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Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- 1. Entering the Transnational World -- Scope and Main Argument -- Bringing the Regional Scale In -- Outline of the Book -- What May Be Gained? -- 2. Four Paths toward a Comparative Sociology of Regional Integration -- Coming from Below: The Burst of the National Container -- Transnationalism-a Local Phenomenon? -- Transnationalism-a Global Phenomenon? -- The Missing Closure Dimension of "Transnational" -- Coming from Above: The Granfalloon of World Society -- Wallerstein's World-System -- Meyer's World Polity -- Luhmann's World Society -- Inside a Granfalloon: Uncovering the Internal Structure of World Society -- Coming from Europe: The Particularism of "Europeanization" -- Europe-Concept or Case? -- "Europeanization" as "Regionalization in Europe" -- Toward a Comparative-Universalist Alternative -- Learning from the Limitations of the Sociology of Europe -- Coming from Politics: The Beacon of Comparative Regionalism -- Early Comparative Approaches to Regionalism in Political Science -- The Latest Wave of Comparative Regionalism in Political Science -- Is There Really No Sociological Equivalent? -- The Missing Fourth Leg of the Elephant -- 3. The Regionalized Structure of Transnational Human Activity, 1960-2010 -- An Increasingly Interconnected World? -- The Transnational World as a Square -- Comparing Regionalism across Time, Regions, and Activity Types -- Absolute Regionalization -- Absolute Globalization -- Relative Regionalization -- Relative Globalization -- Results for Alternative Constellations of Regions -- Letting the Algorithm Speak -- Summary and Discussion -- Color Plates -- 4. Why Does Regionalism Occur in Transnational Human Activity? -- Culture, Politics, Economics, or Geography -- Cultural and Historical Factors -- Economic and Technological Factors.

Für internationale Studierendenmobilität ist oft ein Visum nötig. Die Kosten dafür variieren enorm, wie Daten des Global Mobilities Project (GMP) zeigen. So zahlen Studierende aus dem Globalen Süden teils mehr als das Doppelte als Studierende aus Europa. Noch größer sind die Unterschiede, wenn man das Wohlstandsniveau berücksichtigt: Während die Kosten für Studierende aus Westeuropa im Schnitt nur dem Bruchteil eines durchschnittlichen Tageseinkommens entsprechen, müsste man z. B. in Zentralasien fast drei, in Subsahara-Afrika sogar mehr als fünf Wochen arbeiten, um sich ein Visum leisten zu können. Es ergibt sich insgesamt also eine paradoxe Situation: Studierende aus reicheren Ländern müssen weniger bezahlen, wenn sie international mobil sein wollen. Diese globalen Ungleichheiten berühren bedeutsame Aspekte individueller Ungerechtigkeit und weisen auf die Dysfunktionalität von Visaregimes, die internationale Mobilität talentierter Menschen aus dem Globalen Süden strukturell einschränken.

This article examines the behavior of the Guantánamo detainees in terms of collaboration and disobedience and how it influences their chances of getting a release recommendation. Joint Task Force Guantanamo–authored memoranda on 765 detainees are used to create a network of accusations between detainees and an attribute data set, which are analyzed using multivariate regression and Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. It is found that while the distribution of incriminating statements obeys a power law, 62.6 percent of all detainees do not incriminate anyone. Yemenis and Saudi Arabians heavily overcontribute regarding incriminating statements and disobedient actions, whereas Afghans and Pakistanis undercontribute. Disobedient behavior does not affect the likelihood of getting a release recommendation, except for hunger striking, which has a negative effect. By releasing information, detainees don't improve their own chances of getting release recommendations but impair those of the detainees they implicate. Three different groups of detainees are identified whose behavioral patterns seem to follow distinct logics.

Coinciding with the shift to the left in Latin American politics, regional integration in Latin America accelerated during the last two decades. Yet, whereas support for European integration has been tracked systematically for decades, trend analyses of public opinion on Latin American integration are still missing. Combining data from eight Latinobarometer surveys on 106,590 respondents from seventeen South and Central American countries, this article provides the first longitudinal analysis of Latin Americans' support for their continent's economic and political integration. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression, we reveal intra- and intersocietal trends and cleavages. Our results show that support rates are generally declining from high initial levels. Furthermore, while gender and educational gaps in public opinion remained stable over time, considerable shifts occurred with regard to political orientation: starting from the lowest initial values, the left surpassed the right—and, at least in the case of support for political integration, also the center—to become the political wing favoring integration most highly. This finding shows, contrary to prevailing ideas, that the political center is not necessarily the primary supporter of integration. When regionalism is increasingly driven by left-wing governments, public support for regional integration may also swing to the left.

Coinciding with the shift to the left in Latin American politics, regional integration in Latin America accelerated during the last two decades. Yet, whereas support for European integration has been tracked systematically for decades, trend analyses of public opinion on Latin American integration are still missing. Combining data from eight Latinobarometer surveys on 106,590 respondents from seventeen South and Central American countries, this article provides the first longitudinal analysis of Latin Americans' support for their continent's economic and political integration. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression, we reveal intra- and intersocietal trends and cleavages. Our results show that support rates are generally declining from high initial levels. Furthermore, while gender and educational gaps in public opinion remained stable over time, considerable shifts occurred with regard to political orientation: starting from the lowest initial values, the left surpassed the right—and, at least in the case of support for political integration, also the center—to become the political wing favoring integration most highly. This finding shows, contrary to prevailing ideas, that the political center is not necessarily the primary supporter of integration. When regionalism is increasingly driven by left-wing governments, public support for regional integration may also swing to the left. Resumen Coincidiendo con el desplazamiento hacia la izquierda de la política latinoamericana, la integración regional en América Latina se ha acelerado durante las dos últimas décadas. Sin embargo, mientras que el apoyo a la integración europea ha sido estudiado sistemáticamente durante décadas, todavía no existen análisis referidos a las tendencias de la opinión pública con respecto a la integración de América Latina. Este artículo, al combinar los datos de ocho encuestas de Latinobarómetro realizadas a 106,590 encuestados de 17 países de América del Sur y América Central, proporciona el primer análisis longitudinal referido al apoyo por parte de los latinoamericanos a la integración política y económica del continente. Utilizando una regresión logística de efectos mixtos multinivel, revelamos tendencias y escisiones internas e inter-sociales. Nuestros resultados muestran que si bien existía un alto nivel inicial de apoyo, en general, este porcentaje está disminuyendo. Es más, si bien las brechas educacionales y de género se han mantenido estables a lo largo del tiempo en el ámbito de la opinión pública, se han producido cambios considerables respecto de la orientación política: en un comienzo con valores iniciales más bajos, la izquierda superó a la derecha y —al menos en el caso del apoyo a la integración política— también al centro para convertirse en el ala política que más propiciaba la integración. Este hallazgo demuestra, contrariamente a las ideas dominantes, que el centro político no es necesariamente el principal partidario de la integración. Cuando el regionalismo se ve cada vez más impulsado por los gobiernos de izquierda, el apoyo público a la integración regional también puede oscilar hacia la izquierda.

Published on 28 Mar 2018 ; Coinciding with the shift to the left in Latin American politics, regional integration in Latin America accelerated during the last two decades. Yet, whereas support for European integration has been tracked systematically for decades, trend analyses of public opinion on Latin American integration are still missing. Combining data from eight Latinobarometer surveys on 106,590 respondents from seventeen South and Central American countries, this article provides the first longitudinal analysis of Latin Americans' support for their continent's economic and political integration. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression, we reveal intra- and intersocietal trends and cleavages. Our results show that support rates are generally declining from high initial levels. Furthermore, while gender and educational gaps in public opinion remained stable over time, considerable shifts occurred with regard to political orientation: starting from the lowest initial values, the left surpassed the right—and, at least in the case of support for political integration, also the center—to become the political wing favoring integration most highly. This finding shows, contrary to prevailing ideas, that the political center is not necessarily the primary supporter of integration. When regionalism is increasingly driven by left-wing governments, public support for regional integration may also swing to the left.

First published online: 23 July 2019 ; The Mediterranean is often portrayed as a hub of human mobility. In this article, we test this widespread view by exploring the structure of travel flows in the region over the last two decades (1995–2016). We find that mobility is much higher and increasing more strongly along the northern than along the southern shore, thus creating a growing mobility divide. South–north and north–south movements are even scarcer and stagnate or even decline over time. With a Gini coefficient of .87, mobility flows are distributed extremely unequally across country pairs in the Mediterranean. Community detection algorithms reconfirm that mobility predominantly takes place in disparate clusters around the Mediterranean, not across it. These findings imply that a 'neo-Braudelian' view of the Mediterranean as a mobility hub is less justified than a 'Rio Grande' perspective that conceives of the Mediterranean as a mobility hollow. Multivariate regression models for network data suggest that geographical distance and, to a lesser extent, political visa regulations, explain the unequal mobility structure better than differences in economic well-being.

AbstractThe Mediterranean is often portrayed as a hub of human mobility. In this article, we test this widespread view by exploring the structure of travel flows in the region over the last two decades (1995–2016). We find that mobility is much higher and increasing more strongly along the northern than along the southern shore, thus creating a growing mobility divide. South–north and north–south movements are even scarcer and stagnate or even decline over time. With a Gini coefficient of .87, mobility flows are distributed extremely unequally across country pairs in the Mediterranean. Community detection algorithms reconfirm that mobility predominantly takes place in disparate clusters around the Mediterranean, not across it. These findings imply that a 'neo‐Braudelian' view of the Mediterranean as a mobility hub is less justified than a 'Rio Grande' perspective that conceives of the Mediterranean as a mobility hollow. Multivariate regression models for network data suggest that geographical distance and, to a lesser extent, political visa regulations, explain the unequal mobility structure better than differences in economic well‐being.

The Mediterranean is often portrayed as a hub of human mobility. In this article, we test this widespread view by exploring the structure of travel flows in the region over the last two decades (1995–2016). We find that mobility is much higher and increasing more strongly along the northern than along the southern shore, thus creating a growing mobility divide. South‐north and north‐south movements are even scarcer and stagnate or even decline over time. With a Gini coefficient of .87, mobility flows are distributed extremely unequally across country pairs in the Mediterranean. Community detection algorithms reconfirm that mobility predominantly takes place in disparate clusters around the Mediterranean, not across it. These findings imply that a 'neo‐Braudelian' view of the Mediterranean as a mobility hub is less justified than a 'Rio Grande' perspective that conceives of the Mediterranean as a mobility hollow. Multivariate regression models for network data suggest that geographical distance and, to a lesser extent, political visa regulations, explain the unequal mobility structure better than differences in economic well‐being.

The Mediterranean is often portrayed as a hub of human mobility. In this article, we test this widespread view by exploring the structure of travel flows in the region over the last two decades (1995–2016). We find that mobility is much higher and increasing more strongly along the northern than along the southern shore, thus creating a growing mobility divide. South‐north and north‐south movements are even scarcer and stagnate or even decline over time. With a Gini coefficient of .87, mobility flows are distributed extremely unequally across country pairs in the Mediterranean. Community detection algorithms reconfirm that mobility predominantly takes place in disparate clusters around the Mediterranean, not across it. These findings imply that a 'neo‐Braudelian' view of the Mediterranean as a mobility hub is less justified than a 'Rio Grande' perspective that conceives of the Mediterranean as a mobility hollow. Multivariate regression models for network data suggest that geographical distance and, to a lesser extent, political visa regulations, explain the unequal mobility structure better than differences in economic well‐being.

Did the election of Donald Trump affect the popularity of the European Union (EU) in Europe? Theoretically, both a positive rally effect (due to a perceived external threat) and a negative domino effect (due to resignation among Europhiles and/or reinforcement among europhobe nationalists) are plausible. We treat Trump's unexpected victory as an external shock and use a Eurobarometer survey that was conducted in all EU-28 member states four days prior to (control group) and six days after the election (treatment group) as source material for a natural experiment. The analysis reveals that the election of Trump caused a significant increase in the EU's popularity in Europe immediately after the election. This "Trump effect" is considerable in size, roughly equivalent to three years of education. Gains in popularity were particularly high among respondents who perceived their country as economically struggling and, surprisingly, among the political right, suggesting that Trump's victory broadened and ideologically diversified the EU's base of support.