Suchergebnisse

Martha Nussbaum, in a reaction to the cultural relativism that pervades much of social science, made the following comment:Highly intelligent people, people deeply committed to the good of women and men in developing countries, people who think of themselves as progressive and feminist and antiracist, are taking up positions that converge … with the positions of reaction, oppression, and sexism. Under the banner of their radical and politically correct "antiessentialism" march ancient religious taboos, the luxury of the pampered husband, ill health, ignorance, and death. (And in my own essentialist way, I say it at the outset. I do hold that death is opposed to life in the most binary way imaginable, and slavery to freedom, and hunger to adequate nutrition, and ignorance to knowledge.)

Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671–1713), the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, was the grandson of the First Earl of Shaftesbury (also Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1621–1683). The First Earl, along with John Locke, was a leader and founder of the Whig movement in Britain. Locke was the First Earl's secretary and also the tutor of the Third Earl. Both the First and Third Earls were members of parliament and supporters of Whig causes. Although both the First and Third Earls were involved in politics, the Third Earl is better known for intellectual pursuits. Indeed, the Third Earl (henceforth simply "Shaftesbury") is second only to Locke in terms of influence during the eighteenth century. Yet if one takes into account effects upon literature, the arts, and manners, as well as upon philosophical trends and theories, Shaftesbury might be even more influential. Even if we restrict ourselves to philosophy, Shaftesbury's ideas were admired by thinkers as different as Leibniz and Montesquieu—something which could obviously not be said about Locke. Within ethics, Shaftesbury influenced Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Samuel Butler, and Adam Smith and is credited with founding the "moral sense" school of thought.

As each individual abandons himself to the solicitous aid of the State,so, and still more, he abandons to it the fate of his fellow-citizens.Wilhelm Von Humboldt,On the Limits of State Action

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Whence Natural Rights? -- 1 What's Wrong with Natural Rights? -- 2 Problems with the Non-aggression Principle? -- 3 Why the Reluctance to Appeal to Natural Rights? -- Chapter 2: How to Understand and Justify Individual Rights: A Synopsis -- 1 Rights as a Moral Concept -- Liberty as a Moral Notion -- Understanding the Role of Rights -- Individualistic Perfectionism -- Why We Have Rights -- A Realist Basis for Rejection of Equinormativity -- 2 The Primacy of Rights in Political Philosophy -- The Virtue of Justice and Metanorms -- Three Senses of Justice -- Social Justice and Natural Endowments -- 3 Conclusion -- Chapter 3: On Principle -- 1 Rights, Principles, and Practicality -- Understanding the Context for Side-Constraints -- The Range of Applicability of Individual Rights -- On Being Practical -- Ideals and Principles -- Conflicting Principles -- 2 Natural Rights as Principles -- 3 Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Objections to Natural Rights and Replies -- 1 Some Preliminary Objections -- Natural Rights do not Precede Their Implementation -- Natural Rights are Over-Individualized -- Natural Rights are Basically a Matter of Power -- Natural Rights are Neither Primary Nor Sufficiently Obligatory -- 2 A Basic Metaethical Objection -- Natural Rights and the "Naturalistic Fallacy" -- The Alleged Naturalistic Fallacy -- Deeper Ontological and Epistemological Issues -- Natural Rights are Grounded in Controversial Metaphysics -- 3 Impracticality Objections -- The Irrelevance of Natural Rights -- Natural Rights Fail to Guide -- The Absoluteness of Natural Rights -- The Impotency of Natural Rights -- 4 Natural Rights and the "Human Nature Problem" -- The Failure of Inclusivity in Natural Rights -- The Problematic Concept of Human Nature -- Chapter 5: Segue -- 1 MacIntyre, Rights, and Tradition.

"Contemporary political philosophy - especially in the works of Martha Nussbaum, John Rawls and Amartya Sen - has assumed that it can separate itself off from other philosophical positions and frameworks. In this book, Den Uyl and Rasmussen challenge this trend by moving from the liberalism they advocate in their earlier work to what they call "individualistic perfectionism" in ethics. They continue to challenge the assumption that a neo-Aristotelian ethical framework cannot support a liberal, non-perfectionist political theory by filling in the nature of the perfectionist ethical approach utilised in their previous political theorising. By developing the central features and principles of individualistic perfectionism they show that it is a major and powerful alternative to much contemporary ethical thinking - particularly to constructivism - and that it is capable of overcoming standard objections to perfectionism"--Back cover

Abstract
It is more than clear that in our previous works—Norms of Liberty and The Perfectionist Turn—we are opposing what is generally understood as egalitarianism in political philosophy. Our purpose here is to clarify our opposition by showing that our rejection of egalitarianism cannot be successfully accused of being inconsistent with morality itself. We believe that discussing what we call "two dogmas of egalitarianism" will go some distance in accomplishing that end. These "dogmas" can be stated as follows: (1) The burden of proof for any deviation from equality in ethics rests upon the advocate of inequality; and (2) One's position on the natural equality (or inequality) of human beings requires a similar position in one's ethical conclusions.

A review essay on a book by Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2009).

AbstractThis essay asks whether what is good for someone is distinct from her self-perfection, and whether it makes sense to understand either her good or her self-perfection in terms of the other. The essay adopts a traditional naturalistic understanding of perfection. It argues, however, that the conception of human nature that underlies the perfectionist view must be more individualistic than it is often taken to be. It goes on to distinguish individuative from generic features of human nature; because the account includes both types of characteristics, the concluding vision of human nature, and hence human perfection, is deeply individualized. What is good for an individual is linked to the exercise of her nature rather than to desires individuals simply happen to have.