Suchergebnisse

Le linee guida nazionali per la valorizzazione del patrimonio informativo pubblico 2016 recano le indicazioni dell'Agenzia per l'Italia digitale relative all'attuazione della politica di open data. In un contesto caratterizzato dalla scarsa attenzione dei governi per la programmazione e il monitoraggio di questa politica, le nuove indicazioni incidono più sugli aspetti tecnici che su quelli organizzativi del processo di apertura delle basi dati detenute dalle pubbliche amministrazioni. Eppure, gli aspetti organizzativi costituiscono l'ambito su cui è necessario intervenire per conseguire i benefici che gli organismi internazionali associano agli open data. In questo modo l'apertura delle basi dati risulta essere ancora estranea alla politica di trasparenza amministrativa, restando una appendice isolata della politica di digitalizzazione.

L'articolo analizza l'introduzione e l'attuazione di obblighi di pubblicazione in materia di spesa pubblica negli Stati Uniti nel corso dell'ultimo decennio (2006-2016). Viene evidenziato il processo di apprendimento che ha focalizzato l'attuazione degli obblighi di trasparenza non tanto sulla mera disponibilità di informazioni quanto sulla loro qualità assicurata dalla standardizzazione delle basi informative. Nel paragrafo conclusivo l'esperienza statunitense viene comparata con quella italiana in cui solo recentemente è stata posta attenzione alla complessità dell'apertura delle banche dati come condizione dell'efficace attuazione degli obblighi di trasparenza.

This article analyses party patronage transformations in Italy since the early 1990s, a time when political parties and the party system entered a phase of continuing change. It examines how the interaction between the temporality of party system restructuring and historical legacies rooted in the nature of public bureaucracies reproduced patronage practices aimed at capturing state resources. The article employs a historical institutionalist approach as a research framework and concludes that this provides a cogent explanatory argument for the development of state exploitation taken by Italian political parties since the crisis of the early 1990s. Adapted from the source document.

The politicization of the state is a relevant feature of contemporary democracies. At the analytical level, the article contributes to the study of patterns of politicization of the state, distinguishing the concept of patronage from other notions of political particularism often used synonymously in the literature. At the empirical level, the article examines patronage practices in contemporary Italy. It is part of a cross-national qualitative survey that allows the contextualization of the Italian case within a wider set of 15 European democracies for which aggregate comparative data will be presented. The empirical analysis identifies the causal mechanisms that explain why Italy still displays high, albeit decreasing, levels of politicization of the state. Adapted from the source document.

Research in comparative politics has shown a renewed interest in the relation between political parties and the state. However, we know comparatively little about patronage - defined as the power of political parties to distribute public sector posts - as a key dimension of the linkage between political parties and the state. This article, based on comparative empirical evidence on patterns of patronage in 15 European democracies, has two central goals. First, it seeks to empirically evaluate commonalities and differences among European democracies with respect to patronage and its pervasiveness, logic and mechanics. Second, it considers the new light that the empirical analysis sheds on the contemporary explanations of patronage. The empirical analysis suggests that it is the interaction of administrative legacy effects with patterns of party system consolidation and crisis that accounts for the differences in contemporary patronage practices.

Between 2012 and 2018, Spanish public opinion has been shaken by a seemingly endless series of corruption scandals, to the point that corruption has become one of the main long-term concerns of the Spanish population, according to nation-wide surveys. Despite the sharp rise in corruption scandals within local authorities, there are Spanish cities that have managed to limit corruption and build a transparent and efficient government, which stand out as islands of integrity and good governance. This article qualitatively investigates two cities in Spain—Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès—which, despite being in a region with comparatively lower quality of government, have managed to successfully control corruption. We argue that the key to success is the administrative reorganization prompted by the appointment of city managers that institutionalized professional management. Findings also have implications for practitioners, meaning that complex anti-corruption legislative frameworks will not work within an overburdened administration unless the administrative structure is reformed.

Between 2012 and 2018, Spanish public opinion has been shaken by a seemingly endless series of corruption scandals, to the point that corruption has become one of the main long-term concerns of the Spanish population, according to nation-wide surveys. Despite the sharp rise in corruption scandals within local authorities, there are Spanish cities that have managed to limit corruption and build a transparent and efficient government, which stand out as islands of integrity and good governance. This article qualitatively investigates two cities in Spain—Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès—which, despite being in a region with comparatively lower quality of government, have managed to successfully control corruption. We argue that the key to success is the administrative reorganization prompted by the appointment of city managers that institutionalized professional management. Findings also have implications for practitioners, meaning that complex anti-corruption legislative frameworks will not work within an overburdened administration unless the administrative structure is reformed.