Christopher P. Long: Socratic and Platonic Political Philosophy: Practicing a Politics of Reading. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. 240.)
In: The review of politics, Band 77, Heft 4, S. 689-692
ISSN: 1748-6858
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In: The review of politics, Band 77, Heft 4, S. 689-692
ISSN: 1748-6858
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 20, Heft 2, S. 30-69
ISSN: 1471-6437
These epigraphs present us with part of the problem that is to be
discussed in this essay. For Spinoza (1632–1677) there is no
metaphysical freedom, except for God/Substance/Nature. The
behavior of individual things, or modes, is completely a
function of causes that bring about the behavior. This might suggest
that there can be no autonomy in any meaningful sense either,
thus aborting at the outset any talk of autonomy in Spinoza. To add to
this problem, "autonomy" is somewhat anachronistic when
applied to Spinoza. The philosophical theory surrounding the concept
of autonomy seems to have developed later, perhaps mostly from Kant
(1724–1804), which is not to say that it did not have parallels
earlier. Kantian metaphysics is certainly different from Spinozistic
metaphysics in allowing for freedom, if nothing else. But even if we
ignore the metaphysics, the structure of a Kantian ethics is different
from a Spinozistic one in its focus on duty and imperatives. One finds
little of that in Spinoza. Consequently, on both metaphysical and
historical grounds, it seems somewhat problematic to speak of Kantian
autonomy in Spinoza.
In: Masterworks in the Western tradition 8
In: Studies in social philosophy & policy 5
In: The review of politics, Band 73, Heft 1, S. 135-143
ISSN: 1748-6858
Martha Nussbaum, in a reaction to the cultural relativism that pervades much of social science, made the following comment:Highly intelligent people, people deeply committed to the good of women and men in developing countries, people who think of themselves as progressive and feminist and antiracist, are taking up positions that converge … with the positions of reaction, oppression, and sexism. Under the banner of their radical and politically correct "antiessentialism" march ancient religious taboos, the luxury of the pampered husband, ill health, ignorance, and death. (And in my own essentialist way, I say it at the outset. I do hold that death is opposed to life in the most binary way imaginable, and slavery to freedom, and hunger to adequate nutrition, and ignorance to knowledge.)
In: The review of politics, Band 73, Heft 1, S. 135-144
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 275-316
ISSN: 1471-6437
Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671–1713), the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the grandson of the First Earl of Shaftesbury (also Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1621–1683). The First Earl, along with John Locke, was a leader and founder of the Whig movement in Britain. Locke was the First Earl's secretary and also the tutor of the Third Earl. Both the First and Third Earls were members of parliament and supporters of Whig causes. Although both the First and Third Earls were involved in politics, the Third Earl is better known for intellectual pursuits. Indeed, the Third Earl (henceforth simply "Shaftesbury") is second only to Locke in terms of influence during the eighteenth century. Yet if one takes into account effects upon literature, the arts, and manners, as well as upon philosophical trends and theories, Shaftesbury might be even more influential. Even if we restrict ourselves to philosophy, Shaftesbury's ideas were admired by thinkers as different as Leibniz and Montesquieu—something which could obviously not be said about Locke. Within ethics, Shaftesbury influenced Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Samuel Butler, and Adam Smith and is credited with founding the "moral sense" school of thought.
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 192-224
ISSN: 1471-6437
As each individual abandons himself to the solicitous aid of the State,so, and still more, he abandons to it the fate of his fellow-citizens.Wilhelm Von Humboldt,On the Limits of State Action
In: Philosophia Spinozae perennis 5
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction: What Is Ethics? -- Part I: Making the Turn -- 1. An Overview of Individualistic Perfectionism -- 2. The Search for Universal Principles in Ethics and Politics -- 3. Tethering I -- 4. Tethering II -- Part II: Facing a New Direction -- 5. The Perfectionist Turn -- 6. Because -- 7. Toward the Primacy of Responsibility -- 8. The Entrepreneur as Moral Hero -- Afterword: Big Morality -- Index
In: Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism Ser.
Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Whence Natural Rights? -- 1 What's Wrong with Natural Rights? -- 2 Problems with the Non-aggression Principle? -- 3 Why the Reluctance to Appeal to Natural Rights? -- Chapter 2: How to Understand and Justify Individual Rights: A Synopsis -- 1 Rights as a Moral Concept -- Liberty as a Moral Notion -- Understanding the Role of Rights -- Individualistic Perfectionism -- Why We Have Rights -- A Realist Basis for Rejection of Equinormativity -- 2 The Primacy of Rights in Political Philosophy -- The Virtue of Justice and Metanorms -- Three Senses of Justice -- Social Justice and Natural Endowments -- 3 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: On Principle -- 1 Rights, Principles, and Practicality -- Understanding the Context for Side-Constraints -- The Range of Applicability of Individual Rights -- On Being Practical -- Ideals and Principles -- Conflicting Principles -- 2 Natural Rights as Principles -- 3 Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Objections to Natural Rights and Replies -- 1 Some Preliminary Objections -- Natural Rights do not Precede Their Implementation -- Natural Rights are Over-Individualized -- Natural Rights are Basically a Matter of Power -- Natural Rights are Neither Primary Nor Sufficiently Obligatory -- 2 A Basic Metaethical Objection -- Natural Rights and the "Naturalistic Fallacy" -- The Alleged Naturalistic Fallacy -- Deeper Ontological and Epistemological Issues -- Natural Rights are Grounded in Controversial Metaphysics -- 3 Impracticality Objections -- The Irrelevance of Natural Rights -- Natural Rights Fail to Guide -- The Absoluteness of Natural Rights -- The Impotency of Natural Rights -- 4 Natural Rights and the "Human Nature Problem" -- The Failure of Inclusivity in Natural Rights -- The Problematic Concept of Human Nature -- Chapter 5: Segue -- 1 MacIntyre, Rights, and Tradition.
In: Journal des économistes et des études humaines: JEEH, Band 26, Heft 1
ISSN: 2153-1552
Abstract
It is more than clear that in our previous works—Norms of Liberty and The Perfectionist Turn—we are opposing what is generally understood as egalitarianism in political philosophy. Our purpose here is to clarify our opposition by showing that our rejection of egalitarianism cannot be successfully accused of being inconsistent with morality itself. We believe that discussing what we call "two dogmas of egalitarianism" will go some distance in accomplishing that end. These "dogmas" can be stated as follows: (1) The burden of proof for any deviation from equality in ethics rests upon the advocate of inequality; and (2) One's position on the natural equality (or inequality) of human beings requires a similar position in one's ethical conclusions.
In: The independent review: journal of political economy, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 441-460
ISSN: 1086-1653
A review essay on a book by Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2009).