from the meaning correspondence. Under two-sided communication in generic and symmetric n × n-coordination games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique Pareto efficient outcome of the underlying game. We extend the analysis to one-sided communication in arbitrary finite two-player games. (JEL C72, C73, Z13)
Collection of data and information on biology and control of vectors of Xylella fastidiosa
In: EFSA supporting publications, Band 16, Heft 5
ISSN: 2397-8325