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Abstract
Atrocities do not happen in a vacuum and incitement to discrimination, hostility, and violence is one of their main drivers – offline and now online. But states continue to disagree about how to deal with inciting speech. Under international law, there is much debate about whether obligations to prohibit incitement, such as the one found in Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, applies universally to all states. This article finds common ground in the overlooked human right to be free from incitement to discrimination, reflected in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and binding on all states under customary international law. It gives rise to common but differentiated responsibilities to refrain from and protect individuals and groups from different forms of incitement. In the digital age, this right can be protected by a range of online content governance measures that this article explores.

Introduction -- Legality and fair labelling at stake -- The principle of legality in international law -- The principle of fair labelling in international law -- The retroactive application of the Rome Statute explained -- The existing views on the retroactive application of the Rome Statute -- The nature of the Rome Statute -- Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and the Application of Criminal Law in accordance with 'internationally recognized Human Rights' -- Conclusion.

Introduction -- Legality and fair labelling at stake -- The principle of legality in international law -- The principle of fair labelling in international law -- The retroactive application of the Rome Statute explained -- The existing views on the retroactive application of the Rome Statute -- The nature of the Rome Statute -- Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute and the Application of Criminal Law in accordance with 'internationally recognized Human Rights' -- Conclusion.

ABSTRACT
The principle of legality is one of the most fundamental principles of domestic and international criminal law. It features in some of the most prominent human rights instruments, and its application has been scrutinised by various human rights courts and international criminal tribunals. One of the principal tests used to check compliance with that principle measures the accessibility and foreseeability of the criminal law at the time of the conduct. Yet a close analysis of this test reveals a number of fundamental flaws that seem to have escaped the eyes of most commentators and practitioners. These have led to outcomes of dubious legality. In this article, I argue that those problems are serious enough to justify a revision or a substitution of that test for one which is more in line with the rationales and dictates of the legality principle.

On 17 July 2018, in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC, the Court), the jurisdiction of the Court was finally activated for the crime of aggression, following a decision made by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) in December 2017. This resulted from a long and painstaking process which not only furthered the divide between states parties and non-parties but also generated controversy within the ASP itself. In an attempt to reach a minimum common denominator, the ASP decided to exclude from the ICC's jurisdiction situations involving states parties that have not ratified the amendments in respect of that crime ('the Kampala Amendments'). Moreover, since the adoption of the Amendments in 2010, it has been agreed that the ICC will not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression if committed by nationals or on the territory of non-states parties, except when there is a Security Council referral. This combination of jurisdictional hurdles has led many to believe that the crime of aggression will have a limited role to play before the ICC. Nonetheless, a closer look at the Activation Decision, the Kampala Amendments and certain key provisions of the ICC Statute reveals that the activation of the crime of aggression might have a series of overlooked implications for non-parties and parties alike, including those that have not ratified the amendments. In particular, this article will argue that, aside from Security Council referrals, there may still be instances where the Court can apply the crime of aggression to situations involving those states.

Abstract
With a long history in international law, the concept of due diligence has recently gained traction in the cyber context, as a promising avenue to hold states accountable for harmful cyber operations originating from, or transiting through, their territory, in the absence of attribution. Nonetheless, confusion surrounds the nature, content and scope of due diligence. It remains unclear whether it is a general principle of international law, a self-standing obligation or a standard of conduct, and whether there is a specific rule requiring diligent behaviour in cyberspace. This has created an 'all-or-nothing' discourse: either states have agreed to a rule or principle of 'cyber due diligence', or no obligation to behave diligently would exist in cyberspace. We propose to shift the debate from label to substance, asking whether states have duties to protect other states and individuals from cyber harms. By revisiting traditional cases, as well as surveying recent state practice, we contend that – whether or not there is consensus on 'cyber due diligence' – a patchwork of different protective obligations already applies, by default, in cyberspace. At their core is a flexible standard of diligent behaviour requiring states to take reasonable steps to prevent, halt and/or redress a range of online harms.

While disease outbreaks remain to a certain extent unforeseeable, international law provides a comprehensive legal framework requiring States to prevent their harmful consequences, effectively respond to ensuing health emergencies, and cooperate in achieving those aims. This contribution shows that, within this framework, many rules take the form of 'due diligence' obligations. Obligations of due diligence, albeit inherently flexible to accommodate different capabilities and circumstances, are binding on States. They impose a duty to act according to a standard of 'good governance': a State must employ its best efforts to realise certain common goals. At least five key sets of rules establishing due diligence duties are relevant to the Covid-19 outbreak: a) the 'no-harm' principle; b) international disaster law; c) the International Health Regulations; d) international human rights law; and e) international humanitarian law. We preliminarily identify some of the actions required from States to prevent new outbreaks and respond to the pandemic, whilst assessing compliance with applicable rules. We conclude that hard lessons learned during the current crisis should spur more decisive action to prevent and address future public health emergencies.

A key reform that has the potential to make the international criminal justice project stronger,more efficient and more effective is the consideration of peace negotiations as an additional factor in the Prosecutor's decision of whether or not to pursue an investigation or prosecution 'in the interests of justice', in accordance with Article 53(1)(c) and 2(c) of the Rome Statute. At present, this would require a revision of the Policy Papers issued on this question, in particular, the 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations and the 2007 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice. Significantly, such reform has the potential to prevent or alleviate, at least in part, some of the most pressing problems encountered by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), namely, the lack of state cooperation, limited budget, and lengthy or complex proceedings. ; The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement No 340956 - IOW - The Individualisation of War: Reconfiguring the Ethics, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict.

Abstract
In late 2020, news surfaced about one of the most extensive attacks on an information technology (IT) supply chain to date. Hackers exploited a vulnerability in the update system of Orion, a network-monitoring and management software developed by the company SolarWinds. Malicious code embedded in Orion updates created a backdoor into the systems used by numerous private and public entities. This backdoor was then used to insert additional malware into affected systems – in particular, spyware to exfiltrate confidential or sensitive data. Considering both the importance of preserving the integrity of IT supply chains and the diverse risks of harm that attacks such as the SolarWinds hack give rise to, this article examines this cyber operation according to the relevant rules of international law – notably those on sovereignty, non-intervention, general due diligence duties and international human rights law. It concludes that the operation may have been illegal on multiple fronts.