Suchergebnisse

Nationwide health interventions are difficult to evaluate as contemporaneous control groups do not exist and before-after approaches are usually infeasible. We propose an alternative semi-parametric estimator that is based on the assumption that the intervention has no direct effect on the health outcome but influences the outcome only through its effect on individual behavior. We show that in this case the evaluation problem can be divided into two parts: (i) the effect of the intervention on behavior, for which a conditional before-after assumption is more plausible; and (ii) the effect of the behaviour on the health outcome, where we exploit that a contemporaneous control groups exists for behavior. The proposed estimator is used to evaluate one of Malawi's main malaria prevention campaigns, a nationwide insecticide-treated-net (ITN) distribution scheme, in terms of its effect on infant mortality. We exploit that the program affects child mortality only via bed net usage. We find that Malawi's ITN distribution campaign reduced child mortality by 1 percentage point, which corresponds to about 30% of the total reduction in infant mortality over the study period. -- treatment effect ; semi-parametric estimation ; health intervention

AbstractThe effectiveness of hiring subsidies for people with disabilities remains unclear due to potential free‐rider, substitution and signalling effects. The authors propose a novel evaluation approach wherein it is randomly decided whether or not job applications disclose the subsidy to potential employers. Based on call‐back rates for interviews, the subsidy is found to be ineffective or even counterproductive in a group of adolescents having completed their vocational training programme. However, the negative signalling effect seems to be much weaker in a group of clients of job‐coaching services who acquired their disability during their working life.

ResumenLa eficacia de los subsidios a la contratación de personas con discapacidades es dudosa debido a posibles efectos de peso muerto, sustitución y señalización. Para evaluarla, los autores proponen un experimento natural basado en candidaturas de empleo que revelan o no (aleatoriamente) el derecho al subsidio del candidato. Según la tasa de convocatorias a entrevista logradas, concluyen que el subsidio es ineficaz o contraproducente para un grupo de adolescentes con su formación profesional recién terminada, pero el efecto negativo de señalización resulta mucho más débil para los clientes de un servicio de orientación laboral que contrajeron su discapacidad durante su vida activa.

RésuméL'efficacité des subventions à l'embauche destinées à faciliter l'insertion des personnes handicapées reste incertaine, car plusieurs effets – d'aubaine, de substitution et de signal – se superposent. Pour en savoir plus, les auteurs proposent un protocole original, dans lequel les employeurs sont informés de façon aléatoire du droit à subvention. L'analyse des taux de convocation à un entretien montre que la subvention a un effet nul, voire contre‐productif, pour un échantillon de jeunes fraîchement diplômés de l'enseignement professionnel. Cependant, l'effet de signal défavorable ainsi mis en évidence est nettement plus faible pour d'autres sujets suivis par un service d'orientation spécifique, déjà actifs avant l'acquisition du handicap.

This paper proposes a difference-in-differences approach for disentangling a total treatment effect on some outcome into a direct impact as well as an indirect effect operating through a binary intermediate variable – or mediator – within strata defined upon how the mediator reacts to the treatment. We show under which assumptions the direct effects on the always and never takers, whose mediator is not affected by the treatment, as well as the direct and indirect effects on the compliers, whose mediator reacts to the treatment, are identified. We provide an empirical application based on the Vietnam draft lottery. The results suggest that a high draft risk due to the lottery leads to a relative increase in the support for the Republican Party and that this increase is mostly driven by those complying with the lottery outcome.

Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part or all of their benefits if earnings exceed certain thresholds ("cash-cliffs"). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for the low number of beneficiaries who expand work and reduce benefit receipt. We analyse a conditional cash programme that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. Four thousand DI beneficiaries received an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 77,000) if they expand work and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the programme announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate is only 0.5 %.