Suchergebnisse

The European railway industry continues to undergo reform and liberalization due to European law incentives. Recent events in Italy give the country a special place in this process: a new competitor has commenced operations in the high-speed rail (HSR) market based on a private initiative. This paper aims to investigate this rail transport innovation looking for the driving forces and obstacles and to identify the main impacts for the Italian consumers. We also try to provide some interesting results helpful for other countries regarding passenger rail reforms. Based on the Italian case, it seems that open access competition in the HSR market is able to produce significant improvements in favour of passengers and also a "win-win" game between all railway actors.

Workshop 5 - The Roles and Responsibilities of Governments and Operators ; The Swiss railway system is known for its high quality of service and integration in a particularly dense public transport system. People are generally less aware of ongoing institutional reform. This article strives to shed light on passenger traffic reform, and more particularly on regional traffic. Which institutional frameworks are implicated? What have been the results obtained both for public finances and for travelers? What are the key elements for explaining recorded performance gains? What lessons could be drawn for railway reform? In sum, it appears that improved performance has been possible in Switzerland even in the absence of competition. These improvements are due to the nature of public governance and its impact on the various stakeholders. Public authorities have imposed ambitious but negotiated targets on operators, coupled with severe financial constraints, in a context of decentralization of public procurement. Given this new institutional framework, railway companies and especially the former monopoly holder, the incumbent SBB have achieved significant productivity increases through management and technical innovation. Client satisfaction, at the heart of the reform, also contributes to these successes.

Workshop 5 - The Roles and Responsibilities of Governments and Operators ; The Swiss railway system is known for its high quality of service and integration in a particularly dense public transport system. People are generally less aware of ongoing institutional reform. This article strives to shed light on passenger traffic reform, and more particularly on regional traffic. Which institutional frameworks are implicated? What have been the results obtained both for public finances and for travelers? What are the key elements for explaining recorded performance gains? What lessons could be drawn for railway reform? In sum, it appears that improved performance has been possible in Switzerland even in the absence of competition. These improvements are due to the nature of public governance and its impact on the various stakeholders. Public authorities have imposed ambitious but negotiated targets on operators, coupled with severe financial constraints, in a context of decentralization of public procurement. Given this new institutional framework, railway companies and especially the former monopoly holder, the incumbent SBB have achieved significant productivity increases through management and technical innovation. Client satisfaction, at the heart of the reform, also contributes to these successes.

Workshop 5 - The Roles and Responsibilities of Governments and Operators ; The Swiss railway system is known for its high quality of service and integration in a particularly dense public transport system. People are generally less aware of ongoing institutional reform. This article strives to shed light on passenger traffic reform, and more particularly on regional traffic. Which institutional frameworks are implicated? What have been the results obtained both for public finances and for travelers? What are the key elements for explaining recorded performance gains? What lessons could be drawn for railway reform? In sum, it appears that improved performance has been possible in Switzerland even in the absence of competition. These improvements are due to the nature of public governance and its impact on the various stakeholders. Public authorities have imposed ambitious but negotiated targets on operators, coupled with severe financial constraints, in a context of decentralization of public procurement. Given this new institutional framework, railway companies and especially the former monopoly holder, the incumbent SBB have achieved significant productivity increases through management and technical innovation. Client satisfaction, at the heart of the reform, also contributes to these successes.

Thématique du numéro : Grandes questions urbaines et régionales ; International audience ; Ten years ago, the SRU law initiated an ambivalent reform of the railway system of passenger transport in France. It preserves the monopoly of operation of the historical operator, but transfers the political responsibility for organizing the regional railway system to the regions. The economic theory suggests that the monopoly led to a revenue capture. With the surplus accounts method, which will be displayed on the SNCF-TER billing account, we can show that, on this initial stage, the Infrastructure Manager (RFF) has been the main beneficiary of the total available surplus, far ahead from the passenger who might benefit from the rail regionalization. The effect on local communities is more equivocal. If the regions have been able to control the border price of the operating subsidy, tolls excepted, they had to yield significant benefits for the rolling stock modernization. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular "TER economic model" ruled by a specific mode of governance. ; Il y a dix ans, la loi SRU a ouvert une réforme ambivalente du système ferroviaire de transport de voyageurs en France. Elle préserve le monopole d'exploitation de l'opérateur historique, mais confie aux Régions la responsabilité d'autorité organisatrice. La théorie économique suggère que le monopole conduit à une capture de rente. Par la méthode des comptes de surplus, que nous déployons sur le compte de facturation SNCF-TER, nous montrons qu'en cette phase initiale, RFF est le principal bénéficiaire du surplus total disponible, loin devant les voyageurs tendanciellement bénéficiaires de la régionalisation ferroviaire. L'effet sur les collectivités publiques est plus équivoque. Si les Régions ont su maîtriser la frontière de prix de la subvention d'exploitation, hors péages, elles ont dû céder d'importants avantages au titre de la modernisation du matériel roulant. Une approche plus fine montre combien chaque Région constitue un " modèle économique du TER " particulier régi par un mode de gouvernance spécifique.

Thématique du numéro : Grandes questions urbaines et régionales ; International audience ; Ten years ago, the SRU law initiated an ambivalent reform of the railway system of passenger transport in France. It preserves the monopoly of operation of the historical operator, but transfers the political responsibility for organizing the regional railway system to the regions. The economic theory suggests that the monopoly led to a revenue capture. With the surplus accounts method, which will be displayed on the SNCF-TER billing account, we can show that, on this initial stage, the Infrastructure Manager (RFF) has been the main beneficiary of the total available surplus, far ahead from the passenger who might benefit from the rail regionalization. The effect on local communities is more equivocal. If the regions have been able to control the border price of the operating subsidy, tolls excepted, they had to yield significant benefits for the rolling stock modernization. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular "TER economic model" ruled by a specific mode of governance. ; Il y a dix ans, la loi SRU a ouvert une réforme ambivalente du système ferroviaire de transport de voyageurs en France. Elle préserve le monopole d'exploitation de l'opérateur historique, mais confie aux Régions la responsabilité d'autorité organisatrice. La théorie économique suggère que le monopole conduit à une capture de rente. Par la méthode des comptes de surplus, que nous déployons sur le compte de facturation SNCF-TER, nous montrons qu'en cette phase initiale, RFF est le principal bénéficiaire du surplus total disponible, loin devant les voyageurs tendanciellement bénéficiaires de la régionalisation ferroviaire. L'effet sur les collectivités publiques est plus équivoque. Si les Régions ont su maîtriser la frontière de prix de la subvention d'exploitation, hors péages, elles ont dû céder d'importants avantages au titre de la modernisation du matériel roulant. Une approche plus fine montre combien chaque Région constitue ...

Telematics of the number: Ten years ago, the SRU law opened an ambivalent reform of the rail passenger transport system in France. It preserves the operating monopoly of the incumbent operator, but entrusts the regions with the responsibility of organising authority. Economic theory suggests that the monopoly leads to a revenue capture. Using the surplus accounts method, which we use on the SNCF-TER billing account, we show that, at this initial stage, RFF is the main beneficiary of the total surplus available, far from the passengers who tend to benefit from rail regionalisation. The effect on public authorities is more ambiguous. Although the regions were able to control the price boundary of the operating subsidy, excluding tolls, they had to give up significant advantages in connection with the modernisation of rolling stock. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular "RER economic model" governed by a specific governance mode. ; International audience Ten years ago, the SRU law initiated an ambivalent reform of the railway system of passenger transport in France. It preserves the monopoly of operation of the historical operator, but transfers the political responsibility for organizing the regional railway system to the regions. The economic theory suggests that the monopoly led to a revenue capture. With the surplus accounts method, which will be displayed on the SNCF-TER billing account, we can show that, on this initial stage, the Infrastructure Manager (RFF) has been the main beneficiary of the total available surplus, far ahead from the passenger who might benefit from the rail regionalization. The effect on local communities is more equivocal. If the regions have been able to control the border price of the operating subsidy, tolls excepted, they had to yield significant benefits for the rolling stock modernization. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular "TER economic model" ruled by a specific mode of governance. ; Telematics of the number: Ten years ago, ...

Thématique du numéro : Grandes questions urbaines et régionales ; International audience ; Ten years ago, the SRU law initiated an ambivalent reform of the railway system of passenger transport in France. It preserves the monopoly of operation of the historical operator, but transfers the political responsibility for organizing the regional railway system to the regions. The economic theory suggests that the monopoly led to a revenue capture. With the surplus accounts method, which will be displayed on the SNCF-TER billing account, we can show that, on this initial stage, the Infrastructure Manager (RFF) has been the main beneficiary of the total available surplus, far ahead from the passenger who might benefit from the rail regionalization. The effect on local communities is more equivocal. If the regions have been able to control the border price of the operating subsidy, tolls excepted, they had to yield significant benefits for the rolling stock modernization. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular "TER economic model" ruled by a specific mode of governance. ; Il y a dix ans, la loi SRU a ouvert une réforme ambivalente du système ferroviaire de transport de voyageurs en France. Elle préserve le monopole d'exploitation de l'opérateur historique, mais confie aux Régions la responsabilité d'autorité organisatrice. La théorie économique suggère que le monopole conduit à une capture de rente. Par la méthode des comptes de surplus, que nous déployons sur le compte de facturation SNCF-TER, nous montrons qu'en cette phase initiale, RFF est le principal bénéficiaire du surplus total disponible, loin devant les voyageurs tendanciellement bénéficiaires de la régionalisation ferroviaire. L'effet sur les collectivités publiques est plus équivoque. Si les Régions ont su maîtriser la frontière de prix de la subvention d'exploitation, hors péages, elles ont dû céder d'importants avantages au titre de la modernisation du matériel roulant. Une approche plus fine montre combien chaque Région constitue un " modèle économique du TER " particulier régi par un mode de gouvernance spécifique.

This thesis, which fits the general economic issues on the research tools of regulation of network industries, questions the appropriateness of regionalization of French railways. The latter, since the reform introduced by Law SRU associates maintain the monopoly to operate the railway service for Transport Express Regional (TER) with decentralization to the regions of a prerogative hitherto ensured bureaucratic and centralized. In this institutional environment, original in comparison with the European movement, the French regions have they managed to write and to govern the "system SNCF-TER" ? To answer these two questions, the author engages the neo-institutional theory, from which it offers an array of interpretive economic architecture conventions TER and a transposition of this method accounts surplus (MAS) for study the economic performance of these contracts. The results obtained on the sample of seven regions that have experienced the regionalization can only partially confirm the usual deductions made from the standard theory of monopoly and capture the regulator by the regulated firm. If the contracting SNCF / regions far removed from the model "net cost", expresses the acceptance by the legislature of a broad insurance cover industrial, commercial, and more on investments by the Community, regionalization resulted a variety of employment contracts. A detailed analysis shows the hybrid modes of governance that the author calls "fiduciaro-authoritarian". The MAS found that while the effect of monopoly is present and needed to Regions, it does little to benefit the railway operator, but rather to RFF. The trend, travelers have become "winners" of regionalization rail. ; Cette thèse, qui s'inscrit dans le questionnement économique général sur la recherche d'outils de régulation des industries de réseaux, questionne la pertinence du choix français de régionalisation ferroviaire. Ce dernier, depuis la réforme introduite par la loi SRU, associe le maintien du monopole d'exploitation de la SNCF pour le Transport Express Régional (TER) avec la décentralisation aux Régions d'une prérogative jusqu'alors assurée de manière bureaucratique et centralisée. Dans cet environnement institutionnel, original au regard du mouvement européen, les Régions françaises ont-elles réussi à écrire et à gouverner le "système SNCF-TER" ? Pour répondre à cette double interrogation, l'auteur mobilise la théorie néo-institutionnelle, à partir de laquelle il propose une matrice interprétative de l'architecture économique des conventions TER et présente une transposition de la méthode des comptes de surplus (MCS), pour l'étude de la performance économique de ces contrats. Les résultats obtenus, sur l'échantillon des sept régions qui ont expérimenté la régionalisation, ne confirment que partiellement les déductions habituelles obtenues à partir de la théorie standard du monopole et de la capture du réglementateur par la firme régulée. Si la contractualisation SNCF / Régions, très éloignée du modèle « net cost », exprime l'acceptation par le Législateur d'une large couverture des risques industriels, commerciaux, et plus encore sur investissements, par la Collectivité, la régionalisation s'est traduite par une grande diversité contractuelle. Une analyse fine montre le caractère hybride des modes de gouvernance que l'auteur qualifie de « fiduciaro-autoritaires ». La MCS révèle que si l'effet du monopole est bien présent et s'impose aux Régions, il ne profite guère à la SNCF, mais plutôt à RFF. Tendanciellement, les voyageurs sont devenus « gagnants » de la régionalisation ferroviaire.

The French regions have since 1997 for some of them, and since 2002 for the others, to a sponsor of public service for regional travelers, faced with a monopoly of the SNCF. Economic theory and the first assessments show that the monopoly will receive an informational means. One wonders whether the regions are not provided a learning process. To test this hypothesis with a capacity of expertise growing regions, this paper applies to the "TER system" method of surplus accounts and focuses on developments border prices. The detailed examination of the 7 regions, which now have more than ten years experience of agreements with the SNCF, shows that they were able to control the evolution of border prices. But they could not avoid the shock, predictable, higher tolls. In total, travelers become, tendentiously, the main winners of the "TER system". ; Les Régions françaises sont, depuis 1997 pour certaines d'entre elles, et depuis 2002 pour les autres, en situation de commanditaire du service public de transport régional de voyageurs, face à un monopole, celui de la SNCF. La théorie économique et les premières évaluations montrent que le monopole profite alors d'une rente informationnelle. On peut se demander si les Régions ne bénéficient pas pour autant d'un processus d'apprentissage. Pour tester cette hypothèse d'une capacité d'expertise croissante des Régions, cet article applique au "système TER" la méthode des comptes de surplus et s'intéresse aux évolutions des frontières de prix. L'examen détaillé des 7 régions, qui ont maintenant plus de dix ans d'expérience du conventionnement avec la SNCF, montre qu'elles ont été en mesure de maîtriser l'évolution des frontières de prix. Mais elles n'ont pu éviter le choc, prévisible, de la hausse des péages. Au total, ce sont les voyageurs qui sont devenus, tendanciellement, les principaux gagnants du "système TER".

This thesis, which fits the general economic issues on the research tools of regulation of network industries, questions the appropriateness of regionalization of French railways. The latter, since the reform introduced by Law SRU associates maintain the monopoly to operate the railway service for Transport Express Regional (TER) with decentralization to the regions of a prerogative hitherto ensured bureaucratic and centralized. In this institutional environment, original in comparison with the European movement, the French regions have they managed to write and to govern the "system SNCF-TER" ? To answer these two questions, the author engages the neo-institutional theory, from which it offers an array of interpretive economic architecture conventions TER and a transposition of this method accounts surplus (MAS) for study the economic performance of these contracts. The results obtained on the sample of seven regions that have experienced the regionalization can only partially confirm the usual deductions made from the standard theory of monopoly and capture the regulator by the regulated firm. If the contracting SNCF / regions far removed from the model "net cost", expresses the acceptance by the legislature of a broad insurance cover industrial, commercial, and more on investments by the Community, regionalization resulted a variety of employment contracts. A detailed analysis shows the hybrid modes of governance that the author calls "fiduciaro-authoritarian". The MAS found that while the effect of monopoly is present and needed to Regions, it does little to benefit the railway operator, but rather to RFF. The trend, travelers have become "winners" of regionalization rail. ; Cette thèse, qui s'inscrit dans le questionnement économique général sur la recherche d'outils de régulation des industries de réseaux, questionne la pertinence du choix français de régionalisation ferroviaire. Ce dernier, depuis la réforme introduite par la loi SRU, associe le maintien du monopole d'exploitation de la SNCF pour le Transport Express Régional (TER) avec la décentralisation aux Régions d'une prérogative jusqu'alors assurée de manière bureaucratique et centralisée. Dans cet environnement institutionnel, original au regard du mouvement européen, les Régions françaises ont-elles réussi à écrire et à gouverner le "système SNCF-TER" ? Pour répondre à cette double interrogation, l'auteur mobilise la théorie néo-institutionnelle, à partir de laquelle il propose une matrice interprétative de l'architecture économique des conventions TER et présente une transposition de la méthode des comptes de surplus (MCS), pour l'étude de la performance économique de ces contrats. Les résultats obtenus, sur l'échantillon des sept régions qui ont expérimenté la régionalisation, ne confirment que partiellement les déductions habituelles obtenues à partir de la théorie standard du monopole et de la capture du réglementateur par la firme régulée. Si la contractualisation SNCF / Régions, très éloignée du modèle « net cost », exprime l'acceptation par le Législateur d'une large couverture des risques industriels, commerciaux, et plus encore sur investissements, par la Collectivité, la régionalisation s'est traduite par une grande diversité contractuelle. Une analyse fine montre le caractère hybride des modes de gouvernance que l'auteur qualifie de « fiduciaro-autoritaires ». La MCS révèle que si l'effet du monopole est bien présent et s'impose aux Régions, il ne profite guère à la SNCF, mais plutôt à RFF. Tendanciellement, les voyageurs sont devenus « gagnants » de la régionalisation ferroviaire.

The French regions have since 1997 for some of them, and since 2002 for the others, to a sponsor of public service for regional travelers, faced with a monopoly of the SNCF. Economic theory and the first assessments show that the monopoly will receive an informational means. One wonders whether the regions are not provided a learning process. To test this hypothesis with a capacity of expertise growing regions, this paper applies to the "TER system" method of surplus accounts and focuses on developments border prices. The detailed examination of the 7 regions, which now have more than ten years experience of agreements with the SNCF, shows that they were able to control the evolution of border prices. But they could not avoid the shock, predictable, higher tolls. In total, travelers become, tendentiously, the main winners of the "TER system". ; Les Régions françaises sont, depuis 1997 pour certaines d'entre elles, et depuis 2002 pour les autres, en situation de commanditaire du service public de transport régional de voyageurs, face à un monopole, celui de la SNCF. La théorie économique et les premières évaluations montrent que le monopole profite alors d'une rente informationnelle. On peut se demander si les Régions ne bénéficient pas pour autant d'un processus d'apprentissage. Pour tester cette hypothèse d'une capacité d'expertise croissante des Régions, cet article applique au "système TER" la méthode des comptes de surplus et s'intéresse aux évolutions des frontières de prix. L'examen détaillé des 7 régions, qui ont maintenant plus de dix ans d'expérience du conventionnement avec la SNCF, montre qu'elles ont été en mesure de maîtriser l'évolution des frontières de prix. Mais elles n'ont pu éviter le choc, prévisible, de la hausse des péages. Au total, ce sont les voyageurs qui sont devenus, tendanciellement, les principaux gagnants du "système TER".

This thesis, which fits the general economic issues on the research tools of regulation of network industries, questions the appropriateness of regionalization of French railways. The latter, since the reform introduced by Law SRU associates maintain the monopoly to operate the railway service for Transport Express Regional (TER) with decentralization to the regions of a prerogative hitherto ensured bureaucratic and centralized. In this institutional environment, original in comparison with the European movement, the French regions have they managed to write and to govern the "system SNCF-TER" ? To answer these two questions, the author engages the neo-institutional theory, from which it offers an array of interpretive economic architecture conventions TER and a transposition of this method accounts surplus (MAS) for study the economic performance of these contracts. The results obtained on the sample of seven regions that have experienced the regionalization can only partially confirm the usual deductions made from the standard theory of monopoly and capture the regulator by the regulated firm. If the contracting SNCF / regions far removed from the model "net cost", expresses the acceptance by the legislature of a broad insurance cover industrial, commercial, and more on investments by the Community, regionalization resulted a variety of employment contracts. A detailed analysis shows the hybrid modes of governance that the author calls "fiduciaro-authoritarian". The MAS found that while the effect of monopoly is present and needed to Regions, it does little to benefit the railway operator, but rather to RFF. The trend, travelers have become "winners" of regionalization rail. ; Cette thèse, qui s'inscrit dans le questionnement économique général sur la recherche d'outils de régulation des industries de réseaux, questionne la pertinence du choix français de régionalisation ferroviaire. Ce dernier, depuis la réforme introduite par la loi SRU, associe le maintien du monopole d'exploitation de la SNCF pour le ...