Suchergebnisse

Prussia, Germany, and coalition war, 1740-1933 -- Hitler, diplomacy, and coalition warfare -- Desert sands I -- The Balkan interlude -- Barbarossa -- Playing "va banque" -- Disaster at Stalingrad -- Desert sands II -- All fall down -- Germany and coalition warfare.

This article examines the relationship between commanders and chiefs of staff during the period of the Wars of German Unification and the entirety of the Kaiserreich. The practice of pairing up a commander and a chief of staff was one that was specific to Germany. Traditional scholarship holds that in many cases, it was really the chief of staff who did all the thinking, while the commander was nothing more than a front man. The primary example of this was the relationship between Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. The problem is that unthinking historians have projected relationship of this particular duo on the rest of the imperial German army. One of the reasons for this was the presence of members of German royal families in high command positions. This article suggests that first, commanders, including royal family members, were far more influential than their chiefs of staff. In addition, the power wielded by chiefs of staff also reflected the nagging problem of battlefield communications, especially given the limitations of telephone and early wireless radio. Once these difficulties were eliminated by the collapse of the imperial regime, and the development of radio, the power of chiefs of staff was severely curbed by 1939. Thus, the relationship between commanders and chiefs of staff was at best a transitory phenomenon.

In October 1917 the German army and navy were able to mount a successful joint operation to seize the Baltic islands in the Gulf of Riga. Although undertaken by each service for motives of its own, and against disintegrating Russian resistance, Operation Albion was the kind of improvised operation at which the German army in particular excelled. The operation featured an interesting employment of aircraft, and marked about the only time in the First World War where the German army and navy were able to co-operate successfully. The landings secured the islands of Oesel, Moon and Dagö, thus giving the Germans the ability to use the port facilities at Riga. After the war, however, the German military establishment quickly forgot about this operation, and paid little if any attention to it in both its professional military publications and in the Kriegsakademie. Thus Albion was an unlearned lesson for the Germans in the interwar period.