Suchergebnisse

Since the end of WWII, states have formed several international organizations dealing with international peace and security issues. Among them are the Security Council, the Conference on Disarmament, the Arms Trade Treaty regime, and the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Although regional actors, such as Economic Community of West African States, European Union or the Arab League, are at best observers in those international security organizations (ISO), their member states frequently get active on their behalf. This paper examines how regional actors engage in ISO negotiations. It shows that not all regional actors are equally vocal in the negotiations, which is puzzling given that negotiation activity is important for negotiation success. To explain the variance in regional actor vocality, this paper draws on international conflict and cooperation theories and develops hypotheses on activity of regional actors in international negotiations, which are tested with quantitative methods. It is striking that even in the traditionally state-dominated policy field 'security', regional actors are vocal and are, thus, contributing to the creation of international peace architectures. However, the role of regional actors varies, depending on the characteristics of the negotiation arena and of the regional actors themselves.

This book explores the interplay between formal rules and real world differences, questioning to what extent size-related capacities between states matters for the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations taking place in the United Nations General Assembly, an institution that strongly reflects the one-state, one-vote principle

No other study comprehensively analyzes small states in a comparative perspective, examines their activity levels in EU negotiations and outlines which conditions are needed for the effectiveness of a broad range of strategies. An indispensable resource for students and researchers interested in how and under which conditions small states can influence EU policies and which of the small states are most likely to be successful.

Im Zuge einer immer tiefer werdenden Integration hat die Frage nach der Bedeutung der Kommission als dem zentralen supranationalen Akteur im europäischen Institutionengefüge hohe Relevanz. Wie wichtig ist die Europäische Kommission? Wann und unter welchen Bedingungen kann die Europäische Kommission Politikergebnisse substanziell beeinflussen? Wann kann sie bestenfalls die Effizienz von Entscheidungen erhöhen? Die in der Literatur empirisch wie theoretisch diagnostizierte Wirkungstiefe reicht von nahezuer Irrelevanz bis zu maßgebender Einflussnahme auf europäische Politikergebnisse und auf die Entwicklung der europäischen Integration. Dieses Buch zeigt, dass das Gros dieser unterschiedlichen Einschätzungen in den verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätzen selbst wurzelt. In den Interaktionsarenen der Europäischen Union (EU) wird nicht hierachisch entschieden, sondern argumentiert und verhandelt. Dies beeinflusst die Rolle, die die Kommission einnehmen kann. Wird Argumentiert, kann die Kommission durch gute Argumente substanziellen Einfluss ausüben und wird zum supranationalen Entrpreneur. Wird verhandelt, so kann die Kommission mangels formaler Verhandlungsmacht bestenfalls die Effizienz der zwischenstaatlichen Entscheidungsprozesse erhöhen. Die Arbeit zeigt erstens, dass konstruktivistische Arbeiten auf den Interaktionsmodus 'Argumentieren' abstellen und die Bedeutung der Kommission als weitreichend erachten; und zweitens, dass rationalistische Theorien Interaktionen in der EU als 'Verhandeln' konzipieren und daher der Kommission eine geringe Rolle zuschreiben. Darauf aufbauend entwickelt dieses Buch einen theoretischen Brückenschlag zwischen Rationalismus und Konstruktivismus, um die varierende Einflussreichweite der Kommission adäquat zu erfassen. Wann dominiert eher das Argumentieren und wann das Verhandeln? Die Arbeit entwickelt einen Interaktionsansatz, um diese Frage zu beantworten. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass sie Kommission vor allem in frühen Phasen europäischer Entscheidungsprozesse substanziellen Einfluss ausüben kann, vor allem wenn es um die Konstruktion der Situationsstruktur und um die Definition des Problems geht. Hingegen dominiert gegen Ende Verhandeln als Interaktionsmodi. Hier ist der Einfluss der Kommission auf das Erhöhen von Effizienz begrenzt, da sie keine formelle Verhandlungsmacht besitzt. Darüberhinaus kann die Kommission versuchen, sich selbst in späteren Interaktionsphasen Gelegenheitsfenster für das Argumentieren zu schaffen, etwa in dem sie auf gemeinsame europäische Ideen abstellt.

Cooperation in regional international organizations (RIOs) can help member states to work toward and perhaps achieve policy goals that would not be feasible unilaterally. Thus, RIOs might be used as a means of states to compensate for domestic shortcomings in output performance. Do states equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to compensate corresponding domestic performance shortcomings? The analysis of a novel database on policy competencies of 76 RIOs between 1945 and 2015 reveals that usually RIOs are not usually used as window-dressing devices by which states disguise limited domestic output performance. Instead, governments tend to equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to further strengthen their already good output performance in most policy areas. However, in the policy area, 'energy' states tend to confer more competencies to their respective RIOs, the worse they perform domestically, indicating that output-related compensation dynamics might be at play in this field.

Cooperation in regional international organizations (RIOs) can help member states to work toward and perhaps achieve policy goals that would not be feasible unilaterally. Thus, RIOs might be used as a means of states to compensate for domestic shortcomings in output performance. Do states equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to compensate corresponding domestic performance shortcomings? The analysis of a novel database on policy competencies of 76 RIOs between 1945 and 2015 reveals that usually RIOs are not usually used as window-dressing devices by which states disguise limited domestic output performance. Instead, governments tend to equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to further strengthen their already good output performance in most policy areas. However, in the policy area, 'energy' states tend to confer more competencies to their respective RIOs, the worse they perform domestically, indicating that output-related compensation dynamics might be at play in this field.

States address many of today's global problems in international organizations (IOs). At the same time, regional international organizations (RIOs) play important roles in IOs, as a series of case studies suggests. RIO member states can speak on behalf of an RIO in IO negotiations. This paper explores under what conditions states voice RIO positions instead of national ones in IOs and thereby turn into agents of regionalization. Based on a novel dataset of more than 500 international negotiations and a quantitative analysis of theory-guided International Relations hypotheses, this paper shows that states are increasingly likely to negotiate on behalf of an RIO, when they regard grouping positions into regional blocs in IO negotiations as more effective, when they have a formal role as RIO chair, and when they possess financial and staff capacities needed in order to voice a regional position in international negotiations.

Cooperation in regional international organizations (RIOs) can help member states to work toward and perhaps achieve policy goals that would not be feasible unilaterally. Thus, RIOs might be used as a means of states to compensate for domestic shortcomings in output performance. Do states equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to compensate corresponding domestic performance shortcomings? The analysis of a novel database on policy competencies of 76 RIOs between 1945 and 2015 reveals that usually RIOs are not usually used as window-dressing devices by which states disguise limited domestic output performance. Instead, governments tend to equip RIOs with policy competencies in order to further strengthen their already good output performance in most policy areas. However, in the policy area, 'energy' states tend to confer more competencies to their respective RIOs, the worse they perform domestically, indicating that output-related compensation dynamics might be at play in this field.

Abstract
The political regulation of the economy takes place on domestic, regional and international levels. Often, states are members of regional and international organizations (ROs and IOs) with competencies in the economic realm. This study explores the effects of such overlaps in membership and policy focus, and examines negotiations in economic Ios. It studies the phenomenon of states being drivers of regionalization of international negotiations. This analysis reveals that states make a conscious choice to influence regionalization of international economic policies. States with strong export sectors and strong economies are more inclined to act on behalf of their RO in international economic negotiations. Apart from incentives, capacities also matter. States need to have domestic and diplomatic capacities to become active in Ios in the first place.

States address many of today's global problems in international organizations (IOs). At the same time, regional international organizations (RIOs) play important roles in IOs, as a series of case studies suggests. RIO member states can speak on behalf of an RIO in IO negotiations. This paper explores under what conditions states voice RIO positions instead of national ones in IOs and thereby turn into agents of regionalization. Based on a novel dataset of more than 500 international negotiations and a quantitative analysis of theory-guided International Relations hypotheses, this paper shows that states are increasingly likely to negotiate on behalf of an RIO, when they regard grouping positions into regional blocs in IO negotiations as more effective, when they have a formal role as RIO chair, and when they possess financial and staff capacities needed in order to voice a regional position in international negotiations.