Suchergebnisse

Abstracts
After the Napoleonic Wars interstate war regularly occurred throughout the Western Hemisphere—until in matter of decades it disappeared. After the 1930s even low-level militarized interstate conflict became less frequent, shorter, and less severe over time. What explains the change in this specific region and historical jucture? We argue that leaders in the Americas identified territorial disputes and foreign intervention as interrelated problems that frequently caused the interstate war. In response, they developed a unique regional norm-complex that bundled together the norms of territorial integrity and non-intervention with the principle of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm complex emerged via Latin American entrepreneurship shortly after independence, cascaded with Pan-Americanism, and crystallized around the signature of the Saavedra Lamas Treaty in the early 1930s. We explain how, why, and when norm complexes develop. We then investigate the evolution and effects of the Latin American norm complex via statistics and within-case counterfactuals. We conclude that interstate war disappeared from the Americas with the acceptance and codification of this norm-complex.

AbstractWhy do some territorial disputes defy settlement? Through what mechanism might these resistant territorial disputes be settled? We propose that the answer involves three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the dispute must receive attention—i.e., be (re)placed and (re)prioritized on the dyad's agenda. Second, governments need altered preferences that expand the bargaining range so they can break deadlock and pursue settlement. Finally, disputing states need third-party assistance to facilitate, locate, incentivize, and support a settlement of their protracted dispute. We test this "AAA Model" in post–World War II Latin America. To do this, we first theorize the particular form of the general model; in post–1945 Latin America, attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance operate through the mechanisms of militarization, democratization, and mediation respectively. We then identify resistant territorial disputes and advance a novel, multimethod research design to evaluate our hypotheses—one that relies more heavily on within-case counterfactual analysis. An extensive series of these counterfactual analyses, along with a statistical analysis, produce consistent, significant support for our model. When resistant territorial disputes in post–1945 Latin America have attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance simultaneously, they always settle; when they lack any one factor, however, settlement never occurs.

Why do some territorial disputes defy settlement? Through what mechanism might these resistant territorial disputes be settled? We propose that the answer involves three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, the dispute must receive attention—i.e., be (re)placed and (re)prioritized on the dyad's agenda. Second, governments need altered preferences that expand the bargaining range so they can break deadlock and pursue settlement. Finally, disputing states need third-party assistance to facilitate, locate, incentivize, and support a settlement of their protracted dispute. We test this "AAA Model" in post–World War II Latin America. To do this, we first theorize the particular form of the general model; in post–1945 Latin America, attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance operate through the mechanisms of militarization, democratization, and mediation respectively. We then identify resistant territorial disputes and advance a novel, multimethod research design to evaluate our hypotheses—one that relies more heavily on within-case counterfactual analysis. An extensive series of these counterfactual analyses, along with a statistical analysis, produce consistent, significant support for our model. When resistant territorial disputes in post–1945 Latin America have attention, altered preferences, and third-party assistance simultaneously, they always settle; when they lack any one factor, however, settlement never occurs.

This research note summarizes version 3.0 of the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data set, which covers the geographic proximity of all directly contiguous states in the international system during the period 1816-2000. After a brief discussion of the role that geographic proximity plays in international relations, the coding rules and procedures used for this data set are reviewed. The changes and additions to this updated version of the data are then explained. This note concludes with a basic statistical summary of the updated data set

This research note summarizes version 3.0 of the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data set, which covers the geographic proximity of all directly contiguous states in the international system during the period 1816-2000. After a brief discussion of the role that geographic proximity plays in international relations, the coding rules & procedures used for this data set are reviewed. The changes & additions to this updated version of the data are then explained. This note concludes with a basic statistical summary of the updated data set. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.