Suchergebnisse

As some emerging market economies have amassed large quantities of foreign exchange reserves, concern has arisen over the sterilisation of the domestic money stock from these flows. Existing studies focus mostly on narrow (reserve) money, and estimate a high degree of sterilisation. Empirical work on the long‐run relationship between money and prices emphasises broad money, yet the long‐run effect of foreign exchange inflows on broad money has been almost entirely ignored. Using a sample of quarterly data from 28 countries over the period 1990–2010, it is shown that broad money is sterilised to a significantly smaller degree than reserve money, raising concerns about the implications for financial imbalances and inflation. This pattern of sterilisation is not confined to any particular group of countries and is unrelated to the nature of the flows (e.g. current account versus capital account surpluses). Sterilisation rates have increased in Asia during the recent period of persistent accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.

This paper addresses three questions: (1) what would have been the growth and income trajectory of Syria in the absence of war; (2) given the war, what explains the reduction in economic growth; and (3) what potential growth scenarios for Syria there could be in the aftermath of war. Conflict impact estimates point to negative GDP growth of −12% on average over 2011–2018, with output contracting to about one-third of the 2010 level. In post-conflict simulation scenarios, the growth drivers are affected by the assumed levels of reconstruction assistance, repatriation of refugees, and productivity improvements associated with three political settlement outcomes: a baseline (Sochi-plus) moderate scenario, an optimistic (robust political settlement) scenario, and a pessimistic (de facto balance of power) scenario. Respectively for these scenarios, GDP per capita average growth in the next two decades is projected to be 6.1%, 8.2%, or 3.1%, assuming a final and stable resolution of the conflict.

This paper addresses three questions: 1) what would have been the growth and income trajectory of Syria in the absence of war; 2) given the war, what explains the reduction in economic growth in terms physical capital, labor force, human capital, and productivity; and 3) what potential growth scenarios for Syria there could be in the aftermath of war. Estimates of the impact of conflict point to negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth of -12 percent on average over 2011-18, resulting in a GDP contraction to about one-third of the 2010 level. In post-conflict simulation scenarios, the growth drivers are affected by the assumed levels of reconstruction assistance, repatriation of refugees, and productivity improvements associated with three plausible political settlement outcomes: a baseline (Sochi-plus) moderate scenario, an optimistic (robust political settlement) scenario, and a pessimistic (de facto balance of power) scenario. Respectively for these scenarios, GDP per capita average growth in the next two decades is projected to be 6.1, 8.2, or 3.1 percent, assuming that a final and stable resolution of the conflict is achieved.