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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic is testing parliamentary systems of governance across the world, especially in relation to oversight of executive actions. Observers in multiple jurisdictions have already noted the proliferation of delegated legislation during the pandemic and the shortcomings in legislative oversight of the same. To date, however, no close analysis has been conducted of the way in which legislative oversight mechanisms have broken down during the pandemic. This paper provides such an analysis, using examples from Westminster systems adopting the 'legislative model' of providing extraordinary powers. Looking at individual examples from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the analysis seeks to identify and explain the failures, and relative successes, in different mechanisms for parliamentary oversight, including parliamentary scrutiny committees (pre-existing and ad-hoc), disallowance, and sunset clauses. Although primarily descriptive, the comparative approach analysis permits preliminary conclusions to be drawn as to the way each jurisdiction may improve its methods of parliamentary oversight of delegated legislation. These comparative lessons will be of use both during and beyond the pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic is testing parliamentary systems of governance across the world, especially in relation to oversight of executive actions. Observers in multiple jurisdictions have already noted the proliferation of delegated legislation during the pandemic and the shortcomings in legislative oversight of the same. To date, however, no close analysis has been conducted of the way in which legislative oversight mechanisms have broken down during the pandemic. This paper provides such an analysis, using examples from Westminster systems adopting the'legislative model'of providing extraordinary powers. Looking at individual examples from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the analysis seeks to identify and explain the failures, and relative successes, indifferent mechanisms for parliamentary oversight, including parliamentary scrutiny committees (pre-existing and ad hoc), disallowance, and sunset clauses. Although primarily descriptive, the comparative approach analysis permits preliminary conclusions to be drawn as to the way each jurisdiction may improve its methods of parliamentary oversight of delegated legislation. These comparative lessons will be of use both during and beyond the pandemic.

It is a fundamental feature of parliamentary democracies for parliament to act as a bulwark against executive power so as to ensure the maintenance of the rule of law. In order for parliament to perform its oversight functions, it is imperative that members of parliament enjoy independence from the stranglehold of their political parties while scrutinizing the actions of the executive and deliberating about national issues facing the electorate. In Bangladesh, the founding fathers, in order to avoid the troubling experiences of unprincipled defections of MPs during the past union with Pakistan, which adversely affected the stability of governments, incorporated an anti-defection provision in Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972. However, the anti-defection provision contained in the Constitution in endeavoring to curb unprincipled defections has adversely impacted the independence of MPs by compelling them to blindly comply with the directives of their parties in the Parliament, thereby impeding its competence to act as a check on the powers of the executive. Consequently, the current government of Bangladesh Awami League by dint of Article 70 has persuaded the Parliament to incorporate far-reaching amendments in the Constitution, which in turn have enabled the regime to essentially substitute the rule of law with rule of man in violation of the guarantees contained in the Preamble of the Constitution. Thus, the presence of the anti-defection provision in the Constitution has impeded the institutionalization of the Parliament. Accordingly, this Article puts forward concrete recommendations for liberalizing the anti-defection provision contained in Article 70 in order to ensure the maintenance of an appropriate balance between ensuring the stability of the political system against unprincipled defection and of simultaneously safeguarding the independence of MPs to ensure the accountability of the executive branch of government.