Suchergebnisse
Filter
30 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
SSRN
Working paper
Grand Corruption by Public Officials: Measuring Theft and Bribery
SSRN
Working paper
Public Goods, Corruption, and the Political Resource Curse
SSRN
Working paper
What resource curse? The null effect of remittances on public good provision
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 431-450
ISSN: 1460-3667
Existing formal models show that remittances generate a resource curse by allowing the government to appropriate its revenues toward rents, rather than public good provision. Households spend their remittance income on public-good substitutes, thereby alleviating the pressure on the government to provide public goods. However, the process by which the government survives the implicit threat of political challengers remains unspecified. By explicitly modeling political competition, I show that there is actually no resource curse from remittances. When there are challengers who can threaten to replace the incumbent leader, the best that any challenger can do is to offer not to take advantage of households' provision of public-good substitutes, which induces the incumbent to try to match the offer. In equilibrium, public good provision is independent of remittances. This result holds even when no challenger can credibly commit to maintaining her offer once she is in power.
Judicial Independence: Evidence from the Philippine Supreme Court (1970–2003)
In: The Political Economy of Governance; Studies in Political Economy, S. 41-57
Public Goods, Corruption, and the Political Resource Curse
In: JEBO-D-22-00618
SSRN
SSRN
The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe
In: The journal of economic history, Band 84, Heft 2, S. 479-516
ISSN: 1471-6372
Sumptuary laws that regulated clothing based on social status were an important part of the political economy of premodern states. We introduce a model that captures the notion that consumption by ordinary citizens poses a status threat to ruling elites. Our model predicts a non-monotonic effect of income—sumptuary legislation initially increases with income, but then falls as income increases further. The initial rise is more likely for states with less extractive institutions, whose ruling elites face a greater status threat from the rising commercial class. We test these predictions using a new dataset of country and city-level sumptuary laws.It is unfortunately an established fact that both men and womenfolk have, in utterly irresponsible manner, driven extravagance in dress and new styles to such shameful and wanton extremes that the different classes are barely to be known apart.
—Nuremberg Ordnance of 1657, Quoted in Hunt (1996)
Religious Violence and Coalition Politics in History
In: GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 22-45
SSRN
SSRN
Health vs. Economy: Politically Optimal Pandemic Policy
SSRN
Working paper
Health vs. Economy: Politically Optimal Pandemic Policy
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15129
SSRN
Working paper
The Political Economy of Status Competition: Sumptuary Laws in Preindustrial Europe
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14407
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
Health vs. Economy: Politically Optimal Pandemic Policy
In: Journal of political institutions and political economy, Band 1, Heft 4, S. 645-669
ISSN: 2689-4815