Suchergebnisse

The paper investigates how states manage multiple rivalries when faced with immediate threats. We argue that accommodation of one rival allows states to shift resources from the management of another rival to deal with the costs of immediate threats. By examining enduring rivalries from 1966 to 1999, we show that states' reliance on accommodation in response to threats varies depending on the number of severe threats and the relative capabilities between the states and the threat-issuing rivals. Findings show that when faced with severe but few threats, states prefer to accommodate rivals that did not issue the threat. They are also more likely to give larger concessions to such rivals and to those issuing less severe threats. Finally, the greater the military capability of a rival issuing a severe threat relative to that of the challenged state, the more likely that a threatening rival is accommodated. Adapted from the source document.

The objectives of the study were to explain why some interstate rivalries recur while others remain terminated. We argue that the recurrence is largely contingent on the congruence between the first rivalry's military outcome and the resulting political settlement as well as the intensity of the original rivalry. Our hypotheses are tested using a data set of interstate rivalries from 1816 to 2001. We use a logistic regression to examine which rivalries recur. As a robustness check, we use an event history model to test the effect of factors that change after the initial rivalry. Our results indicated that a rivalry with an incongruent termination is nearly three times more likely to recur than one where the settlement reflects the preceding outcome, and more intense rivalries recur more than twice as frequently as their less intense counterparts. Whether a rivalry recurs is strongly conditioned by how it concludes, and not by later events after the initial termination. Adapted from the source document.

ObjectiveThe objectives of the study were to explain why some interstate rivalries recur while others remain terminated. We argue that the recurrence is largely contingent on the congruence between the first rivalry's military outcome and the resulting political settlement as well as the intensity of the original rivalry.MethodsOur hypotheses are tested using a data set of interstate rivalries from 1816 to 2001. We use a logistic regression to examine which rivalries recur. As a robustness check, we use an event history model to test the effect of factors that change after the initial rivalry.ResultsOur results indicated that a rivalry with an incongruent termination is nearly three times more likely to recur than one where the settlement reflects the preceding outcome, and more intense rivalries recur more than twice as frequently as their less intense counterparts.ConclusionWhether a rivalry recurs is strongly conditioned by how it concludes, and not by later events after the initial termination.

Once the Cold War ended, the international community expanded the mandates given to its peace operations. Traditional thinking suggests that this trend occurred because of an increase in the number and a shift in the type of conflicts prevalent in the international system. This "demand side" explanation argues that as predominant conflict in the system changes from interstate to intrastate, the tasks shift accordingly from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Despite the persistence of this argument, no systematic studies exist that empirically test its validity. Considering conflict and peace operation patterns since 1945, we analyze whether conflict occurrence, conflict type, negotiated agreements, and international intervention changed fundamentally after the Cold War. We find that patterns of interstate and intrastate conflicts provide some limited support for this demand side argument, but the greatest support comes from the proliferation of negotiated agreements that terminate conflicts, in which disputants often request peacebuilding assistance.

Most efforts in international relations scholarship focus on understanding war and conflict. To the extent that peace is considered, it is often treated as an afterthought or a control condition. In this paper, we construct a five-level scale of dyadic peace. We then operationalize the scale using indicators suggested by different scholarly literatures as well as measures derived from case studies. Further, we advocate the use of "anchor cases" and pair-wise comparisons to code dyadic peace in non-rivalry periods. We conclude with a pilot study of the scale, as applied to pairs of states over the period From 1816 to 2006.

In this study, we look at the relationship of arms races to war, with appropriate consideration of rivalries. Are arms races more common in rivalries than in lesser competitions? Are they merely a consequence of rivalry competitions? How do the patterns of arms races map with those of war in rivalries? We explore these concerns with an empirical examination of rivalry and non-rivalry populations in the 1816–2000 period. In brief, we find that: arms races occur most frequently in the context of enduring rivalries; arms races are more likely in the middle and later stages of rivalry; the frequency of arms races is higher in rivalries with war than rivalries that do not experience war; and only when arms races occur in the later phases of rivalries is there an increased chance of war. Our study narrows the scope of the arms race–war relationship relative to past studies, demonstrating that the arms race–war relationship is conditional on rivalry processes.

Introduces a special journal issue on "The Spread of War, 1914-1917.". Adapted from the source document.